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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EXILE:
KARL MARX AND THE JEWISH QUESTION OF OUR TIMES
MAY 19 88
DENNIS K. FISCHMAN, B.A., YALE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Jerome King
Karl Marx's philosophy of writing demands his
readers help develop his theory by questioning its gaps
and contradictions. A crucial question concerns Marx's
relation to his Jewishness.
In "On the Jewish Question," Judaism stands for civil
society and the transformative power of practical need,
Christianity for the "political state" and spiritual
solutions to material problems. Human emancipation will
spring not from politics but "the negation of Judaism":
recognizing and overcoming barriers to fully human
existence.
Marx thus endorses a "Jewish" viewpoint which senses
reality as the Hebrew bible does. The Torah conceives
human beings in dialogue with God as indispensible
partners in creating the world. We are called to act;
our action matters. Marx criticizes the Greeks and most
Western philosophers for their static, contemplative view
iv
of reality. Any ontology which imposes a truth beyond
social relations privileges some people and needs,
excluding others. By rejecting God
, Marx discredits the
God's-eye view that leads to false universals. He
retains the structure of dialogue between the species and
its evolving needs.
Hegel had offered the young Marx a dialectical
approach to reality, but Marx eventually found Hegel's
ontology too Greek. Rather than simply reversing Hegel,
though, Marx corrects him as though he were subject to a
Jewish worldview. Marx's method resembles the traditional
Jewish style of hermeneutics called midrash
. It performs
the same function: restoring sense to a chaotic world as
glimpsed from a particular tradition.
The breakdown of social meaning is central to Marx's
theory of alienation. The Jewish theme of exile explains
Marx's urgency. A group is exiled when society constructs
reality to preclude it from expressing or acting upon the
needs that constitute its identity. A society in exile
frustrates the realization of human purposes. Both
workers and capitalist society are exiled. To return,
they must believe the world can become human—as their
experience under capitalism shows it cannot.
Marx's personal exile is that his audience lacks the
Jewish context to recognize his theory of how we become
free. Theorists continue his work by listening to people
in exile and working out different roads to emancipation.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose, playfully, as a kind of parlor game, one
tried to answer the question, "what single phrase of
Karl Marx's tells us most about his life and thought?"
The reply for which I would hold out comes not from
Capita1
'
nor The Communist Manifesto
, nor any of his work
the public and scholars know best. I would point to a
letter Marx wrote to his son-in-law Paul Lafargue in 1882,
one year before he died. in that note, he gibes, "What is
certain is that I am no Marxist." 1
What did Marx mean by this extraordinary statement?
Even before making itself understood, it displays the
man's abiding love of paradox—his irresistible pull
towards ironic formulations and his fascination with
contradictory realities'. Once in context, the remark
speaks of another, perhaps less endearing trait: his
biting sarcasm. For the "Marxists" he puts at a distance
are his would-be disciples, the leaders of the workers'
movement in France, whom he disowns because of their
reformist and anarchist leanings. The old lion devours
the young whelps. To a theorist who is also a revolu-
tionary, his followers must be his most prized
possessions, since only through their efforts can his
goals be expressed in practice. Yet incredibly, one can
1
2hear "the cutting disdain with which he pronounced the
word bourgeois" 2 ringing through Marx's sneer at "Marxists."
Granted that Marx never took political disagreements
lightly. Although a dot.ing father and a loving (if
unfaithful) husband, over his ideological opponents he
often sat as a grim and implacable judge, pursuing them
relentlessly in polemic after polemic. Still, I would
argue, Marx's declaration "I am no Marxist" is there to
teach us something crucial about his theory and our
relation to it.
Without relinquishing its immediate message, we could
proceed nevertheless to read this remark very differently.
If we chose, we could hear Marx repudiating with this
statement, not only those particular interpreters, but
all the copyists and critics who would try in later years
to make "Marxism" into a system. His continual revisions
are as much a part of Marx's writings as the texts them-
selves. "I find unsatisfactory a work written four weeks
before and rewrite it completely," he observes. This is
no mere quirk, no annoying personal tic: it is a
philosophy of writing. "It is self-evident," he writes,
"that an author, if he [sic] pursues his research,
cannot publish literally what he has written six months
3previously." The passage of time, Marx presumes, brings
change and growth, to the writer if s/he is fortunate; to
3the text, always. The meaning of what is written lies
always in the future.
If we pursue this line of thought, we can read none
of Marx's many books and essays as a finished work. Each
refers to the next, to all the others, and to works he
never lived to write or (perhaps) even to imagine. Just
as he labored over Hegel, Feuerbach, and Ricardo, looking
for questions that demanded to be asked and riddles
crying out to be resolved, so, too, did Marx exploit his
own work as a mother lode of gaps and contradictions
awaiting further inquiry. Writing his work, Marx also
read it; writing new texts, he read through and beyond
old ones. Thus, Marx is no "Marxist." But those of his
readers who codify his thinking, whether as votaries or
heretics, are. And they have not learned all Marx has
to teach.
An amusing piece of wordplay, but... is this any way
to draw conclusions about Marx's theory? Even for the
sentence in question, we have one perfectly sound
explanation already: a political disagreement between
Marx and the French socialists. Did he mean anything
else by it? We have no obvious reason to think so.
After all, it takes an enormous leap of the imagination
to read one flippant comment as a theory in brief; besides,
it requires setting the actual circumstances or context
4of the remark to one side. Above all, even if Marx
considers his work as open-ended, self-referential,
meaningful totality, is he right to do so? Does any
theorist have the right to set down the standard by
which his or her own work shall be judged? Unless we
treat Marx's theory as a set of positions taken, how can
we come to terms with it at all?
These are serious questions indeed--perhaps
, too
serious. By any chance, might we entertain the possi-
bility of ignoring them? I think there are good reasons
for us willingly to suspend our disbelief in the validity
of the reading we have pursued so far. For one, it is
simply not true that we discovered Marx's philosophy of
writing in the phrase "I am not a Marxist" alone. That
would have been impossible. In order even to think of
connecting them, we first had to become aware of Marx's
work habits and publishing history and his way of
approaching his own and other people's previous writings,
and regard them as a problem. At the same time, we had
to come to wonder what in the world "I am not a Marxist"
means, coming from Marx. Only that initial noticing and
wondering could move us to join the perplexing phrase to
the odd theoretical attitude in order to search for their
shared interpretation. We did not explain "I am not a
Marxist" by a previously known theory, nor did we prove
the existence of the theory by the single citation.
Instead, we groped about for a way into Marx's thinking
that would let us make sense of both, together. Finding
that way in, our next step should be to travel it back
through the dense undergrowth of Marx's theory in general
to see whether it can lead us to an understanding of that
theory at least as clear and convincing as any other
approach. There is nothing strange in this procedure: it
is a variant of the famous hermeneutic circle, with the
difference that we start by puzzling over what we do not
understand about the text rather than clarifying what
, 4
we do
.
Suppose we do go ahead and make the attempt to apply
our tentative insight to the task of understanding Marx.
Inevitably, at the same time we inquire, "Is this really
how Marx conceived of what he was doing?", we will be
asking and framing a definite opinion on the related
question, "Was he right?" For if Marx can plausibly be
thought to have intended to include future developments
of his theory in the theory itself, then his intention is
part of the theory. To disregard that intention (as
distinct from disbelieving it) would be to commit a
breach of faith. If we come to affirm that Marx did
regard his work as stretching into the future, beyond the
printed page, then we would have to treat that self-
6definition as a kind of "performative utterance": i.e.,
it does what it says it does. When an authorized
official says, "I now pronounce you man and wife," it makes
no sense to ask if s/he is telling the truth. 5 Similarly,
if Marx intends that we readers should get caught on the
surface irregularities of his theory, not plane them down
to a smooth superficiality, how can we legitimately do
otherwise? To read Marx literally is to falsity him. in
order to read him truly, we must lend him the use of our
imaginations
.
In his recent work on Marx's critique of culture,
Louis Dupre urges a similar approach. He writes:
But the lasting effectiveness of Marx's analysis
invites us to an active dialogue. This distinguisheshim from past figures whose impact has long been
absorbed by our culture. Descartes steered modern
thought in a new direction, but he has ceased to
inspire cultural innovation. Marx's critique
continues to challenge our attitudes today. He
remains a living partner in the sociocultural
discussion. But precisely on that ground he demands
to be treated as a contemporary—that is, critically
rather than deferentially. 6
Certainly, this philosophy of writing we have
ascribed to Marx grants an incomparable advantage to his
social and political theory over against the more
straitened formulations of other thinkers. By accepting
it, we agree to "learn from" Karl Marx not only what he
7teaches us explicitly, but anything we infer or invent
to make sense of his teachings. In return, Marx becomes
extraordrnarily vulnerable. On the same assumptions, he
has no choice but to bend to any plausible construction
with which we burden his theory. There are limits, of
course, both to our license and to our debt, his obl lgation
and his claim to respect. An argument can oppose Marx's
logic instead of restoring it, clash with his themes, not
harmonize with them. The burden of proof shifts-it falls
on those who would narrow the orbit of Marx's teachings-
but it is not done away with altogether. stil]
, the
boundaries of Marx's theory, just as its persuasiveness,
finally remain a matter of judgment, not proof. They are
"essentially contestable," and so each person's decision
where they lie is intimately related to her or his
identity and concerns in a way that argument alone is
unlikely to change. 8
In this essay, then, I will explore the social and
political theory of Karl Marx from a non- "Marxist
"
perspective. That means, practically speaking, that I will
start out from one of the many unsolved riddles about
Marx's thought and try to read through and beyond it, as
he might have, in order to learn where the theory has to
go next. Now, there is no more obscure question about his
theory than its relation to his Jewish background. Jews
and Judaism obviously provide a potent symbol for the
organization of Marx's political thinking. It is to the
on
own
"Jewish question" Marx turns when he announces his break
with Left Hegelianism, and again when he renews his fire
at Bruno Bauer in The Holy Family
. m the succinctly
worded theses, on Feuerbach, Marx takes the time to chide
his opponent for considering practical activity "only in
its dirty-judaical manifestation." 9 Overt references to
Judaism are fewer in his later writings, yet on careful
reading even Capital exhibits the stance Marx earlier
identified as "Jewish": the assertion of present human
need against the claims of philosophical idealism that it
had already made humanity free.
Yet studies of Marx tend to deny any relation
between Marx's Jewishness and his theory. Saul Padover
offers the most simplistic account: Marx was an anti-
semite; therefore, he could not have learned anything from
Judaism. "Marx's hatred of Jews was a canker which
neither time nor experience ever eradicated from his
soul." 10 it "reflected nearly total ignorance, possibly
willful, of the lives and faith of the people from whom
he descended." 11 I will demonstrate (in chapter 1) that
Marx is nothing like a simple antisemite, that his
attitude is much more ambivalent than it seems, and that
on the whole he comes out supporting the claims of
Judaism against those of Christianity. All this, however,
is somewhat beside the point. Antisemitism in no way
9precludes learning rrom the Jewish tradition, especially
in tne case of internalized antisemitism on the part of
one who was born into that tradition. The really
interesting question would be: how did Marx's conflicted
relationship to his own Jewishness affect the manner of
his learning from Jewish thought?
This is where more serious objections arise. David
McLellan offers one. According to him, marginality, not
Jewishness, was the element of Marx's background which
shaped his theory. "Marx was all the more predisposed to
take a critical look at society as he came from a milieu
that was necessarily excluded from complete social partici-
12pation." A stress on the outsider status of German Jews
in the nineteenth century tends to downplay the signif-
icance of the content of Jewish identity, and this is
McLellan* s intention. He contends that Marx shows
"virtually no sign of Jewish self
-consciousness in his
published writings or in his private letters." 13
Some students of Marx believe they have found the
key to Marx's whole system of ideas in his rabbinic
ancestry; but although some of his ideas—and even
life-style— ~* — u~*.i - j— J - tJ —
this traditi<
intellectual
to reduce Ma:
Shlomo Avineri roots Marx's theory firmly in one
specific part of the "Western intellectual heritage,"
namely "his Hegelian antecedents." Hegel's philosophy,
10
s
ie
argues Avineri, is "a unique synthesis between the
theological traditions of the Judeo-Christian [sic] world
and the intellectual achievements of the Enlightenment." 15
In order to grant any importance whatever to Marx'
Jewishness, Avineri first demands a solution to "th<
problem of Marx's own awareness of those specific
traditions held responsible for his own views." 16 Avineri
and McLellan represent a widely-held orthodoxy as to the
irrelevance of Judaism to Marx's theory. 17 They would
undoubtedly endorse the following summary by a sociologist
of religion.
Marx was not a Jew in any religious, national, or
cultural sense. He knew nothing about Judaism and
showed no interest in the subject. Nor did he
"inherit" any rabbinic or talmudic qualities or
properties. These are acquired skills, no more
transmitted by birth than a knowledge of philosophy
or geology would be.l 8
As literary theorist Susan Handelman writes, "To try
to prove that a Jewish background has some influence on
even the most avowedly secular Jews is a difficult and
19
complicated task." I shall not attempt it here, even
though I believe (and will show in chapter 1) that the
"irrelevance" argument is much overstated. Instead of
tracing influence, though, I will outline the structural
affinities between Marx's thought and the worldview of the
Jewish tradition. Marx's ontology, I suggest in chapters
2 and 3, makes much more sense read through the particular
11
notions of being and becoming, space and time which
animate the Hebrew bible. His peculiar use of language
(what Bertell oilman, after Vilfredo Pareto, calls "words
that appear like bats") 20 likewise seems almost familiar in
a Hebraic context.
In chapter 4, I view Marx's philosophy of writing in
light of midrash, the classic Jewish style of hermeneutics.
In both these cases, the purpose of the comparison goes
beyond mere coincidence towards the discovery of new
meaning. My assumption is that it makes a difference if
we find that Marx's theory becomes richer in the matrix of
the Jewish tradition than in the Greco-Christian tradition
of philosophy taken alone. The difference that it makes
becomes clear in our changed conception of Marx's overall
project. Chapter 5 attempts to reconstruct that project,
drawing on the added understanding that an acquaintance
with the plotline of the biblical narrative (with its
themes of exile and return and its Messianic promise)
bestows. Finally, in the conclusion, I consider how we,
today, must reinterpret Marx's task in order to fulfill it.
Just to be clear: when I suggest certain elements of
Jewish thought can serve us as an appropriate context in
which to read Marx, I do not wish to deny the interpretive
usefulness of other approaches. The way we will take here,
though, is practically unexplored. To pursue it, we may
12
find ourselves far afield, even temporarily out of sight
of the well-trodden paths of Marx scholarship. That need
not bother us. We know the way back, and we can leave it
for later, by the hearth's glow at the end of the journey,
to try to trace the routes on the same map. For now, we
must simply follow our own trail.
Nor need we stumble on the mistaken notion that if
an idea of Marx's is not solely or exclusively Jewish, we
cannot read it in the context of the Jewish tradition.
Part of what it means to participate in a tradition is to
be sensitive to how one part of that tradition comments on
and is enriched by all the others. ideas are not free
agents. We understand their content and their signifi-
cance in relation to the complex of other thoughts and
themes in which we are accustomed to finding them. If we
decide to relate Marx's writings to Jewish thought, we
open ourselves to a whole world of allusions and associ-
ations, and we begin to make out an already ongoing
conversation in which old statements may resonate with
new meanings. The question for us is not whether Marx
wants to be a part of this conversation, but whether
we do
.
One more caveat: when I propose to explore the
structural affinities between Marx's thinking and Jewish
thought, I am not subscribing to any of the rival
13
"structuralist" or
"post-structuralisms" which have
recently deluged social theory. As x understand Marx,
dichotomies like "structure vs. event" or "form vs.
content" have little help to offer n° *P ° rt us m engaging with him.
As for the tack I am taking here, a non- "Marxist
"
approach to Marx through the question of his relation to
Judaism, it leads immediately towards two potential dangers:
misreading Judaism to make it foreshadow Marx or misreading
Marx to make him somehow more Jewish. With respect to the
first, presenting a living religious culture as an ideology,
to some extent limitations of scope make this unavoidable.
To compensate, whenever relevant, I will differentiate
among movements and periods in Jewish history. I will try
at all times to indicate when I am offering a controversial
perspective on Jewish belief, whether that perspective is
my own, Marx's, or belongs to someone else. Yet contro-
versy is an integral part of the Jewish tradition, and
innovations can sometimes claim the authority of something
"already told to Moses at Sinai "--even mine.
As for the opposite danger, what McLellan calls
"reduc [ing] Marx's idea to a secularized Judaism, I confess
I do not see how exactly it could be done. Certainly, it
is no part of my intention; indeed, it runs directly
counter to a crucial feature of my interpretation. For
I understand Marx as a political thinker in exile : a man
14
trying to express the truths of one reality in the
language, the concepts, the grammar of another. Caught
between what can be done... and what must be, misunder-
standing his own predicament, compelled to write, fated not
to be heard, Marx never found himself a home in either
philosophy or Jewish thought. His work remains unfinished,
a legacy to generations of seekers. if we attempt to
recover the meanings of Marx's thought which only emerge
from the context of the Jewish tradition, it is not to
simplify his project, but rather to elaborate it for the
purpose of taking it up anew.
To quote the most subtle of his biographers:
Karl Marx was not merely a revolutionary, a
theorist of socialism, or a figure in the history
of economic or political theory. He was—and
remains—an exemplary presence in the development
of modern consciousness, whose significance is not
exhausted by the truth or falsity of the specific
doctrines he propounded. His life exemplifies the
link that joins thought to action, and the gap
that separates them. 21
Because in modernity, we live our lives in the midst
of that divide, struggling to forge that link: because we,
too, are strangers in a land not our own, our dialogue
with Marx goes on.
CHAPTER ONE
FOUR JEWISH QUESTIONS ABOUT MARX
Anyone who has seriously studied Marx has read the
essay "On the Jewish Question," perhaps only once, or
perhaps too often. whether one time or many, we have been
taught to read it in a special way that an innocent reader
would never think of alone. This peculiar consensus echoes
in the words of David McLellan when the writes that the
"central problem" of "On the Jewish Question" is "the
contemporary separation of the state from civil society and
the consequent failure of liberal politics to solve social
questions." 1 Louis Dupre defines the essay's theme this
way
:
Attacking Bauer's proposal of total secularization
as the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany,
Marx claimed that the secular, democratic state is
tne modern version of the religious illusion. It
maintains the same relation of apparent dominance
and real subservience to civil society which exists
between the religious sphere and the profane world.
2
Both these writers agree that the liberal notion of
freedom is Marx's real target in "On the Jewish Question."
They construe that notion as the real subject of the
essay. Accordingly, Jews and Judaism enter the picture
only incidentally. McLellan considers the nominal issue
"a convenient peg on which to hang his [Marx's] criticism
of the liberal state," while Dupre locates the "Jewish
15
16
question" within Marx's general oritlque of religion
Together with Shlomo Avineri, who ignores Judaism
altogether in his exposition, they delirait what has^
the orthodox approach to the article Tt •cle., it is an approach
"hich has proved enormously powerful in extracting
theoretical resources from the rough terrain of Marx's
rhetoric. Like any extractive technology, however, it
leaves a changed landscape behind it.
If we were to read "On the Jewish Question" for the
first time, naively, we surely would not blurt out, "what
is Marx saying about freedom? How does he relate the
state to civil society?" Instead, I imagine we could
almost not help asking, "why is this man so antisemitic?"
That he is shockingly antisemitic, the essay appears
to leave no doubt. True in i-t-c ii , m s first, longer installment
(responding to Bruno Bauer's book Die Judenfrage ) , Marx's
animus reveals itself less blatantly. He sins by omission
only, repeating without comment Bauer's claim, "The Jew,
by his [sic] very nature, cannot be emancipated
... since
he opposes his illusory nationality to actual nationality,
his illusory law to actual law." 3 m the second section,
though, Marx seems fairly to bristle with anti-Jewish
sentiments. He begins by substituting for Bauer's inquiry
into "the capacity of present-day Jews and Christians to
become free" the question: "What specific social element
17
is it necessary to overcome in order to abolish Judaism?" 5
Jews, says Marx, can only become free when, as Jews, they
no longer exist.
It would be a mistake, however, to think Marx
advocates genocide, or even religious assimilation, as a
solution. If religion in general (read: Christianity) is
the opium of the people, in Marx's view the Jewish religion
in particular lacks the power to produce even illusory
happiness. Religious Judaism is a mere nullity which
"would evaporate like some insipid vapour in the real life-
giving air of society," if society were as it should be.
Indeed, totally disregarding the content of Jewish belief,
Marx identifies Judaism completely with the economic
arrangements he finds prevailing in capitalist society,
and the abolition of Judaism with the transcendence of
capitalism.
Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew
,
whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew.
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his [sic]
religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion
in the real Jew.
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self interest . What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering . What is his [sic] worldly god?
Money
.
Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckster-
ing and money
,
and thus from practical Judaism, our
age would emancipate itself.
6
18
"Money,.' writes Marx, » is the Jealous gQd Qf
beside which no other god may exist." In order to speak of
the growing power of money over polities, Marx carries the
association to its outpre limits: society, he declares, has
become "Jewish.
"
becorthe
f
goi Tt^ttr sss*- r\has .
Uiusory g&V" ^ f S It onryar 18n bill of exchange. 7
On this account, Marx finds nothing incongruous in speaking
of "the effective domination of the Christian world by
Judaism." on this point, he can even quote Bauer with
approval: "...in theory, the Jew is deprived of political
rights, while in practice he [sic] wields tremendous power
and exercises on a wholesale scale the political influence
which is denied him in minor matters." 8 Because "the Jew"
functions as a symbol for Marx's thinking, he does not
really mean to subscribe to a Jewish conspiracy theory,
but the overtones are still ominous.
II
The question as to the reason for Marx's antisemitism
brings a second, equally troubling question in its wake.
Why is it that writers on Marx leave his anti-Jewish slurs
unchallenged, even unexamined? Not unnoticed
,
certainly:
nearly every commentator mentions antisemitism in passing
19
(again with Avineri as a notable exception). They bring it
up, however, only to denounce it or to excuse it, never to
confront it as a problem in itself. it is as if there
never were a "Jewish question," as if the substance of
what Marx says about Jews were entirely unimportant.
We may take McLellan 's book once again as the epitome
of how Marx's anti-Jewish harangue is usually treated.
"It is true," he admits, "that a quick and unreflective
reading of, particularly, the briefer second section,
leaves a nasty impression." Furthermore, Marx is known to
have "indulged elsewhere in anti-Jewish remarks—though
none as sustained is here." On the other hand, McLellan
notes, in the same year Marx wrote "On the Jewish Question,"
he lent his support to a petition for Jewish rights,
commenting to his associate Arnold Ruge , "The point is to
punch as many holes as possible in the Christian state and
smuggle in rational views as far as we can." In fact,
suggests McLellan, the whole antisemitic line of thought
in Marx's essay may be largely accidental. "The German
word for Jewry
—
Judentum—has the secondary sense of
commerce and, to some extent, Marx played on this double
9
meaning." To some extent!
The implicit conclusion is clear. Marx's anti-
semitism has been exaggerated, and in any case is
tangential to his main point
. No harm^ ^
it. Time to move on.
The problem with this way of reading Marx is that it
takes for granted the same dubious assumption that Marx
relies on: that we can learn something from the "Jewish
question" without actually paying attention to it. At
first glance, it might seem Marx is simply following the
same procedure we used earlier in interpreting his
utterance "I am not a Marxist." Out of the social fact
that German Jews seek emancipation, he divines a new
meaning: that the liberal state must ever fail to create
freedom for all of its citizens because it depends for it
own power on an inherently unfree and unequal economic
system. in our exegesis, though, we kept the original
situation in plain view even while we departed from it.
Our resulting interpretation added a new layer of meaning
to the tension between Marx and his followers at the same
time as it opened up the new question of how Marx wrote.
Marx's reformulation of Bauer's topic, though, makes the
original controversy invisible, and the Jews, its subject
along with it. What is more, by adhering to Marx's
explicit argument, commentators like McLellan obscure the
Jewish question of "On the Jewish Question" even further.
And this is too bad, for two reasons.
The first is that when a Jew makes antiseptic
-marks ana no one disputes them, even the well-meaning win
wonder if they are not true^ ^ ^ ^
probably no individual, from Abraham and Moses to Herzl and
Martin Buber, to whom the epithet 'Jew has been more
persistently applied than Marx...-" Born in 1818 ^
anoient city of Trier, Karl Marx descended from three
oenturies of rabbis on both sides of his family tree,
including scions of the illustrious Heschel and Katzenelen-
bogen families. 11 His father, Hirschel ha-Levi Marx,
changed his name to Heinrirh nnon k-;^ „^ n ancn up his conversion to
Christianity about a year before Karl was born. Hirschel «s
baptism was a matter of economics, not faith: the Prussian
government had begun to enforce its requirements that all
lawyers be Christians. Paris vaut bien une messe
. The
Jewish faith also had held little attract ion for him. A
staunch rationalist, in philosophy a follower of Kant,
Hirschel believed in a simple deism, "the faith of Newton,
Locke, and Leibniz." 12 Yet his ties to the Jewish people
remained firm enough that in 1815, he drafted a long
randum to protest an edict aimed at bankrupting Jewish
eylenders, while in the following year he unsuccessfully
sought a special exemption to allow him to keep both his
religion and his livelihood. 13 in all probability, Karl
Marx's father was one of the many Jews who converted
memo
mon
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"without really relinquishing their Eamlly and^ ^
with the [Jewish] community." 14
Karl's mother, Henriette Pressburg Marx, remained
even more stubbornly entrenched in her Jew.sh identity.
The daughter of a Dutch rabbi, she probably spoke Yiddish
in her parents' home; whether she continued doing so in
Trier is uncertain, but we know from her letters that she
never bothered to learn to write German grammatically.^
She resisted conversion until 1825, nearly eight years
after her husband's baptism and almost a year after her
children's (including that of Karl, who was then six and a
half). From her correspondence, it is clear that the
Marxes retained their Jewish contacts, especially with
Hirschel's sister-in-law, the widow of the rabbi of Trier,
and her children. Even in 1853, a full eighteen years
after adopting the Lutheran church, Henriette could write
to her own sister about Karl's sister's departure for
South Africa: "And it seems that the lot of the People is
again being realized in me—that my children should be
scattered throughout the world..." 16
As for Marx himself, one biographer asserts:
Karl Marx spent his earliest years in a family whose
religious division was a witness to the way society's
power over men's livelihoods could play tricks on
their self-conceptions, forcing them to deny their
convictions. 1'
Whether for that reason or some other, Marx never studxed
Hebrew, even though the language was taught at the
Wsium he attended at by a (Christian) member of the
Casino Club, a pro-French organization to which Hirschel
Marx also belonged. 18 In Berlin
, ^ ^^
jurisprudence under Eduard Cans, one of the founders of the
Wissenschaft des Judentums movement, and it was under that
instructor that he first paid serious attention to Hegel. 19
In later years, Marx would cross paths with an extraordinary
selection of "non-Jewish Jews," including Heinrich Heine,
Moses Hess, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Ludwig Kugelmann. He
also made a friend of the rationalist Jewish historian
Heinrich Graetz.
More crucial for our purposes than Marx's relations
with other Jews, however, is the fact that others recog-
nized Marx as a Jew. A sponsor of the Rheinische Zeitunq
.
the Cologne paper Marx edited in 1842, gives us this
description
.
Karl Marx from Trier was a powerful man of 2 4 whose
thick black hair sprung from his cheeks, arms, nose,
and ears. He was domineering, impetuous, passionate,
full of boundless self-confidence, but at the same
time deeply earnest and learned, a restless dialec-
tician who with his restless Jewish penetration
pushed every proposition of Young Hegelian doctrine
to its final conclusion. .. 20
Aside from his "penetration" and his hairiness, Marx
also sported a swarthy complexion which gave rise to his
interesting alias. Writes Engels, '"The Moor* was Marx's
nickname from his University days on... lf , had ever
called him by some other name, he would have thought some
misunderstanding had arisen between us." 21 Yet all his
intimates understood "Moor" as "a veiled reminder of his
Jewish origins." 22 His daughter Eleanor undertook to lift
the veil by learning Yiddish and "talking union" in the
Jewish quarters of London. There, she was known to declare,
"I am a Jewess" 23
-which was not literally true, since
Jewish religious law counts descent through the mother. So
vivid was her conviction of her beloved father's Jewishness
that she freely took the identity on herself.
If modern writers on Marx leave his scurrilous attacks
on Judaism unanswered, then, they run the risk of helping
to perpetuate them. Along with Freud and Einstein, Marx
is the world's figure of the Jew. Who should know better,
the naive may justly ask, what Jewish faults are than the
Jew Karl Marx?
Ill
Besides the moral obligation to combat antisemitism,
there is another reason to be astonished at Marx scholars'
neglect of the Jewish question, one that touches directly
on their theoretical concerns. Let us say that Marx's
real targets in this essay are the liberal notion of
freedom and the modern separation of state and civil
25
society, as is generally supposed. Marx achieves his
commentary on these themes in a marvelously indirect
manner. At every step of his argument, he makes his point
by manipulating the various meanings he imputes to the
symbol "Judaism" and by contrasting them with the meanings
he ascribes to "Christianity." it would seem, then, that
we have to unpack those heavily laden symbols in order to
understand what Marx is saying about politics and freedom.
But that is exactly what has not been done.
"The German Jews seek emancipation. what kind of
emancipation do they want? Civic, political emancipa-
4.- .,24rion. From his opening sentences on, Marx looks to the
case of the Jews to shed light on how people become free.
Bruno Bauer had argued that Judaism, with its arrogant
peculiarity, prevented Jews from participating fully in
the life of the state. If they would agree, for instance,
to attend legislative sessions even when they took place
on Saturday, then they would be eligible for the full set
of rights political emancipation implies.
If, thereafter, some or many or even the overwhelming
ma jority felt obliged to fulfil their religious
dUties
,
such practices should be left to them as an
absolutely private matter. 25
Precisely because it preserves religion as a private
duty, Marx rejects political emancipation as an inadequate
formula for human freedom. The Hegelian ideal of the
state which motivates Bauer calls for politics to be a
26
sphere of universality, in which all the higher needs of
the spirit are met. To Bauer as well as to Marx himself,
"The existence of religion is the existence of a defect."26
If Jews (or Christians, for that matter) hold onto their
religious practices, it is prima facie evidence that the
state is not fulfilling their needs, and that the non-
political still exerts great power over their choices.
The incapacity of purely political means to make people
free is not confined to the state's defeat by religion,
however
.
The political elevation of man [sic] above religion
shares the weaknesses and merits of all such political
measures. For example, the state as a state
abolishes private property (i.e., man [sic] decreesby political means the abolition of private property)
when it abolishes the property qualification for
electors and representatives... ~
But the political suppression of private property not
only does not abolish private property, it actually
presupposes its existence. The state abolishes,
after its fashion, the distinctions established by
birth_, social rank
,
education
,
occupation
,
when it
decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation
are non-political distinctions; when it proclaims,
without regard to these distinctions, that every
member of society is an equal partner in popular
sovereignty, and treats all the elements which
compose the real life of the nation from the stand-
point of the state. But the state, none the less,
allows private property, education, occupation, to
act after their own fashion, namely as private
property, education, occupation, and to manifest
their particular nature. 2/
Instead of real universality, the state makes
manifest "the illusory universality of modern political
2 8life." Just as Jews do not become emancipated by the
27
ballot if they still need the synagogue/ sQ seif _
interested individuals do not become free, rational
citizens simply by acquiring politic&1 ^ ^
*.w and the bourgeois remain subject to an external power,
be it religion or money, even if ( in their alienated way)
they embrace it as their own. m fact, because politics
has failed to create a home for the human spirit, the only
sensible thing to do is to hang on to one's private good.
S^^aiSm ' ° r ^ tSiC] bG aSkSd to abo^sh
Remarkable is the sympathetic tone Marx adopts toward
his fellow Jews at this stage of the argument. it is
almost as if he were cautioning them not to sell their
birthright (on which he spends such harsh words later) for
the mess of pottage that is modern citizenship. He
reproves them, not for their religious faith, but for
their political credulity.
If you want to be politically emancipated, without
emancipating yourselves humanly, the inadequacy andthe contradiction is not entirely in yourselves butin the nature and the category of political
emancipation. if you are preoccupied with this
category you share the general prejudice. 30
IV
But of course, Marx does discover a real form of
28
freedom for which he thinks giving up Judaisra would be
amply worthwhile: namely, -hunsm emancipation." oddly, i n
all the essay, he affords it only one paragraph of its ownK S^aHan^icfL^aSber- WheD
his Ufe
2en;
" *<^dividual
0
* r!n
f
||2|£|s) as s|cial powers so that he no l5n^ir-
power?31
S thlS S° Clal ?°wer from himself as 'political
This is an enigmatic passage, to say the least. it is
difficult to say what Marx means by "human emancipation,
-
except that it will overcome the fragmentation and
insufficiency of communal life that political emancipation
only feeds. The problem for the reader is to discern
that underlying the distinction between political and
human emancipation is an even more basic divide, between
"civil society" and the "political state." Or, to be
even more precise, we need to realize that a society which
splits life into these two spheres differs dramatically
from a society in which they are united.
What is the "political state"? In the Contribution
to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right
,
Marx
traces the emergence of a sphere of politics, centered on
government, laws, and constitutions, which lies alongside
the parts of human life concerned with survival "without
materially permeating the content of the remaining, non-
29
political spheres." Hegel claimed the state subsumed and
transcended all the particular activities of material life.
Marx debunks this claim of universality. As "political
state," he argues, the state
.merely puts itself forth as
one more fragment of national life, in no way integrating
or integrated with the rest.
In monarchy for example, and in the republic as a
has
e
hLParV1CUl fr f°rm ° f State ' P^itical man sic]
man ™ n
P
°
Ul ^ ° f he±^ alongside unpoliticalma as a private individual. Property contractmarriage, civil society, all appear he?e_is 'particular modes of existence alongside the politicalstate as the content to which the political state isrelated as organising form; properly speaking, the
relation of the political state to this content is
merely that of reason, inherently without content
which defines and delimits, which now affirms and nowdenies . iZ
According to Marx, "The abstraction of the state as
such belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction
of private life belongs only to modern times." Other ages
and other cultures did not split off the "political
constitution as distinct from the material state or the
other content of the life of the nation." In ancient
Greece, for example, "The res publica is the real private
affair of the citizens, their real content, and the
private individual is a slave"—i. e. , only slaves bore the
brand of an identity having nothing to do with their role
in public life. During the Middle Ages, again, "The life
of the nation and the life of the state are identical,"
30
but only because one's membership in an estate, a guild, or
a corporation determine one's political status. "what
distinguishes the modern state from these states charac-
terized by the substantial unity between people and state,"
to Marx, is "that the constitution itself has been
developed into a particular actuality alongside the life of
the people-that the political state has become the consti-
tution of the rest of the state." 33 The quest for a fully
human existence is severed from, and set against, the
activities which. secure existence itself.
The same historical dividing up of social life that
produces the political state at the same time gives birth
to civil society. in "On the Jewish Question," Marx
specifies that he means by civil society "the sphere of
human needs, labour, private interests, and civil law." 34
From human needs, the other elements follow. Since Marx
assesses human needs in two distinctly different ways, he
also holds two opposed evaluations of civil society,
neither of which, however, can stand without the other.
Human needs are first of all for Marx a type of deprivation,
an absence of something the lack of which frustrates human
powers and stunts the development of the species. At the
same time, though, needs spur human invention, open up as
yet unrealized capacities— in short, spur human development.
Xnaee d
, acguiring
_ ^ _ ^
°f what Marx thin:. progress is aU^
Civil society, the sphere of human needs, reflects
both the ne gative ana the positive evaluation. shorn of
"even the se^ of a general content,^ civll soclety
» a realm of pure egoism. Within it
, each^ ±
_ ^
"an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into
»Wlf [sic], whoilv preoccupied with his private interest
and acting in accordance, with his private caprice."" „
the political state fails to provide universal freedom
civil society never aspires to it. Paradoxically, then,
Marx goes on to argue that civil society and not politics
forms the real basis for human emancipation. -Political
man sic is only abstract, artificial man, man as an
allegorical, moral person." 3 * civil society, the world of
practical need, constitutes the effective reality in which
people actually live. Narrow and selfish it may be, but
only changes in civil society can be powerful enough to
move the species beyond civil society and political state
alike, towards an integrated, meaningful, species life.
Both civil society and the political state are human
inventions, as Marx sees it. Neither is natural nor
inevitable; both are becoming obsolete, yet Marx
champions the importance of civil society for future
emancipation, not because it is good but because it is
effective. His commitment embraces the nasty but real
over the nice but fictional.
The dialectic between political state and civil
society helps us to understand what Marx means by human,
as opposed to merely political, emancipation. Political
emancipation deepens the split in social life while human
emancipation overcomes it, reconstituting social relations
on the basis of what people require in order both to
survive and to live humanly, without the concepts "civil
society" and "political state," Marx's reply to Bauer
seems perverse, or simply meaningless. Thus, it is
striking that no one has explored a crucial element of
these concepts as Marx presents them in the essay-that the
political state is "Christian," while civil society is
"Jewish.
"
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Marx contradicts the liberal notion that separation
of church and state removes politics from the influence of
religion. Instead, he sees in liberal democracy "the
perfected Christian state," more Christian even than "the
state which is still theological" which is merely "the
Christian negation of the state." 40 By privatizing
religion instead of abolishing it, the political state
helps perpetuate the Christian projection of human powers
onto a transcendent God. 41 In order to end this alienation,
.8
the state would have to become involved in answerxng the
unmet needs that drive people to the private solace of
religion. For the political state, though, that i,
impossible, since (Marx argues) its whole claim tc
emancipate rests on its refusal to take private differ-
ences into account in the way it treats its citizens.
There is neither rich nor poor, Jew nor Gentile, to the
political state. For Marx, that fact alone speaks volumes
about the origins of that state "under the sway of
Christianity, which objectifies all nation,! . natural,
moral, and theoretical relationships. 1,42
We have already seen that Marx does not think any
more highly of Judaism than of Christianity as a faith.
Indeed, he tends to dismiss the concept of Judaism
altogether. How, then, can he identify civil society,
the effective reality of social life, as "Jewish"? Marx
draws a distinction between "sabbath" Judaism, the
theology he considers an "insipid vapour," and "everyday"
Judaism, "the particular situation of Judaism in the
4 3present enslaved world." Just as civil society is the
social engine that the political state aims to veil, so
the everyday Jew, in Marx's formulation, is the secret of
the Jewish religion. Marx sums up the Jewish situation in
19th-century Germany as "practical need, self-interest." 44
The Jews' place in the economy forces them to make self-
34
preservation through money their truest faith. But
^Sli^J^^i^ is the principle of civil socrety"
as well. It is for this reasonj ^ assertsj ijuaaism
attains its apogee with the perfection of civil society;
but civil society only reaches perfection in the Christian
world." In other wordS; „Jewish „ civn soc . ety Qniy
dominates the •Christian" political state once Christianity
succeeds in separating the state from civil society. By
attempting to banish human need, Christianity succumbs to
it
.
ILTjuTAL^ ?Ppeara y>Ce that Christianity overcame
eiiminatP fhl
t0
° refined
'
to° spiritual to
raistnf^ .
Cr
^
SneSS of^tTcal need except bysing it into the ethereal realm. 47
V
Reading what Marx has to say about Jews and Judaism as
if it mattered enables us to make two interesting discov-
eries concerning the thinker and his theory. First, we
learn that Marx's reputation as an antisemite obscures the
true complexity of his views on Judaism immensely. Judaism
as a religion, he holds in greatest contempt. Judaism as a
social force, on the other hand, Marx regards as supremely
important. What Marx chooses to call "Jewish" is nothing
less than the driving force of his social and political
theory: the reality of human need, as expressed in the
contradictions of capitalist society.
3b
It is indeed no lonqer a<^koH. u- vJudaism or Christianity? On th^ T*** 8 free"asked: which makes freel-the n~ ^°ntrary' it is nowthe negation of ChristianUy ? 4
!
gatl °n of J^aism or
Marx's answer is clear. The negation of "Judaism" is
essential to emancipation, whereas the negation of
"Christianity" leads to nothing-because the „christian „
Political state is itself a nothing, an illusion
, possessed
of no power to produce anything substantial. Marx's
tribute to Judaism is the xind of recognition one grants a
skilled and potent adversary. From a man who lists his
idea of happiness as "to fight" and of misery "to submit,"
this is a compliment, indeed. 49
As a corollary, though, we must realize that we have
not understood what Marx's theory means until we understand
what Judaism means to Marx. We know that it symbolizes the
gritty details of how people make a living, the historically
unresolved problem of human need. But why this symbol? 50
Such representations do not, as a rule, arise from nowhere:
they are prepared by associations in the writer's mind
which grow more vivid at opportune moments, only to fade
when they begin no longer to be needed. Jerrold Seigel
points out one reason why Judaism may have seemed partic-
ularly relevant to Marx in 1843: his opponent.
If Bauer was a former religious Christian who hadfreed himself by denying Christianity, Marx was in
origin a secularized Jew who regarded himself asliberated from "practical Judaism," self-interest.
Marx's claim against Bauer was that his own personal
standpoint--grantinq all it c a„<=Bauer's, provided the point of J
tS ~~rather th«
liberation. 51 P° l entry for true human
certainly, there is something to this. Bauer's
argument and Marx's reply reseni>ls mng so ^ ^
that rngenious medieval trial by ordeal, the^
deputation. Like the Christian clerics Bauer ltsaue claims
Judaism has outlived its reason Eor being and only
on invincible stubborn refusal to see the facts. Harx
argues like a rabbi who is mindful of the monarch's eye-
without claiming any positive virtues for the faith, he
finds reasons nevertheless to justify its existence and
thus bests his accuser at his own game. 52 while this
desire to score points on Bauer may tell us something about
Marx's motivation c+--in ,
'
Xt stlU ieaves the content of Marx's
symbol "Judaism" wholly unexplained.
Our reading of this essay therefore leads us to ask
yet a third question: the "Jewish question" itself. What
did 19th-century Germans mean by "the Jewish question"?
What did the phrase mean to Marx? What was Marx's own
experience of Jews and Judaism outside his immediate
family, and how did it color what he had to say on the
issue? if the "Jewish question" is tied up in Marx's
thinking with his ideas about how people become free, then
what does his stance towards the emancipation of the Jews
tell us today about his notion of freedom?
At the beginning of the 19th century, when German
liberals inspired by Prench revolutionary ideals were
agrtating the Prussian monarchy for a constitution, the
status of Jews throucrhont- +-h^ u •rougnout the kingdom remained unchanged
since the Middle Ages
. Jews were not citizens in Germany.
Under the law, they were not even human. They existed as
^£Xi_£amerae, " serfs of the chambe^„ ^
Property of the king, to be disposed of at his pleasure.
German rulers valued their Jews as an unending source of
revenue: they zealously maintained the autonomous Jewish
social structure so as to make entire Jewish communities
responsible for tax levies collectively rather than per
capita. Non-payment was likely to result in the taking of
the rabbi or other local leaders as hostages. Like other
serfs, Jews could not move from one town to another, marry,
or have more than one child without permission. Because
of their international connections, however, Jews were
officially encouraged to settle in Germany with a view to
facilitating trade. Periodically, to assuage Christian
merchants' resentment, the government turned a blind eye
while pogroms, anti-Jewish riots, decimated the Jewish
population. Invariably, a new set of Jews would be
invited in to continue the cycle. 53
Under Napoleon, after a lengthy investigation of
their allegiance, the Jews of Germany became citizens
before the law . In practice> ^^ _
-POttily. Because of its originS;
emancipatiQn
was stigmatized by the cnnno^-t- *Y n o cept of tyranny which in the
eyes of the aentile nnnni,^population was attached to all acts ofthe Napoleonic ^..54
_ ^ ^
newish trade which aroused Hirschel Marx's protest; 1817
the decrees against Jewish lawyers which moved him to
convert. m the year Karl Marx was horn, anti-je„1Sh
riots broke out in pruS si a and continued into the next
year. (Because some Jews, esneciaii,,= S
,
p cially veterans of the
Napoleonic wars, fought bark n,„ u •,n c , the whole Jewish community
of Wurzburg was expelled. 55
) In December ua2f Frederick
William HI barred Jews from teaching at universities or
schools. 56 The advocates of Jewish emancipation were
forced to realize that noninal citizenship would not
suffice. They turned their efforts to tearing down all
invidious legislation standing in the way of full Jewish
participation in public life.
Before they could grapple with the laws, though,
they had to confront centuries-old prejudices against the
Jewish people. "The image of the Jew prevailing in the
public mind," writes leading Jewish historian Jacob Katz,
was the image of the popular Christian tradition,
combining the theological tenets of the Jews' guiltin rejecting the Christian message and an aversion totne foreign tradesman whose greed and cunning remain
unchecked by a common brotherhood in the one creed 5 7
That this caricature convinced many educated Germans is
borne out in the history of the term "Jewish emancipation."
The Jews, initial thrust at citizenship was called by the
name of "naturalization," implying that all Jews had been
aliens in Germany up until then. An enlightened Protestant
minister then introduced the nomenclature "civic better-
ment
" ( ^£ge_rliche verbesserung) which became widespread,
partly because it left ambiguous who was to be bettered,
society or the Jews. (The term "advancement" in the name
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People shares some of the same uncertainty.) Jewish
advocates finally took up the term "emancipation" because
it "implied that natural rights had been withheld till
then from those concerned, and that these must be
restored to them unconditionally." 58 Precisely for this
reason, opponents of Jewish rights objected strenuously
to the label "emancipation." Jews, they contended, already
had all the rights they could handle: as Jews, they were
too morally degraded to be equal to full citizenship. 59
The fear and suspicion of Jews that led to denunci-
ations such as these did not only arise from the popular
images of Christ-killers and Jewish moneymen, however.
Cultural differences made the Jews and Christians of
Europe strangers to each other, all the more incompre-
hensible for their apparent similarities. From the
40
Christian side, the "Jewish question" t-h «=therefore took onthe form of the query, "Are t-ho tY, he Jews congenitally
unsociable and rude, or are thev tM
«
n y his way as the result ofbeing segregated into ghettos?" 60 t un John Murray Cuddihy
calls this emphasis on the unseer.lv meem y manners of the would-be
emancipated Jews "the ordeal ^ .,.-iic a of civilitv " "T,h ' . _y
-
Th is problem,"
he writes, .. Stems ultimately... from a disabung inabiuty
of Judaism to legitimate culturaUy ^ dlfferentiaUon Qf
culture and society " 61 d,,*.Put more simply: the Jews of
Europe were unable, un„ill ing
, or failed tQ ^
need to privatize their particular concerns and charac-
teristics in order to become good citizens. The politeness
of public life in the Christian polity, "the fragile
solidarity of the survace we call civility,« created a
schism in the lives and the personalities of the Jews who
first encountered it.
:n-r^-nge
m
„orl1rtf^fr^?L1e-1e
'
observing a strange halakha [code of conductl?hevexamine this world in^ImlTy with wonder anger Yand punitive objectivity . 63 ,
The Christian world, of course, returns the compliment,
judging Jewish behavior by its own standards as "public
sconduct," and resisting every attempt to violate its
rms of what can be spoken of and what, for the sake of
decency, must be kept silent.
mi
no
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The Jewlsh guestion in Germanyi
Christian puzzlement as tQ treat an entire
Peopie Who are unfitted tQ b£ free
_ Now
_ aithou^
r
cts us theo1
———
,
he shares the conmon
assessment of the Tott-i cu - .JSW1Sh rehgl°n
- **-d, his strictures
on "Jewish Jesuitism" descend in a straicrht i iaig l ne from theGospel imacre of the Phari •n sees via Paul's anathema on "the
Law" in the name of "the Spirit." 64 About fh(3D t e provenance
of this stereotype, at le^tYP
,
as , there is no mystery. Marx
also accepts the stock picture of the Jewish
right down to the term jJidentum for "commerce." Even if
he does twist its usual meaning into an indictment of
Christian society for its own
-Jewishness , - he can only
achieve this end by agreeing to identify Jews and money.
What is curious about this is that nothing in Marx's
native milieu would naturally lead him to this conclusion.
His birthplace, Trier, contained only 260 Jews out of a
Population of 12
, 000-a little higher than the national
average, but still only roughly 2%. Among the more urban
Jews of Trier, the statistically most likely occupations
would have been artisanship and innkeeping, not money-
lending or trade. 65 There was little scope for high
finance in Trier anyway: located in the heart of the
Moselle wine country, its economy was primarily agri-
cultural, in fact, though a higher percentage of Jews
42
n°n-Jews Uved ln
— *• Je„ish population ofthe government distriet centered on Trier ^
or more than two -thirds .6S „
'
what he really experienced, neither his negative^
f .cation of Jews and
"huckstering,., nor its double,
Judaism as the elemental social force of h,r uman need, wouldhave been possible for him.
VI
The symbols
-jew" and ..Judaism „ in Rarl ^
the Jewish Question" owe their existence to „idely -heid
stereotypes rather than empirical example. „arx employs
them as literary terms of art, playing on their various
nuances to denigrate the political state (because its
existence implies that of "Jewish" civil society)
, to
deride political emancipation (because it leaves "Judaism"
in control), and to assert the superiority of his own
approach ("the negation of Judaism") to the problem of how
to make humanity free. Having said this, we still have
left what Marx meant by "Judaism" in doubt. For, within
the boundaries of those stereotypes, there is simply no
room for the positive connotations the unity with practical
need sheds on Judaism in Marx's theory. Instead of
ennobling Judaism, one would think the link with casuistry,
greed, and outlandish manners would demean civil society.
Vet for Marx, although the ..Jewishness „ q£^
i- an argument for transcending ^
ter is what makes its transcendence (and that cf the
state, and of the rift hetween them
, poSsible
. Apparently
,the Jewish defects of civil society are its virtues as
well. How can we understand this?
We must remember our earlier observation that for
Marx to plaoe value on any social phenomenon, it must
really exist, i.e., produce material effects. (Marx's
view is. no simple utilitarianism: effective reality is a
necessary condition of his esteem, but not always
sufficient.) By this standard
, we can readily see that
i^sh rudeness" must indeed be judged a virtue In "On
the Jewish Question," as noted earlier, Marx declares
Christianity "too refined, too spiritual to eliminate the
crudeness of practical need." 67 it takes no great leap of
the imagination to read this as an indirect swipe at Bruno
Bauer, since ignoring the power of practical need over
political life is Marx's precise reproach to his former
teacher. By calling attention to the brute economic
facts, Marx violates the norms of Left Hegelian discourse
d states unwelcome truths in an obnoxious "Jewish"an
manner
.
Nor does he let the matter rest. In The Holy
Family
,
the interminable polemic against the Left Hegelian
44
"critical Critics" fh = f \«t at Marx and Engels compiled in 1844
the authors attach Bruno" onoe again. tad once^
Marx chooses the Jewish que Stlon as Ms battlefield. This
time, though, he draws a tight oonnectlQn betKeen^
vulgaris, and the ability to see the mean.ng of real human
freedom, the Kind that onl y communism ( he new asserts) can
achieve
m
gines
in "the idea" and that
Ch*lns
'
that is biriifUT
massT^xTsrfnc" m 1*?™ 1™**** all
measure at once the «itira?
S
^
atement °ne can
^ Profane co^s^d SiSSH^^'
illusion, and desires So? ™? ^H|££_lheory as an
idealistic "win " verv L^i^^T' . besides the
condifinno 68^' V y Pal Pable, material
The Jews are "massy" (of the masses, plebian) and
they lead a "massy existence" (lumpish, material, real).
They cannot imagine real freedom on their own: that is
left for Marx himself to do. Even they are capable of
seeing, though, that Bauer's proffered form of freedom
stems partly from the desire not to be "embarrassed" by
them any longer. For their cramped but secure mode of
survival, Bauer offers "emancipation in mere theory ." We
can hear Marx warning, as he did in "On the Jewish
Question," that the Jews must hold out for the real thing.
Even more, however, we can recognize an unexpected parallel
Marx is drawing between profane sociaiism Md t^ ^
Profane socialise in fact
, seems fco be
its insistence on changing
"very palpable
, materiai
conditions..: the same pr0gram whlch
, one year
Marx had called "the negation [or abolition
, or^
cendence] of Judalsm .
„ Marx's success at cominc to grips
wxth the real issue ,as he understood it, of hurnan
freedom is here connected, not with his education, nor
with his class background, but with his Jewishness. m
later works, he tries to dodge the issue of his own
consciousness, but here, between the lines, he hints at an
explanation.
When we consider the argument of The_Jipiy_Family in
conjunction with the line Marx pursuesT^nT^ish
Question," the example of the Jews tells us vital
elements of Marx's conception of how people become free.
One predisposing factor is certainly the position they
occupy in civil society, or what Marx calls "the particular
situation of Judaism in the present enslaved world." 69
Another such factor would be a standpoint which is not
"too refined, too spiritual" to concede the vicissitudes
of human need; a perspective, a set of cultural resources
that direct people to take material conditions seriously
without being cowed into accepting them as immutable.
Over his lifetime, Marx oscillates between granting one
or the other the primary role. When revolution looks
imminent, he credits objective social rPl,Ke ations, while when
the prospects of upheaval dim, he turns to blame the
ideological limitations of the masses. 70 In general
though, his attention shifts to the study of political
economy, and as it does, the proletariat takes center
stage, while the Jews disappear into the wings.
Continuously throughout Marx's writings, however, we
find a tension in his notion of freedom that appears first
and most clearly in "On the Jewish Question" as we have
read it. Everyday, practical Judaism is rooted, according
to Marx, in the realities of civil society during a
capitalist age. For that reason, its negation goes
lockstep with the superseding of the conditions that
maintain it: the power of money, the exchange system,
ultimately, capitalism itself. m the freed world, the
Jewish perspective which had criticized the old society
and helped the new one to be born would lose its reason
for being. Both in its sabbath and everyday versions, it
would disappear, the former exploded, the latter deprived
of its material basis. The "particular situation" of
Judaism would be dissolved. The Jews themselves would be
absorbed into the species as the abstract citizen is
absorbed into the individual.
And yet... even from the standpoint of human emanci-
pation, "Can the Jews be required to abolish Judaism?"
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Emancipation, as Marx describes it n68 X
'
P^ceeds by reading
°- s "particular situation „ cioseiy
_ ^^^^ ^ s
Poss ibiliti es, and reinterpreting it through^ ^
°rder
"
bSCOme
—
• » oannot succeed, however
, if« «- re-reading, the author is annihUated __for
is it that becomes free' Marv> c «X S °wn ^entity is bound up
with the "Jewish" activity of critiri „r cizing alienated human
ixfe. m what possible world would his anxiety over
trading the substantial Jewish perspective for an Ulusory
freedom finally disappear?
All of which presents us with a fourth and final
question about Karl Marx. Could it be that Marx's sooial
and political theory in general is structured by assump-
tions and patterns of thought which can also be found
within the Jewish tradition? How would recognizing these
affinities have transformed Marx's understanding of his
theory? how might it affect ours? This is the Jewish
question about Marx we will explore in the following
chapters
.
CHAPTER TWO
THE POWER OF THE TONGUE
Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in th.difference between the Jew and L n ? eperhaps the unity of what is canL l^' Whi°h islive in ana of Jf ferencV^? Verify.
.
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—Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics 1,1
The tradition within which we generally read the
writings of Marx is called "modern political thought." it
is a line of descent that stretches from Machiavelli down
to the present day. Modern political thought can trace
its origins to Christian theology. Either by continuing
it or by reacting against it, modern theorists acknowledge
this inheritance. Because of its Christian roots, the
understanding of reality on which modern political thought
has nurtured itself—what philosophers generally call an
ontology—rests on the attempt to combine Jewish thinking
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with GreeK which has characterized so much of christian
religious thought.
Derrida's pointed questions suggest, however, that
neither the theological nor the theoretical enterprise
squarely confronts the question of its own possibility.
What if Jewish and Greek thinking were radically and
irreconcilably different, and to synthesize the, would be
to do violence to both? m order to consider that
possibility, it seems, theorists and theologians alike
would have to renounce the dream of absolute knowledge,
whether of the world or the cosmos. One clear picture of
how things are could only arise if, from the right
perspective, the whole of reality made a single sense. if,
though, the ontology on which we relied were fundamentally
in tension with itself, then truth, too, would speak in
many voices, and it would have to be heard that way, as
well
.
Derrida argues that, faced with a bedrock conflict
between Jew and Greek, theorists should feel enormous
pressure to question their motives for doing theory.
What interest, he asks, compels the enforced detente
between the two modes of though? Why do we cry "Peace,
peace" when there is no peace? In the reduction of two
divergent species of thought to one and the same—and,
most keenly, in the expulsion of the specifically Jewish,
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and the consequent bodily «rsion of Western thought in
the baptismal waters of the Greco-Christian tradition-
Derrida detects a kind of Inquisition. He opposes this
"ontologic.1, or transcendental oppressron ,
"
2
which does
not consist of imposing one ontology on another, but
rather of posing "ontology" (reality as Being, a peculiarly
Greek notion) as the only way reality can be understood. 3
Whether or not we confirm the full range of Derrida 's
suspicions, we find that, in order even to ask whether
Jewish patterns of thought re-emerge in Karl Marx's
thinking, we shall have to rescue the difference of Jew
and Greek from disuse in modern political theory. By
itself, however, that will hardly suffice. if modern
political thought does indeed move within the "horizon of
peace" of which Derrida speaks, we would be foolhardy to
expect the difference to reveal itself at a glance. Jewish
and Greek modes of thought are not "entirely discrete
functions that can be neatly peeled apart for inspection—
apparently, like the different colored strands of elec-
trical wiring." 4 Especially for a thinker like Marx, who
stands in ambiguous relation both to Judaism and to Greek
philosophy, the illusory unity that philosophical language
forges out of the two traditions becomes an inescapable
feature of linguistic reality. The identity of the two
sets limits to what a thinker can say, write, or even
think, if s/he means to be intelligible< ^ ^
entirely unexpected way, ., Theory^^ _ ^
^ce" <as Marx puts The theoretical practice of
collapsing Jewish assumptions reauty ^
ontology insures that^ ^ ^ ^
exhibit neither in any unalloyed form
. We would be
mistaken to look for pure samples.
How, then, can we go about inquiring into the
affinities between Marx;s ontology and traditional Jewish
thought, if comparing them directly is only a first step?
I propose we use the special hermeneutic style charac-
terized earlier as a non-»Marxist reading of Marx: to
seek out gaps, discrepancies, rough spots, incipient
contradictions in Marx's ontology and to read through and
beyond them to understand what that thought now means.
In the following discussion, we shall be concerned
with the incapacity of more orthodox readers of Marx,
grounding themselves in the Greco-Christian tradition, to
reach all of the complexities of the real that Marx
either displays or presupposes. Where they fall short,
we will investigate whether placing Marx's theory in the
context of Jewish thought gives a more satisfying account.
We can employ the method of interpreting the gaps in
Marx's writings that a Greek-oriented reading leaves
unnoticed even if we suspect that the first one to
r SUCh 3 r— - «• The phllo£ophyof wrrtrng we identified earuer ^ aoes ^^
1UXUry
°
f bel^ the arbiter of his own
meaning. Resnprt-fnii,,pect ully, we may dispute his self-interpre-
tatron. indeed, respect may demand that we do so. If in
the process of searching out the hidden implieations of his
understanding of reality, we find affinities with Jewish
thought, refracted though they may be
, we will then have
reason to question Marx's inattention to the relation
between Judaism and his own thinking. From examining the
interstices of his writing, we would then turn to probing
the curious absences in his life and thought, adding
another, less obvious dimension to the Jewish question
about Marx.
Let us turn first, though, to exploring exactly how
Jewish and Greek thought diverge, and where they lead.
II
Life and death are in the power of the tongue.
--Babylonian Talmud"
In language there lies a petrified philosophy.
—philologist Max Mueller 7
The disjunction between "Greek" and "Hebrew" modes
of thought has been recognized in the West for centuries.
Matthew Arnold, in a famous essay, declared, "Hebraism and
Hellenism—between these two points of influence moves our
on
c
world." 8 i n the earlier nart ^p of this century, with his
magisterial Israel- ti-<? HfQ
^-i^-iiif^-^ll^ult^, Johannes
Pedersen devoted four volumes to a historicn storical examinatiu
which presumes and reinforces this contrast.* The classi
exposition, however, arrives with Thoriie f soman's Hebrew
»^Compare<^^ Despite^
some of it justified, this work renins the indispensable
starting point for discussion of Jewish and Greek thinking
Therefore, we will go into it in some
Boman sees the contrast between Hebrew and Greek
thought as fundamental. As he conceives it, "What in each
of the two peoples remained identical with itself curing
the people's entire mental-spiritual history was more
essential than the later alterations and transformations.-*0
Although he recognizes the different complexions each
tradition can wear (Aristotle and Homer, or Exodus and
Ecclesiastes)
,
he affirms that each possesses an underlying
unity. For Boman, the Greek conception of the world
reaches its fullest expression in the works of Plato, so
that he treats Aristotle, for instance, primarily as a
later Platonist. 11 Similarly, the thought structure of
the Hebrew bible, as he interprets it, regulates his
concept of Hebrew thought in general. He thus constructs
an antithesis which, he says, "is already there, but it
does not lie intone, word or
viewpoint; yet it extends throughout tne whole to eve rydetail
.
" 1Z
The opposition between Hebrew and Greek, moreover,
applies not only to thought but to t„, •n , feelmg and judgment.
interesting, in li ght of our earlier finding that
"-deness" ma de the emancipation of the European Jews
impractical is Boman
' s following observation:
From
|
its own] viewpoint Greek mental ,„n ^appears harmonious, prudent L^f ? activityto the person to whoS the Greek klnd^f^hH P"Ceful ;occurs nlainlv i a~ i „ , Kina o thinking
mannersor expression^'
HebreW thinki^ and its
discordant
, anTin Cad^^^ .f^Srated ' --derate ,
What divides these two great cultural styles so
sharply, m the first place, it is their ontology, in the
strict sense of "notion of being." Boman describes Greek
ontology as static-or, in its own terms, harmonious.
What really is, for the Greeks, always is.
an hfh 9 therefore ^ rest and in harmony, andll igher being is unalterable and indestructible-there is also a certain order of rank among allexisting things. The more original a thing is, themore being it has and the higher is its dignity."
Examples spring to mind of how Greek philosophers
constantly presume that what changes or passes away is not
as real, true, or good as what remains fixed and unmoving.
In the Timaeus
,
Plato assigns the creation of the world to
a lesser divinity, or demiurge, carefully keeping the
ultimate persona of his god above the process, as if
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action and material substance were medis ^la to° gross for the
highest reality. in tk„ cy- m he Syjmpc^ruj,, he discusses how
human love can become divine by ascending gradually from
the incidental beauty of an individual to the idea of
beauty itself, which never ^^
doctrine of the forms emphasizes that true being manifests
Itself only imperfectly, as shadows on the walls of a dimly-
Ut cave, as long as it must inhabit physical bodies.
Bodies age and decay, matter crumbles, but reality is
eternal
.
Aristotle's teleology, or doctrine of final ends,
stretches the "order of rank among all existing things-
over time, so that any being in his philosophy may
eventually reach the peculiar excellence of which it is
capable. m addition, the idea of a telos-as opposed to
that of an eidos, or form-lifts some of the stigma of
mortality from bodily human existence. The notion of
teleological development allows for the human life-cycle;
it even sets a value on growth and change, as long as they
conduce to the final end. In light of this, Western
theory has celebrated Plato as the philosopher of being and
Aristotle as the philosopher of becoming.
On Boman's view and by comparison with Hebrew thought,
however, Aristotle's conception hardly seems such a great
departure. Plato's "forms" set a standard for the good
life which is given before any and all .y a attempts to live it
Aristotle's
-ends" ana
"excellences" do the same. „e ither
'
thrn.er permits human beings tQ determine ^
determining) our own goals: we are onlv t„ *y o discover them
and to embody them, as far as we are aole. ln this manner
Boman implies, Aristotle's ontology, like Plato , s
, rests on
the disposition to reqard realit-u *r,A ±u uy lity and the human role within
it as essentiallv fixpd 17 \7& v,xxy i e . very consistently, therefore,
Aristotle reserves his highest ethical rung for the
followers of the contemplative life, who fix their attention
on the immutable truths the universe displays for the
edification of human reason. 18 m the Greek tradition,
spiritual realities befit the concern of the most noble
persons, and the saintliest souls are those who devote
their lives to those things they cannot change.
For the Hebrew thinker of biblical times, in contrast,
reality is dynamic and constantly in motion. Boman states:
"Motionless and fixed being is for the Hebrews a nonentity;
it does not exist for them." 19 To illustrate this propo-
sition, he points to various peculiarities of the way that
verbs function in the Hebrew language. For example, the
verb root sheket can translate into English both as "to be
silent" and "to become silent." Neither, Boman argues,
really fits the character of the verb as "a conscious,
willfull activity": "to hush," with its studied ambiguity
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over who is hushing whom, is the best th« i
20 e lan9uage can
°- "It is really m0re correct to say that we are
baling here neither with a 'being- nor a . beComing . but
with a dynamic third possibility, therefore mni n r ore an
'effecting 1
.
1,21
This third possibility, i„ which the distinctiQn
between being and becoming is "experienced
... as a unity,"
is the touchstone of Hebrew thought as Boman outlies it 22
What is, to the Hebrew mind, is not always the same: it
moves, it changes, it acts and responds to action. "To
be" and "to become" are the same word in Hebrew, and that
word, hayah, is »a true verb^ ^ f^ ^
Through countless examples, Boman demonstrates that hayah
virtually always means action-the producing of an effect.
Consequently, the idea of ontology as "study of being-
misleads us when we examine that which is real to Hebrew
thought. In biblical usage, in so far as "being" is
something real, it is also "becoming," while being as
distinct from becoming hardly seems real at all.
Boman provides a further example of the dynamism of
biblical Hebrew: its verb tenses. Modern Hebrew follows
the pattern English speakers know best. It divides all
actions into past, present, and future. The bible,
however, knows but two tenses: perfect and imperfect. The
first designates action which has reached its completion;
the second refers to action the effects of , h l uir which are "still
in process of coming and becoming.
"
24
Just as Hebrew thought treats continuity and change as
one, similarly, Soman understands it to consider actions
together with their lived conseguences
. As long as a deed
continues to make its influence felt on the course of
current events, it is present and incomplete. Thus, the
structure of Hebrew verb tenses moves the Hebraically-
minded thinker to think of reality as somehow still
unformed and pliable, yet capable of imposing an obligation
to act. Reality may even manifest itself most strikingly
where it is most incomplete, since that is where action is
most demanded.
Not surprisingly, then-even if it deviates from the
practice common to Greek and most European languages-
Hebrew tenses operate "from the standpoint of an experi-
encing person," be that person human or divine.
25
Whether an
action has reached its fullness does not depend on the
essential qualities of the activity, nor on the detached
judgment of some hypothetical observer. Rather, it is
determined by how the act resonates in the life of someone
caught up in the process which it sets into motion.
Therefore, it is entirely possible for different people to
view the same situation as ended or not yet complete,
depending on their relatiQn to ^ their ^
categorizing it.
The dynamic-static distinction Boman draws between
'Hebrew and Creek thus separates two opposed ways of looking
at reality: one which calls movement, action, and change
prrmary and includes "mere being" as a moment in the
process of becoming, versus one which privileges balance
and immutability and which regards true being as eternal.
.
Now, this fundamental disagreement plays itself out over a
number of other related areas. Pirst: according to Boman,
Greeks and Hebrews differ over the right way to conceptu-
alize space and time.
For us [sic] space is like a great container that
HZT' ar"n*e ?' holds everything together^space is also the place where we can live breathe
He
X
grewsf5t
elY
-
****^ * £?%V
Is Boman perhaps waxing overly poetic here? Obviously, the
ancient Hebrew like anyone else occupied three dimensions
in space, lived in them, and traveled through them. What
he really means to show is that Hebrew thought identifies
time with the events it contains, while Greek thinking, in
order to come to grips with time at all, must express it
in terms of space. Consider the time-line, a conceptual
device that maps our complex and often confused sense of
time's passage onto the physical distance between one point
and another. Boman traces the origin of this spatial
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metaphor to Plato's definition of time as moving image
of eternity" and Aristotle's insistence that temporal
existence is represented best "by the image of movement
along a line." 2 ? A line is infinitely thin, because each
of its points occupies no area. it also stretches on to
infinity in both directions simply by juxtaposing po.nts;
it never relates them one to the next, nor melds them into
any larger entity. They remain discrete. what matters
for this conceptualization is not what kind of time one
passes but simply how much. Amounts of time, in turn,
come to be gauged according to the language of distance,
by how far one "point in time" lies from another.
In constrast to this formal and quantitative approach
to time, Boman explains, "The Israelites understood time
as something qualitative, because for them time is
determined by its content." 28 Instead of attempting to
stand apart from events and watch them shuffle by a fixed
point marked "the present," Hebrew thought anchors its
conception of time to the interests of the person experi-
encing the action. Events mark time's passage, engraving
specific moments in memory. Of course, biblical Hebrew
can still tell noon from midnight, or one year from
another. Far more important, though, are the expressions
which do not merely define a period for us but actually
acquaint us with it: "wartime, peacetime , hard times , time
of mourninq, fP = cf 4-^^^ £9, reast time, favourable time « * ^
h . K1 . ,
un ... Furthermore,biblical Hebrew discern. • 4_
^ lntr«sic connection betweentimes and activities sc ^ *6S
'
35 ln the famous verse from
Bcclesiastes,
"To everythlng there ^ ^ ^ ^ ^SVery PUrPO
!;
h™= • to be born ana a
time to die ,,2y rpK ^The purpose of particular moments
through the life experrence of societ.es and
.ndividuals
Because Hebrew thought perceives different
as internal^ related rather than as mere "points in time -
Boman believes it immensely advances "the capacity for
experiencing contemporaneity." 30 Historian Yosef Hayim
Yerushalmi has observed that up until the modern era, Jews
hardly relied at all on the writing of history to preserve
group memories. Instead, in evocative ceremonies like the
Passover Seder, "Both the language and the gesture are
designed to spur, not so much a leap of memory as a fusion
of past and present. Memory here is no longer recollection,
which still preserves a sense of distance, but reactualiza-
3
1
tion." m a similar vein, Boman claims that biblical
Hebrew usages facilitate "the feeling of contemporaneity...
when the psychical content of two periods of time appears
32identical." He emphasizes, however, that this capacity
does not imply an objective pattern of repetition or
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recurrence in history. indeed „h*«- i • ,y maeed, w at links different
historical moments in the Hehr,^ •braiC mind 15 their import forthe fulfilment of divine commands. Just as .„
,
Ub individual and
socxal purposes organize fche human ^ t^ ^
eve ryday life
, so does^ fchink GQd , s ^
understand them structure the Hebrews ,
^
history.
..Hence in the framework of Hebrew piety
eschatology is just as necessary a oonciusion as Mutable
eternrty is for the Greeks who think reli g ious l y . -
"
From his stress on the Hebrew regard for time's
content (as versus its formal quantification,
, one might
think that soman would go on to suggest that Greek is to
form as Hebrew is to content. He does come perilously
close to such a broad equation. Looking closer, though,
what he is really arguing is that whereas Greek thinkers
make much of the dichotomy between form and content, or
form and matter, the writers of the Hebrew bible minimize
the difference. Neither form nor content interests them
by itself, and empty formality, in particular, counts as
less real in their thinking. How can this be? Is it
possible for an intellectual culture to survive without
making formal distinctions?
Boman never denies that Hebrew thought can devise
classes with which to group objects at a higher level of
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attraction.
„e does maintain ^ HebraicaUy .minded
thinkers arrive at abstractions by , very ^
than those Western philosophers usually take and^
formal definition need not lie along its way.
When we [sic] draw a tree-trunk w» f .draw the outline with two mSLfr"9' of a11that we can even see the contour l^' WS believeerror, however, for when we go nv to thfVeally ingo around it, we can see k P, he tree and
kind of strokes i °° ? ^ and wood ' but n°
only auxiliary lines whicn TiT^ ThUS ' these areinto what we see in order tn mi?tr°duce voluntarilythe visual impression Accordfno t rePre^tation of
is Precisely wnaftnf^^t^o^ure
.
W
The correctness of Boman^s art theory is not at issue
here. His point is evident: drawing lines around reality
may not finally depict it any more clearly. instead, we
may strive to view the form of an object and its matter as
coextensive. Thus, in Hebrew a boundary, for example, is
not a line of demarcation, a "thus far and no further,"
but rather a natural landmark, such as a hill or tree,
that actually belongs to the area it bounds. As with
territory, so with ideas. Boman notes that the word
"definition" comes from the Latin findo
, or "split": if a
piece of wood is split into two parts and they are put
back together, there is a boundary line between the two
pieces, a line which takes up no space." So, too, Greek
thinkers abstract from matter to create abstract repre-
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sentations which, unlike real obiect«. « u „OD]ects
'
can be defined by
drawing boundaries.
"it is in *nnhsuc acts as these that
Greek, Indo-European logical thinking consists." 35
Hebrew thinking, by the same token, is like perception
without auxiliary lines: at its sharpest at the center of
its field of vision, it "diminishes in clarity in all
directions until it ends in imperceptibility .
"
36
To
"define" something in this mode is to progress from its
clear, paradoxically definitive center in one's own
experience of it toward the fringes of one's relation to it.
If Hebrew thinking does refuse to separate form and
content, then one might expect three other disagreements
between Hebrew and Greek thought: on the relation between
thought and thing, on that of word and deed, and on the
nature of truth. Boman does, in fact, find evidence of
such disagreements. On the one hand, to the Greek mind,
"The thing is a means of knowing. The one who seeks to
know is not attemptina to alter something or other in his
fsic] environment, but he is trying only to observe how it
really is." 37 To reflect on true being is to partake of
the divine: indeed, "The standpoint of the spectator is
already divine in itself." 38 To the Hebrew, however,
"Things have a meaning; they are symbols given in
39
nature." A Hebrew thinker would fail utterly to
comprehend Goethe's epigram, "All that is transitory is
only a symbol," because seeking to find a «y tm guide to action
in the fleeting events of Uv. is paying attention tQ
precisely what is real
, from tne 4Q
Likewise, where the Greek philosophers complain of
the inadequacy of language, to the Hebrew thinker true
speech is synonymous with effective reality. One term,
d-var. covers the meanings thine,, ^ and ^
lie for the Hebrews is not as it is for us [sic] a non-
agreement with the truth..
.
For him [sic], the lie is the
internal decay and destruction of the word."*! Language
has power, end truth is the word's result in action.
"That which is powerless, empty, and vain is a lie: a
spring which gives no water lies." 42 Hebrew thought
accordingly seeks truth in trustworthy relations between
actors in the temporal and material world, while Greek
thought looks for truth in valid perceptions of the eternal,
spiritual reality.
The distinction could not be more clear—but it must
become much more precise before we can inquire where, in
its terms, the thinking of Karl Marx stands.
Ill
Boman's comparison of Hebrew and Greek thought makes
very strong claims, and it has drawn criticism of equal
intensity. Linguist James Barr attacks, not the "thought
contrast" itself hnf
three .
' "
SSmantlC^ -Wortln, it on
»aln grounds. First
, he argues> Boraan , s
r
and Greek is
—matic . Boman fails to examine
I
1
"" langUa9S
^
—
"
— «~- UKe statie and
absolutely instead of along a cQntinu
—
languages, an d makes his comparisQns^ ^
would produce nonsensical results i f . tapplied to ancient
Egyptian or modern German, for example. 43
Second, Barr raises serious doubts about whether
language and thought directly corr,i a fi elate, as Boman constantlyP-u^. r Boman . s habit Qf contrasting^
wxth its alleged ^plications with Greek thought and not in
the first place with Greek linguistic structure" only
obscures the issue further ) 44 n=r n .) Barr warns of f'the danger
of taking a sense of a word along with its context and
suggesting that the significance which is given through
associations of the context is in fact the indicator value
of the word." 45 That danger
, he contendS/ is fche confusion
of end use and meaning. To use language at all, people
must structure their utterances according to "linguistic
form and type," which may have nothing to do with
"distinctions in the actual objects." Grammatical gender,
for instance—the rules by which various languages
determine at what points to assign a gender to objects, or
to maintain a correspondence between gender and sex— "is a
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:orm,
prime example of a lin guistic structure wnich cannot betaken to reflect a thought problem.« Not „ t .
! . . .
1NO a11 particu-larities of a lanquaqe tell »«g us anything about the way the
speakers of that language think. Barr explains:
Even on the most general fh0. ^
relation is assumed to exist IT** 1 lGVe1 ' if apattern of a certain lin. etWeen the mental
structure of ?heir JaJanf
Stl
° gr°Up and the
choice of at least ItJT^ ' °ne Would h^e the
a) that the m
"owing simple relations:
linguistic structure; ottVat h
by the
structure is dpto™^^ u e linguistic
that thfya^^^^^T™' C >Under c) can perhaps be Lflofl 11 2 y lnteractive.d) that the interaction is not ^ f^ther al ternativebut occurs only hanhazLJ , /MStant and unif°=
and therefore for reasons LT, i " P°intshave to be separate^e^T1711^11^
Third, Barr attributes to Boman a vested interest in
the Hebrew-Greek distinction arising out of the desire to
prove "the uniqueness of Christianity. » scholars grouped
under the rubric of biblical theology make much of the
fact that Christianity tries to combine Hebrew and Greek
thinking, an apparently impossible task. They therefore
try to show that Christianity "belongs with Jewish thought
as a roughly homogeneous entity clearly set apart from the
other currents of European thought." 48 This preconceived
notion heightens the reader's awareness of any linguistic
feature which seems to make Hebrew thought more idio-
syncratic, at the same time classifying evidence which does
not bear on the issue as neutral. 49
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B—s criticise ana cautions serve the useful
Purpose of alerting us to those instances ^^^^ Boman _ sntua^for^^^^^^^
^
tnese excesses, we oan find an emanation in Bo.an-,
very Cree* approach to distinguish^ Greek ^
or demarcation between them
, ^fining- them by mutual
exclusion after the fashion he calls In ^"<s n i others "Inao-
European logical thinking.-" By taking the identifying
"3rtS
^
"e m°deS ^selves, he reinvents Hebrew ana
Greex as abstract types. He can then see the examples he
Cite, as the matter that embodies the formal categories
ana this makes easy the over-interpretation of which Barr
complains
.
Beyond that, Boman
• s typology fails to allow for
historical change. His concepts "Hebrew" and "Greek-
reside in some timeless and universal dimension of thought,
as in reality languages can only do once they are dead.
This atemporal perspective inclines Boman to locate his
comparison of the two modes within a world of ideas and
thinkers in which Hebrew and Greek exist as opposing
essences, always have, and always will, even (one
suspects) if there had never been any Jews or Greeks to
instantiate them. Consequently, he lays himself open to
Barr's methodological reproach.
Whereas Boman overestimates his ability tQ^
Hebraically, Barr makes no effort at a, i i tfc
„ u .
" 311 ln that direction.
"
hlm
'
"hether
°
r Greek thought differs from its
Hebrew counterpart is a guestion that oan only be settled
throUgh Greek -liKe processes of definition ^^^^
To Barr, for instance, the meanin g of a word properly
consists of its "indicator value," a Kind of Piatonic
^eal of the word that transcends an y partrcuiar context in
which it mi ght visi bly appear. The Hehraic sanation that
proper meaning mi ght actually be constituted by context
would seem to him absurd. Barr, therefore, stands in the
uncomfortable position of Alioe beyond the looklng - gla S s,
in the Red Queen's garden.
"When you sav 'hill • " +-v,~ ^ij i y n ii, the Queen lnterruni-ori »t
you^u call thaVa^fle
1".^"^
"No I shouldn't," said Alice, surprised intocontracting her at last: "a hill'can ' t be avalley, you know. That would be noEseKie--"
The Red Queen shook her head. "You may call itnonsense' if you like," she said, "but I've heardnonsense, compared with which that wouldT^as
sensible as a dictionary ! "52
The Red Queen, infuriating though she may be, has it
exactly right. To a mind which, like Barr's, conceives
truth as never varying regardless of persons, a hill
cannot be a valley, and the dictionary is the final
5 3arbiter of meaning. No wonder he thinks the Hebrew-
Greek distinction "over-dramatized.
"
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HOW, though
, could we go abQut reading
S
° ^ t0 C— **« and complete hisintended proiecf?J r
-
At his most precis n«P ecise, Boman recognizesthat when he says „Greek> „ he^ ^
PhiXosopMca! writings of^ ^ ..^
^e. Thus
, he ls actuany deaung> ^^
but With texts
. »Boman.sanalysisof theHebrewmind>
however, does nof »+• =nat all touch upon the concept of the textitself and the Jewish relation to it » a, e» , s Susan Handelman
rightly remarks. 54 m ordorin e to raise the question of how
"Hebrew thouqht" entprcgn e s into the thought processes of an
up the typology in three dimensions.
"Hebrew" will descend
into the material world and become "Jewish."
"Thought-
will travel through time and come out as "tradition."
Finally,
"textuality" will emerge from between the line—
those auxiliary lines that Boman forgot to erase-to take
on weight and substance and a specifically Jewish
coloration. 55 For, as Handelman intimates
, it makes all the
difference that the text we are scrutinizing is the Torah
and that the tradition of reading through which we will
seek the meaning of the text is the Jewish tradition. As
one bible scholar observes, "For the Jewish tradition,
reading is more than reading: it is a love affair with the text."56
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IV
The~ ** - -ws aPply to the five boQks
Moses, or Pentateuch, and inabroader
_ ^ ^^
W>U. from Gene sis toCto„ icle, These writings ^ ^the constant source of Jewish cuiture. Every week in
synagogUe for the last two thousana years, observant Jews
have heard a portion of tne Torah reaa aiouo in Hebrew.
The portions fall i n a cycle i-h*+- „t at completes the five books
and begins again annually. A11 other Jewish
cogent on the Torah in one way or another. Indeed
, in lts
broadest sweep, the name "Torah" encompasses all the
Prophetic writings, legal interpretations, guides to daily
conduct, poems, legends, folktales, and mystic doctrines
that ever have elaborated on the text, as well as those
that have not yet been uttered but will be in the future.
Torah, therefore, is not only text but interpretive
process, too-better, it is text understood as process.
For the religious Jew, Torah summarizes the history of the
Jewish tradition: because every generation studies it, the
text and its readings to a considerable degree, constitute
the Jewish experience. 57 According to poet and translator
Joel Rosenberg, the books of the Hebrew bible
generated a cultural legacy, and the cultural
experience they embody and the literary modes they
employ are familiar to the Western thinker partly
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Because each successive ^ ^
all over again, the meanings that its Heha wi brew words acquire
-socrai meaning of the words^ Hebrew ^
•Jewish cultures
-pk0 k ax
-
The literary art- = ut that has gone into the
certain way or understanding reality, and study reproduces
that understanding in one wave o f readers after another
The text aiso employs an especialiy effective device for
constructing lasting sets of shared meanings: a system of
leitworter. or "key-words," nlavs . i =i " p y a large part in the
Torah's narrative stratum ok,i.rategy. Shakespeare critic Bruce Kawin
^ows how in King^ear key-words port "the meaning they
have acquired with them into their present and future
contexts, immensely complicating and inter-relating the
concerns and actions of the play."" So alsQ^ ^
Torah. just as the imperfect tense of the Hebrew language
leaves an action hovering in the air until its effect is no
longer felt, so the use of key-words in the Torah also
calls the reader to attend to hidden influences and
consequences
.
When a text uses words in this fashion, they gain an
importance over and above their narrow linguistic meaning.
To understand truly what view of reality the Torah provides,
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therefore, we must reunite our care for the .
....
d t ontologicalimplications of the hpk.0 ,
bibl . ,
t Heb
-« language with our att
ical content. We must ask what we can 1
T • ,
learn about theJewish sense of the won a *rn rld from the plot ch,ra ,fu
' a cters, andthemes of the biblical story. 60
At first, though, we might wonder whether we candiscern any coherent philosophy in such a 1+m multivocal body
of work as the Tor^ha . Rosenberg, for ^stance, warns
against too
"ideological" a reading.
Given the enormous variety o-f uforms in the Bible and tL 1
SUb ? ects ^ literary
which the Hebrew Bibie as !Pan ° f time init is impossible to stall tL kn°W lt coalesced,
narrative. 61 6 ^ message of biblical
The best summary of biblical narrative, he explains, is
the narrative itself. The Torah already uses an extremely
compact, highly allusive style, at some points bordering
on the cryptic. if we attempt to soak the distinctive hue
out of the warp of its fabric, we risk dissolving the
threads altogether-a risk inherent in any attempt to draw
a moral from a piece of literature, but immeasurably
sharper in biblical exegesis. Nevertheless, the same
author concludes, with great care, "it is possible to
speak of 'preoccupations' in biblical narrative, and as
such to determine what the narrative is saying." The
Torah recurs repeatedly to some themes while yet others
to influence the story throughout, so that without
seem
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the*, the text would be unimaginable. It ls entirelylegate to spel! out these central themes and vitally
necessary to do so i f we wish t0 understand ^^
structures of thought differ from the Western^ ^ ^
what relation Karl Marx stands to eaoh.
The touchstone of reality in the Torah is the active
dialogue between God and humankind. By
..dialogue" we must
understand, first, actual conversation between two part.es
m the storytelling style of the Torah, dialogue predom-
inates. Where the text could have related events in its
own voice, it most often
.axes its characters recount the,
instead, even if that leaves the narrator only to summarize
or confirm assertions already made or just about to be made
in speech. The Torah relies on dialogue rather than
description in order to characterize the actors in its
dramas. What individuals say or fail to say, and when, and
how, tells us who they are. Dialogue also suspends the
progress of events and allows for extended scenes of
tension and dramatic irony: one need only look to
Abraham's words to Isaac as they ascend Mount Moriah or the
discourse of Joseph and his brothers in Egypt for
, 62examples. Even poetry, that most individual form of
expression to the modern way of thinking, speaks in the
Torah "as the end result of dialogue."
which he adds. Thus hp L °h hSHis audience, as bearers oTtradi^ COm^ alone,his collaborator, who interact cor>stitutesbringing to his words derii^ Wlth the Poet hythem both shape and sub^tancetsl^ 8"^ 10" 2 th" lend
in short, ^erything in the biblioal WOrld ultimately
r"""
8 tOWard dlal°9Ue
'" " — r puts it-.andfor good reason '"tv>To the ancient Hebrew writers, speech
seemed the essential human faculty: by exercising the
capacity of speech man sic demonstrated, however
imperfectly, that he was made in the image of God.""
Beyond actual speech thnnnh a- -,F n
'
rtough, dialogue means the
inescapable relatedness of persons which is what makes
communication between them possible, desirable, and urgent.
Martin Buber, who gave the wnrlHy rn o d the concept of an "I-thou"
relationship, calls dialogue "this dramatic over-against-
ness of God and man sic
,
on which the faith of Israel is
grounded." 65 Already in the Talmudic period, poring over
the biblical text, the rabbis had asked the question: Why
did God create the world? They answered: because God was
lonely. So the divine Person created human persons, and
so the story which the bible tells begins.
The dialogical situation comes about "because God's
purposes are always entrammelled in history, dependent on
the acts of individual men and women for their continuing
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realization." c inf,p j_ i_ _faince the creation, in thP T0t • u
is .
S Jewish view, it
-™
- -
-—
~
-»
......
-
Within the Torah, human beings are fi rst . „ ,tl and foremostpersons in dialogue with the divine Ths ,. at communication isWhat makes us ourselves, shaping our identities from the
-re. The relatlon of ^ goQd ^^
^ings. „ the Torah concentrates ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
that is because, for the divine experiment as the text tells
of it, they form a sort of laboratory sample in relation-
ships. If this stiff-necked people oan learn to love and
be loved by God
,
the story intimates, then there is hope
for everyone else as well.
As a way of engaging the universe, though, dialogue
implies several orientations which seem astounding next to
any Greek-like model of ontology. The Torah demands of its
readers that they seek to know God, not as an eternal set
of esoteric truths, but as a distinct personality who
speaks and wills, acts and interacts, and to whom they are
already committed for life, like a parent or a spouse. The
Torah is relatively lacking in theology preceisely because
the question of what God is lacks interest to the Jewish
tradition. Only things merely are, if even they, and God
is not a thing. The Torah tries to evoke a sense of what God
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SSt£. ana any aspect of Cod that aoes not bear on our
personal acquaintance ana history together is pushea to
the periphery of its attention. Being buman, we thin k in
human terms, very well: «The Torah speaks ^^
language,', as one rabbinic dictum puts it." It presents
God as someone enough U]5e ourselves ^ consulting ^
own experience of what people are like will give us . clear
deal with God.
But then, what is a person, in the woria the biblical
story presents? Soman had already remarked, "The person is
an active being who is perpetually engaged in becoming and
yet remains identical with himself [>io] .«8 Ja language
reflecting a dialogical grasp of reality, we might rephrase
it: People become who they are in the process of relating
to others who are also changing and growing over a period
of time.
Now, this does not sound at first like a particularly
Jewish idea. Aristotle, in his Ethics
, writes of how one's
friends crucially affect the development of one's character
for good or ill. 69 m his analysis, however, one person
causes changes in another in a predictable, almost mechan-
ical way. Even if the person influenced influences the
first person in return, the effects all take place within
each individual soul. Moreover, by a certain age,
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Aristotle belipupc f u nueves
'
the gears of ner^iu upersonality have locked
-to place: one is what one u gQing ^ ^ ^^ ^
— ogue, on the other hand
, Presumes that bQth
"1U ^ th8mSelVeS * ~— - -ajust to each other
throughout life. Each person certalnl .i ly change; it is
the relation that will continue. Tflere is a] .„ . umer lso a further
difference
.
nature of character i eT 1CtJble and ch™<3^personages cannot Lve ?ixed HoTrTo" ^i 1"1is not "wily Jacob," Moses is no?" 6pithets (Jac<*
strat^.L^
13110^ 1 ^tl'dSSr^^^"")
MicS? 9 recrements of the immediate context-
S^-'L^iS-^SrW^' iS ^"daughter
If God, the creator and origin of meaning in the
universe, is conceived in the Torah as a person and there-
fore as an essentially relational self who changes as we,
God's partners, do-if God, too, is a "center of surprise-
then relating to God and participating in the divine
purpose must be radically unlike gaining knowledge of the
cosmos and contributing to the achievement of a telos.
Both surely imply a degree of aim and intention; both
demand movement in a predetermined direction. Teleological
development, though, aims at a fixed goal which human
beings can only discover, not shape, while partnership
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with God allows for discussion, revi slon d i
'
l
' disagreement
and reconciliation.
Teleology hinge s on epistemology
. one can only
succeed at reaching one's highest s.tate if one can
correctly ascertain that in which it consists and those
intermediate steps one must take to arrive there. For the
dialogical relation, though, the best parallel is probably
a good marrrage. The lovers, over time, learn each other
intimately, even if they only learn certain important facts
about each other after many years, or never. They know the
important things-what makes the loved one happy, depressed,
nervous, serene, comfortable, irritated, frightened,
secure
-in a rudimentary way from the beginning, or nearly
the beginning. what they discover is the range of one
another's reactions, not the rules of them. Day by day,
they take note of the changes in each other's lives and
work to meet them together. At times, unavoidably, one or
the other will become withdrawn, fall out of synch; their
commitment to what they share carries them through. On the
basis of trust, without needing or seeking perfect knowledge,
they create a small world that shelters them both.
The dialogue which the Torah records between God and
the Jewish people (and potentially between God and all
humanity) aspires to exactly this kind of marriage for the
renewal of the larger world. As Buber puts it:
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The real communion of man r=i~lhas its place in the worlV £ ! ^ th God not onl YGod speaks to man in the thinos ^k^ 3 sub^«.sends him in life; man answers in rf,^ lng\ that Hethese things and beings."! tl0n to 3 ust
One final lesson the Torah teaches us about the Jewish
sense of reality, we must not overlook. In the bibUcal
story, human action is undertaken freely even though Cod has
purposes which only human beings can work out. »P,Jt most
simply," says Rosenberg,
"persons are free to act as they
will, but their actions are fateful."" By creating ^
world in a fit of loneliness, the God of the Torah has
voluntarily become dependent on the notoriously perverse
and inconsistent powers of human will and action. As com-
pared to Greek myth (in which mortals and gods alike await
the designs of Fate)
, Greek philosophy (in which the
universe allows for excellence but neither promotes nor
needs it), and those elements of Christianity that stress
predestination, original sin, and undeserved divine grace,
the Jewish themes of dialogue and partnership in creation
mean that people and their actions matter . That sense of
the cosmic importance of human action is a thread that
leads us straight into the Marxian labyrinth.
CHAPTER THREE
AND HEBREW IN MARX'S ONTOLOGY
When we examine the body of Marx's writings, we find
(in works as dissimilar as Tl^erman^ology ana his
doctoral dissertation, hints that Marx himself recognizes
a Jewish-Greek distinction among views on the nature of
reality
.
As regards Greek thought and culture, we do not have
to look very far to discover what importance Marx attaches
to them. For nearly ten years, from 1837 to 1846,
classical Greece figures prominently in Marx's writing.
Unlike his contemporaries, though, Marx treats Greece as a
cautionary example. He dissents from " the admiration,
even worship for classical Greece" which had buoyed
German literature in the late 18th century and which still
left its traces on Hegel. 1
Marx regards the Greek city-state, or polls, as an
attempt at freedom that failed. The lesson he draws from
its collapse is that trying to reunite the worlds of
thought and action by means of philosophy alone is futile.
Philosophy inevitably raises up some partial, one-sided
view of reality to the level of Truth, suppressing other
equally compelling perspectives. Thus, Greece in Marx's
vocabulary stands for a typically "Greek" bias in
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linking, according fco the of Qreek thought ^
~ered in the last chapter
. By fche token
_
"« crlt ic1Z es the Greek ^^^^ ws ^^^^^ ^ar.se from something disUnctly
_^
of vrew on what can plausibly be called real.
F°r many of the German Romantic thinkers of the late
"CO-., according to Charles Taylor, the ancient Greeks
presented an inspiring portrait of
a mode of life i n which the hichest ir. „his aspiration to form and expression\ T n S1 ° 'was at one with his nature a£d !n S clarity
was an era nf „„,4. " n ° all of nature, it
which thought Iff harm°n y withi" »an. in
were one? in which the ? 9 '
mo
5ality sensibility
his lifl wither Lr«?
fo™. whlc h man stamped on
7
Hegel, the "gigantic thinker" of Marx's young adult-
hood, offered a more nuanced but scarcely less laudatory
version. 3 Like the Romantics, he saw the polis as both
the realization of the human essence and its most adequate
expression to date. At its height, he theorized, being
and thought did not conflict in classical Greece, nor did
the individual and the community. Citizens knew their
place in the natural and the political order and acted in
keeping with that knowledge. Human beings related to the
polis in which they lived, and its ideals, as particulars
to a universal: they lived as instances of the state, and
its existence embodied itself in theirs. They enjoyed
freedom, not in unrestraint, but in the
the achievement ofv.rtues praised by the ethos
Political H,
" immunity.
Ufe, rn Hege^s pioture of Greek cultureSUPPUed
-
-ose virtues, and nenc
'
thePreconditions for human freedom.
m. h aPPy unity as envisiongd
a
'
toWeVer:
~^ty. „egel argued that
- it any Greek ^^^^^
rea^ u^eromy « Taylor - s words) „the ^ a
r:
many
-
-
— -— veness was achieved
" the expense of reflection. Mos t cities knew only oneway of life: their own ^
in time, some deeply spiritual individuals, most
notoriously Socrates, would rebel, seeking a larger unity
-
a consciousness too broad for any one polls. As sinQle
numan beings, though, they could not embody universal
truths. Simply by being individual and part . cular
_
Heaei
contends, they would be inadequate to the task. So thev
challenged the societies in which they lived to transcend
whatever limited notion of the good human life their
citizens uncritically accepted. m doing so, however,
these universal thinkers began a tragic struggle which
sometimes destroyed them (as it did Socrates) and always
fractured the unified, if one-sided, cultures that had
given them birth.
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Hegel celebrated the achieve.ents of the polls and
-oumea its passing. but he thought Qf ^
necessary for the recapture of human freed™ at a higher
level. In
, sense
, his philosophy ^^^^^ a cQimitmsnt
to the idea of a society in whioh neither Socrates ^
Jesus would have had to die in order for their
.essaoes togam an audience.* all nations, c iasse s, and philosophies
would find a home within the complex structure of such a
oulture. The state he hoped for would express, and thereby
reconcile, the totality of its citizens' beings, while
their lives would give substance to the ideal of an
expressive unity.
Marx takes over Hegel's idea of a connection between
the ancient Greek republic and the ideal of unity when he
"goes over to" Hegelianism in 1837, but with a dramatic
difference. From the outset, Marx treats classical Greece
as a failure in the pursuit of that ideal, and not as a
historically limited form of its realization.
Marx's distinct viewpoint emerges most clearly in his
analysis of the position of the philosopher in Greek
culture. Hegel had considered the classic thinkers of
Greece shoots of a living culture from which they drew
their intellectual and spiritual sustenance. Their
thinking, he believed, reflected their civic life. Marx
draws the opposite conclusion. "The Greek philosopher is
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a demiurge," he writes in a Drenar*^p paratory note for his
uissertation. „His[sic]
flourishes in the natural sun of substantial existence. -«
The very idea of wisdom in Greece .-Pftr(,^j.ee , acco ding to Marx,
arose from individual thinkers' reflection on ^^nectio their private
experience, in abstraction from the life of the community
Far from exemplifying the unity of the ideal and the real
in Greek communal life, thesp QorvK^-;r n e sophoi negated it by walling
themselves off in a wnrlri o-f 4-v,~-orld of their own imagining and
calling it "spiritual truth." In their own persons, the
Philosophers estranged thinking from living. They also
created a realm of pure thought called philosophy and
fenced it off from the public domain.
If the Greeks had ever experienced the wholeness
Hegel envisioned for them, Marx dates it far earlier than
the classical age, possibly even before philosophy was
invented. By the time of Socrates, certainly, the "split
between reason and existence reached full expression" in
Greek communal life. Socrates, Marx writes, is not a
victim of a society which he challenges. Rather, he
embodies the inner conflicts of the polis and succumbs to
them. "Divided within himself" so deeply that his own
spiritual impulses seemed to him a daimon
, or indwelling
spirit, "condemned" to generate chimerical visions of a
good that his own nation could not make material, in
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Marx's judgment, Socrates^
,
death ln vain. Hisfate reveals "the relationship of Greek k-,P Philosophy toGreek life and thereby its i„„ainner contraotion into itself."7
In the main body of hi =
.
f
"
dlss^tation, Marx frames his
I T GrSek th°U9ht " 3 di"erent *°» the opposition of thought and life played^ J Jlives of two lesser Greek philosophers, Epicurus and
-mocritus. Each of^ to^
_ ^ ^the dilemma, and eaoh lands himself in a web of insoluble
contradictions. Epicurus
, as^ ^ ^ ^
dogmatic idealist. ln his theory of nature, atoms-which
"e, in a literal sense, the basic units of reality-must
tend to swerve fro, the paths the forces of gravity and
mutual repulsion mark out for the, simp ly to show that
true being does not wholly submit to material laws. Now,
the unpredictability Epicurus 's view impl i e s should have
impelled him to examine the physical world in search of
contingent truths. To do so, however, he would have had to
concede that the ability of any individual consciousness to
get at the truth depends on forces external to the indi-
vidual, in the material world. But admitting that material
considerations determine the reality we experience would
mean denying the basic principle which, on Marx's reading,
led Epicurus to hypothesize the atomic swerve in the first
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i on;;
in i
Place. Consequently, Marx argues, Epicurus
neglected empirical studies and led a BtaHa s tic, sedentary,
"id untroubled life. 8
Detritus, on the other hand
, lf , stamch
i.t. He founds his atomic theory on fche assumpt . on ^
atoms are law.abidlng parUcles the . r s^ ^
-plain
.11 that exists. As Marx taxes him, though,
Democritus confronts a paradox: ne also ^
natural phenomenon makes the presence of atoms Obaarvabl,
to the human eye. The materially-based regularities never
disclose themselves, while the apparent world, „hich the
senses cannot deny,, is all chaos and deception.
™&
Tusl^^^^^^^^
I > i i licit > i 'l 1 " -
,R , 0rn , r,,<> fr<™ ,, <"
St 2hi
P
!i«,1
1
!?
ent
^
1
?
ft in its autonomous reality;a t e same time it is the unique, the real objectand as such has value and importance. 9
Consequently, Democritus roamed the known world, mastering
a variety of sciences and accumulating endless data about
the "subjective illusion" which is ail the reality
vouchsafed '<> him. Legend has it tl,,,| j,,. ended h j ,.
fruitless quest for positive knowledge by blinding himself,
"so that the sensible Mghl in the eye would not darken
sharpness of intellect."
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-curus
,
According to Marx's proqno^i, ng s s, Democritus, Epic.
and Socrates all fail becau^ o-f <-uause of the same cultural bent inGreek philosophy: the belief fK = ^P Y that thought can comprehend
-self in isolation from life, or, more concretely, that a
thinker can discover the truth about human nature outside
of his or her social relations with other human beings
This feature of Creek philosophy is also one of the ma
: or
differences between Jewish and Greek thought, so it is
significant that Marx uses it to indict the Greeks.
Marx also accuses modern philosophers of repeating the
errors of the ancients. Once again, he charges, they
pretend to be able to devise a better world without
engaging the one they presently inhabit. Modern philosophy,
it seems to Marx, has inherited the Greek disposition to
exalt the stance of the spectator, and to choose contem-
plation rather than interaction as its preferred way of
learning about reality. This, too, ranges Marx against the
Hellenic influence from a standpoint which resembles the
Jewish one. Since he groups moderns with Greeks, he passes
harsh judgment on nearly all political thought.
The one great exception is Hegel. For the youthful
Marx, Hegel had promised a way "to seek the ideal in the
real itself," and thereby to avoid the "inner contradiction
into itself which he thought had doomed Greek philosophy."11
Up until 1841, in fact, Marx prescribed Hegel's holistic
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approach as the an-n <q«+.cn tidote to metaphysial e 4.p ical systems which
-e- philospher , s consciQusness^ ^
the usefulness of Hegel. m the mm
^^ISPhiL^fRight
, written h,n~ 2__, two years after his disserta-
tion and shortly before "On the Jewish Question," he
accuses his former mentor with reducing the individual to
"his heard and Mood" [si,] and abstracting f_^
contexts and relations. 12
Marx's putative break with Hegel has been much
explored, but one thing that has not been widely discussed
1- how, in order to settle aooounts with Hegel, Marx begins
to read him more and more as a Greek. In the Critique just
mentioned, Marx likens Hegel to Socrates. Neither, he
declares, is "allowed to measure the idea by what exists;
he must measure what exists by the idea." 13 In the 1844
Manuscripts
,
he expands on this comparison. Both Socrates
and Hegel display "the opposition, within thought itself,
between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real
14sensuousness." where Marx had earlier honored Hegel as
the philosopher of "the whole," he increasingly rereads him
just another partial thinker. Like the ancients, Hegel
takes his own end (defined by Marx as "constructing the
hereditary monarch out of the pure Idea") 15 for the end of
society. in addition, Hegel begins to resemble Epicurus.
As Jerrold Seigel points out:
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With Hegel,
"abstraction resolvp, «
abstraction and to have a n*<-
S? Sabstraction." But iust L nature free from
gave objective form to hit llt^l ln the end merelyHegel, too...natSre already exxs?ed thi^' so for*mmd as an imaqe of his own SX i St ln the thinker'shas really le 9 m Le r ! h -ty ' *nd "What he
abstract nature ? only n^?ure Z "^ °nly this
being of thought ..." 16 fc ls the other-
Later, when Marx shifts his theoretical stance even
fUrth6r in The_Germ^n_Id^^ he continues to differ _
entiate himself from former associates by pointing out the
specific defects they share with the Greeks. He and
Engels, for instance, deride the German "true socialists"
by claiming they convert the practical program of the
French party into a set of timeless truths. it is worth
noting one of Marx's favorite axioms at work here: that an
isolated group of thinkers will tend to propound an
impossibly unconditional notion of human freedom. Thinkers
of Marx's day, he asserts, follow the Greeks in inverting
the real relation of being and thought, and they do so
necessarily once they eternalize their own perspective in
a characteristically Greek way. 17
In short, something very like the typology of Jewish
d Greek thought we discussed earlier shows up in the
nter of Marx's critique of German philosophy. Typically,
he does not endorse the one and decry the other so much as
pronounce a judgment on the effect of adopting either.
Marx clearly regards the "Greek" attempt to establish the
an
ce
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~al on a higher plane than ^ ^ &
Chlmera
'
3 Vet even if this specu.
lative vision o f reality conformed fco ^^ ^^
still provide no basis fnr t-v^ uo to the harmonious order its
Proponents see, to achieve. To say that all Peopl e and all
-Cities in society contribute to an expressive unity of
-an existence, out that only People who are philosophers
(or ordinary people only while thinking philosophically,
oan experience it as such, is to say that no such unity
exists, by any standard Marx would accept.
As long as a society systematically excludes certain
categories of people, activities, states of mind, or human
experiences from its normative version of what is real, it
is still parochial, abstract, and less tha n fully human.
Therefore, Marx demands that any acceptable ontology
provide for the possibility that humanity can achieve a
genuine social whole (which he calls "species-being" or
"human emancipation," and later "communism"). Anything
less is self-defeating. Therefore, also, he is drawn to
the sense of the real he associates with civil society and
with the Jewish outlook. In its emphasis on human action
directed toward the effective overcoming of practical
human need, what he terms the "Jewish" viewpoint offers
Marx a more trustworthy guide than philosophy to what
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mustbedone
-
startin^-^t, hebelieveshecan
realize the social wholeness o £ which philosophers may
only dream.
II
The way of understanding reality that Marx calls
Jewish fits the pattern of Jewish thought much as his
notion of Greek culture fits Greek thought as a type.
Turning to the Jewish side, though, we cannot see the
relation unless we once again make a distinction between
"sabbath" and "everyday Judaism." Marx, as we noted
earlier, holds no brief for the Jewish religion, nor does
he think it an important phenomenon as a religion. This
judgment does not necessarily stem from ignorance, either.
Often, when Marx needs a good pungent example in order to
make a point, he reaches for the name of a biblical charac
ter: Moses, Joshua, the Levites, Adam, Esau , Habakkuk
, and
Ezekiel all pop up in his writings. 19 These references
demonstrate Marx's familiarity with the bible as liter-
ature (probably attained in Gymnasium under a Lutheran
teacher). Clearly, though, they have no bearing on his
ontology. Any educated German of Marx's day would have
read the bible along with Shakespeare and Goethe, these
being regarded as the cornerstones of German culture.
Nor is there anything particularly t • uy ^ i i Jewish about Marx'shandling of his biblical allusions. It is of intJ-t r erest that
Marx rarely, if ever, resorts to the Go.n.in spels or any part of
the Christian canon for an illustration. His bible is
strictly "Old Testament." 20 still m."il , one cannot make much of
that. Paradoxically, then, at those moments when he
touches on the content of the Jewish faith, Marx tells us
virtually nothing about his relation or non-relation to
Jewish thought.
Perhaps, though, Jewish thought exerts itself in
Marx's theory the way that atoms do in Democritus's physics:
as a "principal element [which] does not enter appearance"
but which nonetheless unifies all the rest. when we look
at the terms in which Marx criticizes Greek thought and think
about the perspective from which they could arise, we
notice that Marx could write exactly the same attacks if he
were presuming a Jewish relation to reality. This observa-
tion applies all the more strongly if we remember that the
outlook Marx calls "everyday Judaism" in "On the Jewish
Question" resembles the paradigm of Jewish thought on
every significant point. So, we could argue that Marx's
critical stances, his differences with the Greeks and
their modern epigones, themselves show the structural
relation of his theory to Jewish thought.
In fact, though we can see the relation quite
directly if we are willing to read Marx the way Marx set
give
:rue
about reading Epicurus
.
„Even ^ ^ ^
their work a systematic form," Marx wrote, »... the t]
inner structure is totally dif£erent form ^ ^ ^^
the philosopher consciously presents it.-" Por Marx> fche
key to the Epicurean philosophy was the atomic swerve- it
revealed the Greek philosopher's notion of freedom. The
"inner structure" of Marx's theory, which shows its
affinity for Jewish thouqht is hi* rm*«i"iw yuu, n s ontology. Bertell
Oilman has summarized its main points.
First, Marx views the world as a system of internal
relations. Nothing exists on its own, discretely,
independent of all else, nor do things simply happen to
come into association by external contingency or chance.
Anything which is, is by virtue of its interrelation with
other features of reality. m Marx's theory, things only
take on a definite existence thorugh interaction. To be
exact, though, we should call this play in the fabric of
the universe " inneraction , " since all the reciprocal
effects which finally characterize any particle of reality
occur within the totality of things real and not primarily
between real units.
For Marx, however odd it may seem, things as such do
not exist. All the factors he examines, he first has to
distinguish out of the whole; furthermore, for different
purposes, he individuates them in different ways. It
follows that in Marx's ontology a thi .Y
'
ng will not bedefined by listing its aualiMy -Li-i, q lities. inst-o^
-** attributes he cQunts ^ J • ' *« Wlll vary
scrutiny dependin
" t0 a" °f hisg on the specific set of relate
— * is looating it at the
-
^ jUSt 33 "™
- - means of
-notion., on »control of ^_ ^ &
s^ectmg the laborer .„ m Marx's fun theoretical
conception, of conrw ^ ^urse, lt means both. 23 As 011man
explains
:
Essentially, a change of focus h aoviewing independent factors whH^h
occurred from
viewing the particular tJr ? are related toin each factor to graspiL^hf 1^ they are relatedmeaning conveyed by^hfconcent *^. aS ?art ° f therule out the existence of = P Thls view d°es notfactor, but treats th?= °ore notion for each
cluster of relations 2f ^ "°ti0n itSelf «» «
When Marx actively determines which relations he will take
to constitute a thing under discussion, he is only doing
what he believes human beings do all the time: namely,
appropriating the world. The ten.
..appropriation" points
to the special place Marx's ontology assigns to human
beings. Like all the animals, species homo sapiens
intrinsically belongs to the natural world. "A being
which does not have its true nature outside itself," Marx
proclaims, "is not a natural being and does not share in
the being of nature." 25 Nature is "Man's (sic) inorganic
Vet humanbeings
_
_ ^
environment, either r^h Physical
ar ,
-gnitively and actig apple with nature in ways that .
ourselves a
-terrally change it, and
s part of -ifit. other annals coexist with their
-
process of appropriate marks off those relations hy
-ch we will hencerorth recognise the real existence of
-ose factors that we incorporate into our own
F
" MarX
'
™OSt
^-acteristioally human way of
labor. m merely looking at a beanHftny d o utiful sunset, for
example, we change ourselves hy heightening our sens.tivity
to beauty, and so
, we appropriate ^ it
^ ^ ^
us. If we go on to paint the sunset, though, or picture
it in words, we "capture" it in a richer, deeper way.
By making the object of our sense perceptions into the
object of our expression, we brlng a wider range of our
human capacities to bear on it. Thus
, we establish a
more all-round, fully human relation to the sunset and, in
the process, „e become more human ourselves. 26 Marx views
things as the summary of relations, and therefore, he can
equally well call human interaction with nature "the
appropriation of the human essence." 27 Human beings only
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in relation to the world; we can nm
• only reveal what we
may be by acting on objects.
What is tM. "human essence „ of wMch ^^^^
Marx denies that any fixed m Qf
_^to humanity in all ages ana counties.
.such a stereo-
type is one of the items he comprehends under the label
as a whole possesses a definite set of shared needs.
Human needs impel us to appropriate the world. "The need
of a thing," writes Marx, "is the evident, irrefutable
proof that the thing belongs to my being..." The needs we
feel, he proposes, stem from the powers we possess. Human
powers range from the exercise of the five senses to
procreation, will, judgment, sex, love, and other varied
capacities. 30 Marx declares that even the most basic
faculties, such as smelling and tasting, can be employed
in either an animal or a human fashion. Progress consists
in part of satisfying needs in a more human manner and in
part of cultivating new needs that extend our range and
bring us more fully into relation with the world.
While individuals must make an effort to realize
their intrinsic powers, the progress of which Marx takes
most note is owing to changes at a social level. The mode
in which a society produces, trying to satisfy human needs,
is not subject to individual choice. The mode of produc-
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tion, however, sets human beings ^ ^
relations, ana these in turn win gQ a ^ ^^
generating one's current needs Par.H
. .
Paradoxically, how humanbeings conceive of their own powers will At> AWli depend mainly onhow the mode of paction (whrch people twelves erect
and maintain) fp^rhocteao es them to understand their own needs
Under capitalism especially, a social formation which
people create reacts back upon them to limit their further
social creativity cruelly. 31
Carol Gould has called Marx's theory a social ontology
an "analysis of the nature of social realityTT^nT^T""
socially interpreted categories. Most people, according
to Marx, do not operate with such an analysis. instead,
they take their cues as to what they need and what they can
achieve from what they observe to be possible under existing
social arrangements. They are thus brought to deny the
impulse to develop their human powers, those very same
powers which brought them to their present pass.
Private property has made us so stupid and partialthat an object is only ours when we have it, when itexists for us as capital, or when it is directly
eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in short,
utilized in some way. JJ
As Marx argues, though, when we opt for our present
practical needs, people (e.g., the Jews in "On the Jewish
Question") are not simply deceived. The mode of production
by which we survive actually contradicts the need to
become what one needs to be. Popular ™ •p consciousness
accurately reflp^fc •Y ects an impossible reality. People
eXP6rienCe W°rld
- - °verPowerrng because ithas really beoome alienated ^^ ^
them.
Because Mao, ontology takes relational human berngs
socral Processes, and changing human needs as it£ basic
natter, it is simultaneously an ontology and a theory of
hxstory. Human history, i„ Marx's telling, shares many
features with a „el 1
-recounted narrative. Its protagonist
15
"e SPSCieS; itS villai
" *• disintegrated existence.
Its plot revolves around the conflict between human needs
and the unsuccessful attempts to fulfill them which have
become necessary to survival. if, in the famous slogan
which opens the Communist Manifesto , all history is indeed
"the history of class struggle," that is because each
class, in accordance with its place in the mode of produc-
tion, seizes on certain powers, needs, and ways of appro-
priating the world and fights to reorganize society so as
to emancipate these particular human potentialities. 34
The purveyors of these partial solutions, even when they
achieve a revolution, typically do not realize the full
significance of their own actions. For Marx, though, one
can only "realize" meaning—that is, make it real—through
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action. He takes practice and not consciousness as the
true expression of what the species has become.
The most human way to create social structures,
nonetheless, is in full awareness of the needs we see, to
meet, and the ways certain kinds of practice succeed
better than others at that task, and (to the extent to
which we can anticipate it) the transforming of human
powers which will result from such practice. Marx sees the
alienation of labor as a force which both prevents and
demands this kind of awareness. Theory, on the other
hand, aids its rise. Theorizing, then, is a part of making
history, and thinking, acting human beings are the heroes
of the story. To break out of the trap set by alienated
laboring and to return to the free, yet directed pursuit
of species-being: that is the purpose that relates one
moment of history to the next.
Human needs first induce us to break up reality into
units that pertain to us. Exactly in appropriating reality
so divided, though, we expand the needs that have been
driving us and lay claim to what we still lack. Steering
by our renewed sense of need, we reinterpret our solutions.
By starting from a sense of something to be done, Marx's
ontology leads on to the conclusion that only by doing it
can we learn what we need in order to live freely and
humanly
.
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III
Over and over again, we find that Marx's sense of
what is real escapes the confines of the Greek conception
of "being." Ultimate reality fcQ ^^ ^
to Marx, it must be rooted in material. Each real thing
in Greek thought has a single essence; in Marx's view, all
things are constituted in relation to one another.
Observing and contemplating the world are the highest
human activities Greek thought can imagine, and theory is
their expression. For Marx, though, human beings at their
best strive to appropriate and transform the world, ;•
through productive practice. Consequently, Marx thinks
of the realization of the world as an inherently social
endeavor, unlike the Greek pursuit of truth, which is a
task for individual philosophers. Also, Marx finds
meaning in historical change, in contrast to the Greek
view that only the eternal and the immutable truly
signify
.
Finally, because of the dialectical quality of
human needs (that one set of needs, being fulfilled,
produces a richer set)
,
Marx cannot project a Republic, an
Absolute State, or any vision of the world made whole once
and for all. Human history is not approaching an ideal
form
,
nor a telos
,
nor any goal given in advance and
always potentially present. Instead, as Marx understands
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Xt, we are tacking towards a goal which changes as we
near it-and so do we. 3 * within the constraints of
serial conditions which our past actions have helped to
shape, impelled by needs we ourselves have in part
Produced, we continually redefine the good human life we
are seeking. That notion of human activity sets Marx
apart, both from thinkers who give human life a prede-
termined end, and from those who make all ends a matter
of arbitrary and individual choice.
It sets him apart, though, only if we allow it to do
so. Many, probably most, of Marx's commentators look at
Marx's ontology and do not recognize the dialogical shape
we have traced there. Both those who speak on Marx's
behalf and those against him agree that he thinks tele-
ologically—that he is working towards an end which
itself propels history to a given conclusion. Oilman,
for instance, assigns communism a foundational role for
Marx's philosophy. Not only does he measure everything by
the standard of "after the revolution," but he insists we
must understand every part of Marx's ontology in terms of
its contribution to producing "communist Man" and his
36powers. So limitless are the capacities he ascribes to
this new breed, too, that he opens Marx to the charge of
making people into abstractions all over again. 37 This is
surely no service to Marx.
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For it is precisely in reaction tc this kind of
"Marxism" that Taylor for ™= ,Y , one, claims Marx's concept of
freedom must be ultimately incoherent. Marx's theory
according to Taylor, can only point out any purpose for
human effort as long as the ends of the theory-the
creating of the conditions for human freedom-are not met.
"But once the conditions are reali 7 Pd » ^I ilzea, he argues, "the
Marxist notion of freedom is of no further help." why is
this? "The overcoming of all alienation and division
leaves man [sic] without a situation"; that is, without
any "predicament which sets us a certain task or calls
for a certain response from us if we are to be free."
Marx's theoretical end unravels itself, and so, Taylor
contends, Marx's is a notion of "an utterly empty
freedom.
"
38
We can appreciate the force of Taylor's argument.
In effect, he is arguing that Marx, despite all his
efforts, has produced still too Greek a solution. At the
end, it still fails to emancipate the real, individual
human beings. Marx could not shrug off this thrust; it
strikes at the heart of his concern and the reason for his
theorizing. Moreover, he himself provides support for
the indictment: in the later pages of Capital
, where he
speaks of expanding the realm of freedom and contracting
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the realm of necessity. 39 Thi.lS aPP^oach clashes harshly
with his main argument that needs sour i-h« kp the humanizing
of all human activity. The idea that we can, and should
minimize the portion of our lives devoted to need
suggests that freedom consists of acting without reference
to the specific powers whose exercise we care about and
which have historically defined what it means to be human.
This freedom certainly resembles Taylor's
"situationless
freedom"; it even smells of Nietzsche
"passive nihilism." 40
Like Oilman's exaggerated defense, though, Taylor's
critique takes for granted that the teleological reading
of Marx is the only one we can accept. what if we choose
not to do so? we have before us an alternative: the
dialogical reading. As it appears in Jewish thought,
dialogue has a direction; it leads somewhere we want to go.
But the goal, hallowing the world, is itself a process
which calls for ever freer and more purposeful dialogue.
In the dialogical relation, that is to say, we can make
progress and perceive that we are making progress
without measuring it off against a fixed goal or telos.
Similarly, Marx's theory of how people become free does
not have to depend on a final smoothing out of contra-
dictions for us to feel its emancipatory thrust. We can
accept it as an interpretation without requiring any
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other "proof" than its ability to caDtu„ «° p re for us our felt
needs and the tasks they impose-wW „y mpose -what Marx himself might
call our "situation in the present enslaved world «
We might therefore read Marx's theory as a story
with a plot and a climax, hut no ending: only, in Taylor , s
terms, "a hent in things whioh inolines without neces-
sitating."^ This sort Qf reaa . ng wQuid ^ ^ ^
paradox of a freedom which dissolves once it is fully
achieved. But, one might ask, what motive does this
reading leave for revolution, lf we are always ceaselessly
pursuing the realization of our needs, only to develop
new ones, why should it matter so much whether we live
under capitalism or communism? Obviously, to Marx it
matters enormously.
Within the paradigm of dialogue, the Jewish tradition
recognizes the possibility of a condition known as exile
which interrupts and distorts the I-Thou relation from
which human life draws its meaning. I will compare
exile to Marx's theme alienation in chapter 5, making the
case that revolution in Marx's theory is structured like,
and takes the place of, return from exile in the Jewish
tradition. For now, let us only challenge the thesis that
revolution, for Marx, must mean the creation of situation-
less freedom. Let us propose that it may mean the
I (It,
creation of a better »^v^'predicament" fron which tQ beg . n
realizing human freedom, instead.
This kind of reading, a non- "Marxist " .««appropriation of
Marx's ontology, makes room for ^^ ^
historically concrete human beings to i„ fl uence their
decisions about how they win go about becom .,ng ^ ^
what to do with that freedo, once they en joy it. since one
of Marx's criticise of Greek and modern theorists is that
they shut out real people and their experiences, admitting
them only as "the other-being of thought,« a reading of
Marx which lets then, in can plausibly clai, to keep faith
with Marx's project.
The interpretation developed here also gains credence
from its affinity for the theme of partnership with God we
encountered in Jewish thought. God nowhere appears as a
real actor in Marx's theory. Nevertheless, in Marx as in
Judaism, human beings take part in the continuous creation
of the world. Human action bears a cosmic significance.
People are engaged in a historic mission, and we sense a
direction to our actions which seems both to respond to
our wills and to something real and effective beyond
ourselves. With all these points of contact, would it be
surprising if Marx's sense of reality embraced one more
Jewish theme: a goal which we help shape, even as we
struggle to make it real?
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IV
is Marx's ontology Jewish? rt is an,S
'
d yet it is notDespite his remarks about "the neaatio *6 <? n of Judaism" as astartmg point, Marx does not select th* t
„ .
1 e Jews a s his chosenpeople. The history he find., mQ •Y n nds meaningful is economic,
political, cultural, but not rpiireligious and not Torah. God
disappears from Marx: what stands in dialogue with human
need is a complex of ^twg. and . ^ ^
continuing to work nn !+ » x.o it. Nature and past human actions
compose the human situation. They set the conditions and
provide the impuise and the raw materials for fulfiUing
human needs. Ul needs are human, thou gh. There are no
others
Marx thus sets himself the puzzle of meeting the
demands a Jewish sense of reality sets upon him while
rejecting the traditional source of answers for how to do
so. His is a dialogue with an exiled God. The rabbis of
the Talmudic period faced a similar crisis of interpre-
tation, and they resolved it by subjecting the Torah to a
series of daring ^interpretations
.
44
Marx's solution is
even more difficult: he must do his exegesis on the "text"
of the social fabric itself.
As a first reading, though, Marx can and does engage
the special part of social practice which encapsulates the
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rest: the writing of theory. As a reader Qf ^ ^
partioular, Marx brings into profane political theory a
style of her.eneutics which is and is not the same ag ^
rabbinic mode of interpretation. Not only do Ms
spring from a refracted version of Jewish reality, but his
methods do, as well.
CHAPTER FOUR
READING AND WRITING MARX
Readers who have followed the story of the Jewish
cuestion about Marx up to this point may now he wondering
why we have passed over an obvious question: namely, what
about Hegel? instead of postulating a convex and
conflioted relation between Marx^s theory and Jewish
struotures of thought, could we not traoe Marx^s diver-
gences from Greek ontology to his being influenced by
Hegel's philosophy?
The idea that in order to produce his own theory Marx
simply inverts the Hegelian system has its origins with
Marx himself. "My dialectic method," he asserts in an
afterword to Capital
,
"is not only different from the
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite."
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain,i.e., the process of thinkina, which, under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into anindependent subject, is the demiurqos of the real
world, and the real world is only the external
phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected by the human mind, and
translated into forms of thought.
...With him [the dialectic] is standina on its head.
It must be turned right side up again, "if you would
discover the rational kernel within the mystical
shell.
1
Twentieth-century writers who treat of Marx's debt to
Hegel take Marx quite literally, assuming that he
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invert the idealist dialectic^ ^
motions. Avineri, for instance, states:
Seen^lrand^fi° ft^eW the <""-encereduced to Marx's rejection ^ " sPect can be
about the existence ? D the Hegelian postulateAbsolute Spirit, and to hiTl * lstorical essence,
^fbebung [transcendence] If
C
?^
S
^i0n that the
o°cu°rred
r
.' 2
While He5Sl ha
n
d
ta
ll?eaay
haS ^
And in fact, it is possible for the theorist reading
«arx to assimilate much of Marx's ontology to Hegel's
^lectio. Like Marx and unlrke many thinners of his trme
Hegel understands the world as constituted by tensions
between opposing (oE "contradictory", forces
. He looks
for these contradictions to produce new configurations of
events and of ideas. Hegel's philosophy is dynamic (it
studies reality in flux ) and procressive (it "gains in
richness" as it examines each era of history in turn, and
it also "moves toward the realization of a final good"). 3
It is therefore intrinsically temporal and historical,
unlike Greek thought and like Marx's. For all these
reasons, commentators have generally agreed that Marx's
theory begins as a materialist critique of Hegel's
idealist logic, and that wherever Hegel writes Spirit,
Marx simply substitutes Man, and proceeds from there.
Since so much of Marx's thinking about the nature of
reality can plausibly be read as Hegel turned right-side
up, and since that reading carries the weight of a long
Ill
and venerable tradition, what^ ^ ^ ^
suggest an alternative, Primarily, u ^ ^
sense that the accepted formula is just tQ ^
transposition it demands sounds too smooth to describe the
way any thinker draws on another i P f in
'
let alone the way that
Marx reads Hegel, when Marx himself expl ains his compulsion
to transcend his teacher, as we have already seen, he does
criticize the letter's
•spiritual" bent, but he also
condemns Hegel's ontology because it is "Greek." It
excludes certain basic aspects of human life and therefore
certain persons in society from full participation in human
freedom. The vision of the whole which Marx, justly or
unjustly, imputes to Hegel makes truth-and consequently,
freedom-accessible only from a philosophical standpoint:
either to philosophers or to those who adopt a similar
God's-eye viewpoint on the universe. For Marx, this is a
deformed understanding of human emancipation.
Reading Marx, then, we observe him attacking Hegel on
two fronts: on his casting Spirit, and not humanity, as
the hero of his story, and on his willingness to exclude
major elements of human life from his ideal of human
freedom. At best, a reversal of Hegel would only answer
the first of the two charges, leaving the second unopposed.
Furthermore, these are not trivial points: they strike at
the heart of Hegel's theory as Marx interprets it. Is it
he read Heqel anH = 4-uy x
'
d that the main points nf h i oFa o his own theory
occurs to nim only a£ the „direct
^ ^
E^iiM^OiohtT
-What can Marx mea „ by ., turnina
Hegel right side up again"?
in order to answer these questions, we must listen
very olosely to what the memorable phrase about Hegel is
saying. To speak of the dialectic
"standing on its head-
is to employ a trope of inversion, reversal, or exchanae of
Place. Like an hourglass in which all the sand has fallen
to the bottom, the expression implies, the dialectic as it
is found with Hegel can be righted, so that what had
settled can be set into motion once again. Once "right
side up," though, neither the structure nor the content
will change. The two sides of an hourglass are identical.
So, if we were to read "standing on its head" as a simple
metaphor, in Marx's theory we would expect God to take the
Place of Man and Man of God, and all the relations between
them to remain the same, although flowing toward the
opposite pole from before.
This is not what happens when Marx reads Hegel,
though; indeed, it is hard to imagine how it could be. in
Hegel's dialectic, human beings in their finitude and
morality embody a necessary moment in the process by which
Spirit becomes real in the world. Although that process
reaches on beyond the,, human be.ngs are among its
constituent elements. They could not be left out For
Marx, matters stand quite differently. Unllke humankind ^
the dialectic of Spirit, God is not essential to the
development of the human species
-rather
, God (or the
belief in God) is an obstruction to that development.
Human emancipation does not incorporate religion but
abolishes it, instead. it does the same to the state, thus
dispensing with an institution Hegel regards as crucial to
the realization of Absolute Spirit. Even culture and
consciousness, the other denizens of Hegel's "realm of the
spirit," take on a shadowy half
-life in those parts of
Marx's writings which are a critique of Hegel. it is as
if Marx were so offended by Hegel's subordination of
humanity to "the Idea" that he could not stand to focus on
anything else in Hegel for long.
If we want to understand why Marx has to remove Spirit
from the dialectic and not just reverse its place within
it, we may consider a crucial presupposition of the
Hegelian philosophy which Taylor describes.
The universe has many levels because it is the
unfolding of an inner necessity in external reality.
The infinite end is realized in finite ends. And
that is why we can see the end of Reason both ai~
always realized and as always having to be realized
.
The experience of finite subjects is that the plan
of reason has yet to be fulfilled. They strive
towards it. But if we rise to a vision of the whole
we can see that this very striving is part of the
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plan and that as a whole it -i = i
appearance of unrealizedness is ™ Y realized - Theand yet this deception itself ?«, £
err
?
r
'
a deception;
Idea, as is the overcoming of thisT9^ £b°Ut by the .g t hls error by ourselves. 4
This is a comforting conclusion In order to arriye
at it, though, Hegel has to make two further assumptions.
F«.t. there is a
.'vision of the whole," a privileoed
perspective from which "external., reality all makes sense.
Second, we can know that this perspective is the true one
and that the more mundane perspective which sees the world
as still fragmented and incomplete is "an error, a decep-
tion." m positing a point of view which is both true and
certain, Hegel aspires to what we called a few pages ago a
"God's-eye view of the universe."
When Marx removes God from the dialectic, though, at
the same time he rejects the God's-eye viewpoint or
anything like it. "The experience of finite subjects" is
all we have to go on. Denying our finitude would lead us
to spin cobweb worlds out of our own heads, as Marx
accuses the Greek philosophers of doing. On the other
hand, denying that we are subjects in the plural and not
some singular world-spirit would open the door again for
some class of people falsely to proclaim itself the
universal, ignoring the experience and the needs of others.
So, from the beginning, the theoretical move that excludes
from the dialectic has a political bearing. If GodGod
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did not exist, Marx =fin ,
'
stlH would be forced ^ /.C to deny Him— in
r 90dUke «— humanbeings.
By now, though, we begin to detect ^L a Pattern into
which „arx . s swerve away from
y rits. it is DUSt the
same turn Marx makes from Bauer in "On ,m the Jewish Question-
when he denies that political e^mancipation from religion,
property, and so on
, is a rP , i i •
u
>
eal liberation. Marx is also
exhibiting the same penchant when he reacts the claims of
the political state, "the perfected Christian state," to
unify and to free society, and again when he leaves the
Pp^is and Greek philosophy behind as models for fulfill
human life and thought. m Capital, Marx returns to
expand on the same Drnnrpcdo^ ttp ogressi n. He reconstructs the
commonplace notion of free exchange in the marketplace.
He reveals by its absence what that notion leaves out: the
laborer in the factory. Then, he restores the ignominies
of the exploitation of labor to the picture. Suddenly, in
his ironic description, market freedom seems as "spiritual,"
as unreal, and as irrelevant as Absolute Spirit, and Marx
treats it, too, as an illusion. 5
Marx seems constitutionally incapable of doing what
he believes Hegel would like him to do: of "rising to a
vision of the whole" that is achieved by making some of the
parts—Jews, workers, the labor process—invisible
. We can
recognize this attitude as consonant with Marx's ontology
wh.ch we have understood as sharrng its key dynamics with
traditional Jewish thought. Reading Marx side by side
with Hegel is like comparing Hebrew with Greek-at least
if we read Hegel the way Marx does. But this brings us
back to the question: how does Marx read Heoel? For, after
all, Marx does purport to be performing some kind of'
operation on Hegel's writings. if he arrives at Jewish
conclusions, that should make us all the more curious to
know how he gets there from where he starts. if Marx is
not standing Hegel on his feet, then what is he doing to
him? And where does Jewish thinking enter into it?
We can tell what Marx is not doing. He is not saying,
"Hegel is all wrong. He's too Greek. Let's dispense with
him." Nor is he saying, "Hegel has corrected the faults
of the Greeks: let's embrace him." Nor yet is he saying
that Hegel has most of it right and only needs correction
on certain points. In fact, the more we read Marx on
Hegel, the more difficult it becomes to encapsulate Marx's
reaction in any simple formula.
Marx seems rather to be responding to various bits
and fragments of what Hegel wrote, finding opportunities
to express his own recurring themes in the course of his
commentary. At moments when Hegel leads to Greek-like
conclusions, Marx takes issue with him as if it were
b He9el had an obli9ation to
~« «*-
COnStralntS WMCh hS
— ** Hegel evidently does not
Those constraints, furthermore, arise out Qf^
^logical view of the world and his Jewish insistence onthe necessary effectiveness of the real.
Where does Marx discover thiscm strange procedure? in
terms of his actual biography, we are unlik.lt- i, e y ever to know
for sure. For the present, though, we would do well to
explore the affinities between Marx's way of relating to
texts and the traditional Jewish brand of hermeneutics
known as midrash.
II
Midrash means the creative style of textual interpre-
tation developed by the rabbis of Palestine and Babylonia
in the 3rd-6th centuries C.E. At least, that is one of
its meanings. Like the term Torah, midrash expands and
contracts, depending on context. Midrash can mean the
exegesis of one verse or part of a verse using certain
"midrashic" methods. It can refer to the product of such
an exegesis, whether that is a one-sentence gloss or a
series of alternative readings of the same bit of text.
Midrash also includes book-length anthologies of these
shorter midrashim
,
arranged in the order of the verses on
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which they cogent. (Bereishit^bbsh, for instance
,ives an the classlc midrash on ^ book ^ Bereish ; t< ^Genesi s
.
)
When someone speaks of "the Midrash," furthermore,
they usually mean the entire bodv of *-uy these midrashic books,
as well as the qfnriapn sto es they contain. Indeed, it is a
COmm°n miStakS t0 «*« fc° «V story that concerns
characters or events in the Torah as a .ldrash. Some of
our conte.porary literary critics, on the other hand, focus
on the character of midrash as text about text. They use
the term to suggest the construction of a piece of writing
as a commentary on nr r-r-o = +- ;Y , o creative misappropriation of, a
Precursor author's work. They also employ the term midrash
to point out the belated and allusive nature of all writing
and to encourage its deconstruction
.
7
What ties together this bundle of usages is the
activity of doing midrash. The Hebrew root of the word,
drash, tells us that midrash is about asking, seeking into,
demanding, requiring a response, investigating deeply.
When a reader does midrash on a text, s/he wants to know
more than what each word and sentence says or what the
author intended to say. S/he also goes beyond the histor-
ical circumstances of the text's production and the
literary art by which it produces its effects. All these
points may interest the midrashist, but they do not
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satisfy on their own ThP ^ a^ rSader who is doing midrash
wants to discover how the text n uCan h6l P her or him to facethe problems of everyday life: her Qr
,..
•
n o his own personal
;
and the
°<
— - here and now
.
;
idrash -maker seeks
- *• — a guide t0 re _engaging
ogue with God
- By
— scriPture
, though
,the reate has alreaay begun to re:oin ^ e
Midrash thus becomes not- « iS
°nly 3 c°™unication about actio,but an aotion in itself
, an^ Qf
I" order to understand midrash (and what the person
doing midrash is doing), we need t„ „„ ^2.J
, o consider again the
unique status of the Tnrah ;„ tun o in the Jewish tradition. We
have already remarked that the Torah continuously generates
the vital themes of Jewish culture and that within that
culture, studying Torah is conceived of as trying to find
out what God wants us to do, in order to respond. The
Torah is not merely the written covenant of the Jewish
partnership with God; it is the place and the moment of
dialogue
.
Any book which can play such an active role in
f fairs of cosmic significance is no mere book. m the
idrash on the first verse of the book of Genesis, the
rabbis accord a new status to Torah: it is the blueprint
of creation.
a
m
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s a
a
Plans and
according to his own w?=h d°es not buHd
records L order £ know how t"^ he hascorridors. The Hoi v One hL r°oms and
-e. ^He looked lnto°tne rorT1^ -d t^
legendary hrstory, such as the revelatiQn ^Wnea as existing before creation itseif
_ ^^^^
Utters of black flre upon a backmi Qf white ^ _ ^
another rabbinic source puts it." The world t.^
according to a ground pl an which we can drscover in Torah
Hence, say the rabbis who brought midrash to an art if
you want to know anything about the world, look first in
the Torah: "Learn it and learn 4+ «
u
S 11
'
for everything is in
it." Even and perhaps especially if what you want fcQ
understand is not mentioned explicitly in the pages of
Scripture, the masters of midrash counsel redoubling your
ingenuity. Between the lines, they assure, you will find
an answer that will guide you and not mislead.
To be completely relevant, a text must be completely
meaningful, too. The rabbis called the Torah an ocean of
meaning into which they could plunge again and again
without ever plumbing its depths. At the same time, they
assumed categorically that every detail of the text—not
only its propositions but the order of the sentences, the
repetition or omission of words fh „, t e shapes and numericalvalues of the Hebrew letters, and even the microscopic
flourishes of the f r^u'ltl0nal Calli^Phy-held
-Portant
messages for the resourceful re«fl«
„ 1 j ,
Sader
- 5^h^g_by_cj^
could have been their motto m * *uiutt . In fact, Rabbi Akih^
^
^AJJ
-
K1£)a, a manor
:
eacher
°
f the 2nd
— «. «- the biblical vers;
*>r it [Torah] is no empty thing froffl yous ^ ^^
'
Ufe» (Deut
. 32 : 47) and commented
_
„ if ^ ^^ ^ ^
on vour aeeonnt, because you ^ ^
It." The duty of every ma l e Jew
, according tQ ^
rabMS
'
t0 P^ that—1= to devote substantialt- to interpreting Torah, £iUing its words with meaning
that one eould then apply to the directlon Qf^
life. 1 "3
Now, there is something paradoxical about the rabbis'
attitude toward Torah to the modern eye. if the Torah is
the ground plan for the world, it must state the objective
truth, and then how could it ever be meaningless? Abba's
warning seems misplaced. Surely, a people which believes
in a divine document would accumulate a body of authori-
tative interpretation. Turning exegesis into doctrine, it
would eliminate the danger that the text would ever stand
empty, or indeed, that believers could mistake its
meaning. 14 On the other hand, if the truth of the Torah
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is subjective, if its meaning is indeterminate untu
readers produce that
«* Of their own thoughts and
the same energy to thinking about our problems airectly
instead of pu2zllng through archaic ^ ^^
sense of it all?
To the rabbis, apparently, these were not serrous
Questions, and not because of blind faith, but simply
because the questions missed the point. ..Learn it and
learn it": assuming that every bit of the Torah has
meaning (and potentially many meanings), 15 our knowledge
of what it is saying can never exhaust what it has to say.
There is always another interpretation. No single reading
can ever replace the text, and none ever will, because as
time goes on, changes in our particular situations may
empower us to recognize something in the text which was
closed to us before.
As for the question, "Why the Torah at all?" The
rabbis would not answer by asserting the objective truth
of the Torah, nor even its utility. They would never
justify Torah study in terms of some less ultimate end.
Interpreting Torah is maintaining the dialogue with God,
which is humanity's purpose. The question the rabbis
would resolve by way of midrash was the question that had
formed the covenant between God and humankind" "How shall
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t-t, „or lB it in the readeri ^ ^ ^^^^ ^
which both are n^rfc t • ,pa ts. m midrash, moreover
_ rabbinio
-aaers filled one part Qf ^ ^
Reprint, the Torah-„i th meaning
. ^^ ^
»as the beginning of the answer
. To^ ^ ^ ^
interpretation, therefore, would not he an assertion of
rational autonomy, but a breaking of faith wl<.„y ^j- i n ith our divine
Partner and with each other. The rabbis could only thin,
of deserting the text as a oo.pletely irresponsible act.
As if to emphasize the indispensability of human
action to Torah, both as text and as divine medium, the
rabbis came up with a second story to explain the Torah 's
uniqueness. Going by the biblical account in Exodus, the
Torah was given to Moses at Mount Sinai in written form.
The rabbis announced, however, that in addition to the
Written Torah, Moses had received an Oral Torah at Sinai:
a torah she b'al peh, an "instruction by word of mouth."
This oral Torah he had passed on to his successor Joshua,
who transmitted it to the elders of the people, and so on,
until in rabbinic times it had lodged itself in the rabbis
lfithemselves.
The Oral Torah was never an esoteric doctrine. The
rabbis of the third century and onwards spent huge efforts
trying to disseminate it among the people, even to make it
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sm
into the common law. 17 The pv ,existence of an Oral Torah,
though, did imply that whoever read frho k-vithe bible without it
rabbinic co^.entary read only a fractioR Qf^^
would come to consider the entire text. This had the
Mediate effect of frustrate chrrstian proselytlZers
since the chain of tradition from s.nai showed that the
covenant between God and the Jewish people remained
^ _ j , 18intact
.
By settling the question of rabbinic authority,
however, the doctrine of an Oral Torah paradoxically set
rabbinic imaginations free to interpret the written text
in creative and innovative ways. True, in order to say
something new, the midrashist had first to refer to
something old. 19 The rabbis mined the entire bible for
prooftexts
-with which to support their readings, sometimes
creating what they themselves called "a mountain hanging
by a hair." m this manner, though, it was almost always
possible to find support. In the end, the acceptance or
rejection of a midrashic interpretation depended on how
well it played off the traditional themes to solve a
present-day problem. Breathtakingly
, the rabbis declared,
"All that a serious student will yet expound before his
[sic] teacher has already been told to Moses at Sinai." 20
on
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By our faithfulness and our ^^^^ ^
T ^ - tUally «. interpretationtranscends revelation.
Ill
Taking advantaqe of fhp l jg t e latitude that the existence
of an oral tradition granted *-v^, the rabbis who did midrash
borrowed from a treasury of exeaetica] <» hx g l techniques to open
the text even wider. They employed
methods depending „hether it was their goal ^
l^iha or aggadah. Midrash halakhah is the interpretati
«* T°rah (or of Mishnah, inquiries into the rrght oonduot
of daily life by rabbis liying before ^ ^ ^
produce praotioal guidance for all one's activities that
could be made holy, from making offerings in the Temple to
eating dinner. Halakha is often translated as "Jewish
law," but this is misleading, it means "way of going," or
more precisely, of walking, as in the prophet's injunction,
"Walk humbly before the Lord your God" (Micah 6:8).
In order to learn how they should go, the rabbis of
the Talmudic period would pose questions to the text in
order to clarify what, they were already aware, God asked
of them. "From what hour may one recite the eveining
prayers?" (Berakhot 2a), for example, assumes we already
agree we are obliged to pray at fixed times and we know
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of what the evening prayers consist
, D u
S
-
Another passage(Baba Metzia 2a) begins,
"One who i P
.
S W
° leave s either cattle orcensus in a neighbor^ care, ^ ^ _ ^ ^
tOWard nSi9hb0rS
-
d £
—
-ponsrbiUt.es when weMdertake
"
Saf
—— ^°ngings
. ^ mrdrash will
atte.pt to spell those responsibiUties ^ fluties ^
m doing so, midrash halakhah w .u ^ fch6
familiar logical systeH of Aristotie; however
_ ^ de^ rtsfrom it in four important ways .21 ^ ^ &
logic of classes. To work wlth it
, Qne places ^
w.thin its proper specres, or a specres within its genus,
and remembers what is common to the species or genus as a
whole. Midrash halakhah does not drew items into relations
of identity or submerge an individual within a class, its
method is not ta Xonomical
. instead of ordering things
hierarchically, it juxtaposes them, finding similarity
across differences, so that what we know about one item,
we can use to understand another apparently quite unlike
it.
Because it is not a logic of classes, midrash
halakhah rarely uses the basic unit of Aristotelian logic,
the syllogism, in its investigations. The classic school-
book syllogism is this: "All men are mortal; Socrates is
a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." Clearly, once we
have agreed that belongs tQ cias£
C0"ClUSi0n 1S
—'tioui, oDvious: it follows b7defini .tion. m midrash halakhah, thouah fh« i
'
n 9n
'
t e closest thing tothe syllogism is the ka^ve-chorner
, or a fortin' '
-' .jLortior^ argument.
Here, in a biblical example
, Moses^ ^ ^
been rebellious against me; ana how mUch more after my
death?" (Deut. 31:27) HerP ^e, the connection is not is, not
Entity, but h_o l^LJ^ ^^ In a cruc . ai ^ ^ ^
not logical out psychological. It depends Qn ^
-Possible only through experience in interaction-that
Moses's personal authority restrain, r)loj-ty s the people from insur-
rection. If Mnqpq rH^ r^4- 1 •oses did not realize this, it would not be
obvious, and it would probably not be true.
Unlike Moses, the midrash-maker confronts, not a
people, but a text. So, a third difference: midrash relies
on associations which are rarely conceptual, often
psychological, but primarily linguistic. For instance,
using a technique called gezera shavah ("equal injunction"),
Rabbi Hillel in the 1st century BCE showed that the Paschal
lamb may be sacrificed on the Sabbath, even though it
involves labor. Both the laws about the Paschal sacrifice
and those about the daily offering contain the word
b 'moado
,
"in its appointed season." Numbers 28:10
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expressly states that the dailv n **
Sabbath ,
15 br°U
^ht on the. so, he argued, the word b'moado
us thaf ^
^JHp comes to teacht the answer is the same in each in.
mav «
stance: the lamby be offered because the ca,P , »LUC <~ases are prmai m.equ l, what is equalabout them? t s thPro = . q
1
e e any principle behind t-ho
y—i .
^ n he connectionsFor the rabbis, it does nnfot seem to matter. identity of
expression is reason enough.
Another techn-irmo k-,-h^que, binyan ay, shows the linguistic
ana psychological bent of midrash even raore clgariy
^m^L mean, "construction of a general rule." On first
^ance, its procedure seems like simple inductive logic
First, we find a case on which the halakha is given-say,
that of a person whose animal causes damaae by eating
something that belongs to another person. Then, we apply
the rulings from that case to a similar instance-say,
that of a person whose animal rubs against a wall, causing
it to collapse. There are two special points to be noted,
though, one: the name the halakhah gives to this whole
category, after the original case, is
-tooth---, concrete
example, not an abstract quality. Two: in this case
(unlike the gezera shavah just cited), the interpreter
states what makes the cases similar. Both involve damage
wreaked by an animal acting for its own satisfaction. But
this hypostasis never replaces "tooth"; in fact, "tooth,"
the model case, is consulted to clarify the definition,
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w^ght, nor do they imply a universal1 truth beyond theparticular cases.
fourth d ifference between the logic o£ Aristotle
that of midrash halaKhah follows Erectly from this
Point about the general and the particular, and it bears
hugely on the distinctiveness of midrash as a style of
interpretation. Aristotle. logic forms true statements byScribing (i.e., assigninQ predicates tQ)^
<SSO). ^th is a matter of the „whatnesE „ ^ fche
its essential beinrr r„+.c nc. But, as just mentioned, midrash
remains agnostic about essences. « finds its truths only
in context and in situation, and its practitioners reaard
Philosophical principles as irrelevant. For Aristotle,
words are only names, mere signs of the nature of things
as they are. Doing midrash, on the other hand, one
studies "the words of the living God," real, powerful, and
effective. One moves, not from signifier to signified,
but from sense to sense.
Therefore, in contrast to normal jurisprudence and to
Aristotelian theories of textual interpretation, midrash
halakhah spends as much time studying those opinions it
rejects as those it certifies into practice. The halakhic
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interpreter wants to understand the inner 1 •
Tho
l lo9 lc of each.e assumption is that all the r.hh'
are „ .
S abblS Clted ^ the Mishnah
serious students." Their declare
no
a clarations, even those notconsidered bindina still ~~g, come from Sinai. Therefore, all
must be studied. i n the mn<=4. *6 ° St fam° US ^stance, the schools
of Killel and Shammai, both leading *. un teachers of their daydisagreed on nearly everv m*wY y ajor point for three long years
Finally, a heavenly voice intervened t*
-
xt announced,
"Both
these and these are the words of fh. na t e living God, but the
halakhah is according to the school of Hillel " 22 The
opinio, of the school of Shammai, though, was recorded and
is studied to this day.
Divine speakers rarely intrude on rabbinic discussion,
though, and so-remarkably
, for what is thought of as a
legal code-midrash halakhah often leads to an impasse.
Frequently, one simply cannot tell from the discussion
which version is valid halakhah. So, even in this
legalistically-oriented brand of Jewish hermeneutics
, the
need to find a solution for the present moment does not
foreclose the possibility of different solutions for the
future. Nor does the methodological strictness of midrash
halakhah mean it must needs become a closed system. "We
do not enact decrees that the people cannot live by," a
Talmudic maxim states. In fact, in later years, custom
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acquired the power to~ once lt did of
course, a new midrash might arise ^ .^^ ^
as well.
IV
But not all miarash focuses on producing halakhah
.
^i^L^aah starts frora different sorts Qf
not "How do we do this?" but "what does this mean?»
Assuming that the Tnr^h *o a is completely meaningful, as the
rabbis did, they could ask about the meaning of any
irregularity in the text and expect a serious answer. Did
a sentence contain a word that could easily have been
omitted? The rabbinic readers would want to know why.
Did a word appear in two dissimilar passages? They might
weave a story to reveal a hidden link. Was there a gap
in the narrative that could not be explained in any other
way? into the breach, the midrash-makers stepped. They
might take advantage of the way biblical Hebrew is written,
without vowels or punctuation, to revocalize words or
recombine sentences. They might trade on the numerical
value of the Hebrew letters to find hints of other
messages that would add up to an equal sum. in effect, in
order to find meaning, the rabbis allowed themselves to
rewrite the text, secure in the belief that they were
doing God's work. "For it i «= «„11 15 no emPtY thing from you":
the guarantee takes on the force nfr o a command.
Although to the outside rP^ Qreader some of these midrashim
may seem to border on the arbitrary, they cou ld not have
been produced and would not have been accepted without a
'
ser.es of constraints that made them legitimate interpre-
tations in the Jewish world To k~ •ia. begin with, midrash
aggadah is conditioned by the text if^irn itself. "No text ever
loses its plain meaning," the rabbis ruled. 2 However
elaborate the lesson one can draw from a biblical verse by
midrash, its more straightforward message (relatively
speakina) remained; it was never cancelled, as in allegory.
Moreover, every midrash had to connect itself, even by a
long and tenuous chain of ideas, to a verse or several
verses of Torah. Also, no midrash could successfully clam
to exhaust the meaning of its text. it is common, in fact,
for midrashic anthologies to list a number of readings on
a verse, sometimes more than one attributed to the same
source, and to introduce each one simply as "Another
interpretation.
"
Beyond the stimulus of the text, however, what really
determined the making of midrash and conferred legitimacy
on its final products was a set of concerns and preoccu-
pations shared by rabbinic writers and their readers
during the Talmudic period. In his study The Rabbinic
MH£, Max Kadushin calls these or™ •
25
ganizing themes
"value-
concepts." Value-concepts arP *
faetq
P Values " opposed to
significant to a given set of readers. Kadushin lists themam rabbinic value-concepts as the th*F "* emes of God'sjustice, God's love (or mercv) nv, uy
, Torah
, and the ^
^rae!. Midras^^a^ mostly addresses^ ^
and the relations between them. Mother way of sayinc
this, and perhaps a better, is that when the rabbis would
°° midrash, they would seex out problems in ; the text that
might have a bearing on one of these four.
The value-concepts act as a complex, organismic whole
that defines, to a great extent, what it meant to be a Jew
during the 3rd-6th centuries CE. Both the self and the
"special character of the group," according to Kadushin,
depended^ largely on "the transmission of the valuational
terms." 26 They were-and still are-a large part of
Jewish culture. By pegging interpretation to these themes,
therefore, midrashists made sure of their audience, and by
building commentary on commentary, they guaranteed their
findings a plausibility that mere pronouncements could
not attain.
But did the rabbis believe their own midrashim, and
did their audiences believe them? It depends on what we
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-an by fcenef. „
^^^^ ^
question ahout whether some event actuauy ^^^^ a^
choosing a "yes" response instead of a "no " «,M
'
then Jews have
never helieved midrashlm-but they^
either. That yes
-or-no guestron rarely troubled the.
Kadushin points out that midrash-raakers often hear and
acknowledge vaiid obj eotions to *eir preferred readin. and
adhere to it anyway.
"Suoh persistenoe , " he states, "surely
implies a he lief of some kind, but a belief which
. . . is ]ust
as surely not unqualified." 27
A receptive attitude toward midrash necessarily
involves a state of mind Kadushin calls
"indeterminate
belief." m modern philosophical terms, to engage a
midrash is to bracket questions of truth in order to seek
meaning. The midrashist and his or her readers play with
the text, sometimes 1 ightheartedly
, but with a serious
purpose. The stories that they foster say something about
their real and pressing problems; through midrash, they
gain a deeper understanding of why and how to act.
If a belief is implicated here, it is the bedrock
belief in the meaningfulness of Torah and in the activity
of interpretation. To believe is to trust. 28 Doing
midrash, especially aggadic midrash, is like exploring
s relationship with another person: knowing objectiveone 1
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facts about the other may not move the relatio „a nship alonaany further. Through midra
*
.,
'
Jews
<3et to know" God andhe world. Thev ,. believe „ ln ^ ^ ^ they
spared to that faith, what importance has mere ^
value?
one
V
It is useful to look at an example of aggadic midrash
whxoh James Kugel has analyzed. The text is Psalm 145
of many Hebrew poems oo.posed alphabetically, with each
line beginning with a new letter of the alphabet. The
rabbis noticed, though, that no line starts with the letter
it is omitted from the sequence, of course, they had
to ask, «Why? . Rabbi yohanan g
.
ves ^ explanat . on
_
David, the supposed author of the Psalms, knew that in
Amos 5:2, the letter nun would begin the dire sentence "She
has fallen (nafelah) and will no more rise, the virgin of
Israel." He left out the nun verse in order to avoid
referring to this prophecy of downfall. Rabbi Nahman bar
Isaac seconded this opinion, adding that the next verse
following the omission provides the antitdote: "The Lord
lifts up all who are fallen, and straightens up all who
are bent."
So far, this is fairly straightforward
— for midrash.
True, the question is not one most readers would have come
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up with, but the midrashist is constantantly on the lookout
for such minutiae. Tru P *-v,^e, the answer Rabbi Yohanan gives
makes David, who lived long beforeiy o r Amos, remarkably
precognitive
. it is a r-aKK-: •3 rabb«^ dictum, though, that there
IS "no before or after in Torah ...30 ^ ^^ ^
answer a guestion about another verse „hole ly disconnected
fro, it. Kabbi Nahman.s addendum, on the other hand, ta.es
the mere fact of juxtaposition to warrant his readinc one
verse into its neighbor. His interpretation, together with
the one it builds on, treats mn-c mo
,
God s mercy toward the people
Israel, thus relating two value-concepts in a wholly
traditional way.
The sages of Palestine, though, offer a more daring
reading than these two Babylonian rabbis, not of Psalm 145,
but of the problematic verse from Amos. They divide the
sentence differently, thus: "She has fallen and will no
more—rise, virgin of Israel!"
What this midrash does is to suspend the original
question (and the other answer to that question) in order
to focus on the real problem: the catastrophe that has
befallen the Jews' relation with God. At the time these
rabbis wrote, Judea was an abject tributary of Rome.
Titus had destroyed the Temple in 70 CE and carried many
Jews off into slavery. A military revolt led by Simon
Bar Kokhba in 135 CE had also been crushed, dashing the
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Messianic expectations of his folio°r l wers. Ten of the most
prominent rabbis of Palestine h*n kd ad been tortured to deathby the P.omans. Jerusalem
, the capital ^^^ ^
.eolarea off-llffiits to Jews. The country as a whole
lost muoh of Us population, and the Jews for the second
time were dispersed ahma/i . • ±.ubroad, with no imminent prospects for
return. One Jewish sect, the Nazarenes or Christians, had
used these disasters as evidence that the relationship
between God and the Jewish people had come to an end, and
what they asserted, many others feared.
Against this background, consider what the Palestinian
sages did and did not do in their midrash on Amos 5:2.
They did not argue, as they might have, that Amos's words
only applied to the Babylonian Exile (586-510 BCE ) of which
he had been speaking. Nor did they read "will no more
rise" in a relative sense, as "not for a long time,"
although this too would have been possible. They chose not
to take "Israel" as the northern kingdom, differentiated
from Judah, though this reading would have at least miti-
gated the disaster. Above all, unlike their prophetic
forerunners, Isaiah and Jeremiah, they refused to rely on
God's omnipotence and God's capacity to annul prophecies
of doom out of divine love.
Any of these solutions, in order to reassure, would
have required from the people their full belief: not only
138
belief i„ the vallaity Qf the lnterpretaUon
crucian,, belief that what it ^^^^ ^ ^^
'
that God would never hide his f„0 *u n lace forever R„f. But of course,
tlu, f.xth was exactly what was lacking
. The^ Qf
Palestine chose instead a solution that reqUlred onl y the
willing suspension of disbelief «a o , or what Kadushin calls
" indeterminate belief wh-i^h ~i ic , on occasion, can harden and
become determinate 1,31 Th0 '
•
Th61r ^drash, though serious, is
at the same time darkly comic. It does not need to be
accepted, only repeated (as a good joke often is) over and
over, until it becomes mrf =part of a common culture which
laughs in the face of exil^ m~ x.ur e. Together with halakhah,
midrashic stories t?n^hne suc as these gave the Jews the strong
social cohesiveness they needed in nrrw ^ccu u o der to survive in a
world whose meaning they no longer understood.
It is the midrashic function of restoring meaning to
a chaotic world which we can find renewed when Marx does
theory.
VI
No one would mistake any writing of Karl Marx's for a
specimen of the literary genre midrash. 32 Marx is not
writing about Torah; he is commenting on philosophy and
political economy. His language is German, French, or
English, never Hebrew or Aramaic. He does not steer by
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the set of value-concepts Kadushin enumerates: he cares
little for God or Israel except as h.storical examples and
curiosit.es. True
,
he is passionate for play s-on-words
.
At the height of an argument, he often throws a pun at his
readers, such as his contents in ^oj^^ that the
Hegelian movement needed to bathe in a "river of fire«~in
German, a ^er-bach. These witticisms make Marx's
writings memorable, as clever midrashim do for rabbinic
texts. But nothing hangs on them. Marx's argument can go
on perfectly well without them.
There is more to Marx's theory than just his argument,
though. m his manner of doing theory, his activity or
practice of theorizing, we find Marx doing something we
might call midrashic. As we have remarked, before Marx
creates his own theory, he reads. His writing proceeds
from his reading as commentary. m his writing, further-
more, Marx gives an interpretation, or reading, of his
precursors and their texts, a peculiar kind of reading
which makes them say—or accuses them of neglecting to
say—something about the themes which seem important to
him (his own "value-concepts"). in the case of Hegel, he
systematically attacks and transforms the earlier writer's
theory at just those points where it ignores or disagrees
with his own sense of what is real. And that sense of
reality, as we learned in chapter 3, is very much tied to
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the worldview of the Jewish traditio^ ^ ^
midraSh
" °" HS9el in
* -nse: he counts on
particular bits of the Hegelian ^ order ^ h^
own points, and those points maKe the text signi flCant for
readers whose persnerH^rspective continues the concerns of the
Jewish tradition.
But then, we are faoed with a paradox. Marx rejects
Judaism and adopts philosophy and political economy, all
the while studying them as if they were, or should be,
Torah. He demands that they mean something for the story
about the world, humanity, and history suggested by his
Jewish sense of the rp^l t-f *-v,~ea . if they do not, he reinterprets
them so that they do. Here is a strange unconscious piety,
an unwillino reverence in the midst of secularity and
socialism. How can we account for this mixing of worlds,
which Marx neither announces nor explains?
In her discussion of modern thinkers influenced by
midrash, Handelman describes a tendency she calls "heretic
hermeneutics." 33 Writers who work in this mode can
simultaneously affirm their identities as moderns and as
Jews without completely submitting to either. This
Houdini-like maneuver involves a double displacement.
First, the writer leaves the world of Torah behind.
Attention shifts. For Freud, psychology, and for Bloom
would
- - rrida
, literary theory become ^ objects ^
investigation. lnto these new ^
heretics port the old d„ s
_ ^ ^^ ^
literature are treated i„ t.^., xn the words of Freud,
"as Holy
Writ»-i„ other words, as Torah. They are
_
^.anded, to be meaningful ^ tQ their tiniest
The modern critic interDrPt,r p e s them as a midrash-maker
do: to make them significant- ,' n +.-Lgmticant m terms s/he believes the
text and s/he must share.
With Marx, we cannot see the exegetical techniques,
but we can sense the gravitational pull that midrash exerts
in his writings.
.'For it is no empty thing from you":
Marx attaches himself to Hegel (and then to political
economy) because their tantalizing similarities to the
reality in which he believes and which he is struggling to
bring to life will not let him ignore them. He can never
fully accept them either; at best, he can note them in a
spirit of indeterminate belief. Eventually, he must
reorder everything, including his own first readings.
"Of course," Marx wrote in an afterword to Capital
,
"the method of presentation must differ in form from that
of inquiry." 34 we have already seen that the way Marx
presented one central feature of his theory, its relation
to that of Hegel, has obscured more than it has helped.
Without explaining midrash, Marx could not explain his
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own activity. Without recooni** *B cm zmathe demands his Jewish
hope to fi„a an audience that would share
concepts. Yet
, the Jewish terms in^ hig
hxs philosophy of writing make sense were foreign to
Marx's audience and to Marx himself. ln the next chapter
we win consider how this dilemma affects our reading of
'
Marx's overaii project, and we will asx how the aewish
theme of exile, retranslated by Marx's theory of alren-
atlon, may help us understand Marx better.
CHAPTER FIVE
ESTRANGEMENT IN A STRANGE LAND
Everything Marx ever wrote-philosophy
,
economics, pities ~takes aim at the problem Qf
0V6rCOming hl
—
ical circumstances which have forced
see of us to work for others, under their control and for
their profit, thus wasting our own creative powers and
losing the commodities we end up spawning, the raw materials
we might have used, and the wholeness of self and society
we need more than anything but survival itself: this is
Marx's theme and his goal as a theorist.
Alienation is the key-word of Marx's early writings,
but it appears over and over in Capital, too.1 And well it
might. For alienation and the transcending of alienation
both require, in Marx's own words, "very palpable, material
conditions," and it is to discover the details of those
conditions that Marx beains his economic researches at
all. 2
As crucial as alienation is to Marx, it has proved
equally troublesome to Marxists. First, they have had to
defend the term from social psychologists and other
researchers who would set it equal to "dissatisfaction." 3
This apparently value-neutral term in fact strips away
the whole theory of human needs which gives alienation
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T
mSaninq
- " Marxi sts , furthermore
, there are those
who woulc resist the languflge of aiienation
Preferr ing the more analyUcal
^
»ateriallsm
. Thelr choice weights ^^ ^^ ^
a deterministic readin g of Marx, which sits pOQrly^
Marx's Jewish emphasis on the rmportanoe of human action
A thrrd problem arises in humanist Marxism, which
casts the distortions of the self «and of social relations
produced by capitalism as mere objects of protest
exemplars of
..man's inhumanity to man" [sic]. At its most
basic, the humanist approach underestimates the power of
economic and institutional barriers to human freedom,
something Marx never did. 5
We should not be misled by this multiplicity of
partial readings. None of his followers have deserted
Marx's struggle against alienation completely. As
Alasdair Maclntyre acutely observes, "When a tradition is
in good order it is always partially constituted by an
argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to
that tradition its particular point and purpose." 6 Using
this standard, the debate about alienation may even be a
sign of Marxism's continuing good health. As long as the
place of alienation still matters to the participants, the
tradition goes on.
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Yet as Maclntyre also suqoem-Q
lose, ton h
9gStS
'
S°metlmes « argument
-Loses uc with what it ic .abOUt
'
and a tradition
"getsinterpreted and misinterpreted in *
. .
. ^
P S l terms of the pluralism
which threatens to submerge us all " 7 e
. _
9 311
•
Some readings ofMarx's theory of alienation do let us learnS more
> and some,
^ferently than others
. Faced^ ^ ^
ohoose among interpretations, we should ask: what version
^ UnderSt3nd the with which Marx con-
fronts alienation, For alienation is no abstract^
- Marx: it is more Ufce aR ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
feel that obsession as Marx did? SinCe otherwise, we
shall be hard put to say „e have understood it at all.
Where shall we searoh for an understanding of
alienation's profound influence on our lives according to
Marx's theory? Let us begin by ignoring the ongoina
debate on the subject, and let us continue by setting
aside for the moment Marx's own writings on alienation.
Marx did not provide us with the full context we needed to
understand his midrash on Hegel. We may also suspect that
when he writes about alienation, he is not pausing to
explain what he is doing. We shall have to imagine that
ourselves. So, let us approach alienation circuitously,
edging up to it from an entirely unexpected direction. We
will explore the meaning of alienation via a midrash on
the theme of exile.
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II
The text we are examining is the f irst line of the
boo, of Bereisnit, or Cenesrs. We are accustom to th e
translation which reads "m k
'
In the beginning God created the
heaven and the earth. Now the eart-h ,„ * ,n t was formless and
void ..."
The Torah, though, is written without vowels or
Punctuation; hence, many interesting possibilities occur.
An equally valid reading would have Genesis 1:1-2 say,
"When God began to create the heavens and the earth, the
earth became (havta) formelss and void." 8 Now, long ago,
in the 16th century CE, Rabbi Isaac Luria, called the Lion,
read the verse in just this manner. And here is the story
he told
dot nf
°n
'
G°d fUled infini ty. There was no
n?\hf ' n° instant of time, which was not part
rod , t
Vln
?' In °rdSr to create the world-becauseG was lonely-God had first to make room, to with-draw from infinity and to contract within himself.
So, the first thing created was the empty space, the
nothing, the "formless and void." into this absence,God emanated pure divine energy. it was like a river
of light pouring, liquid, into containers also made
of light.
But the freely flowing emanation could not containitself. The vessels shattered. The shards fell into
chaos. And the scraps of the broken vessels came to
encase the light they had held like scars over
wounds, or like thick, woody shells around nuts. 9
All that we now recognize as our world, said Luria
and his followers, is really the jumble that resulted from
the shattering of the vessels. The world is infinitely
precious-every bit contains sparks Qf ^ divine __but
3ust for that reason, it is direly in ^ Qf ^
Kabbalah 6XP— thi. extreme Urgency by stating
that when the primordial vessels shattered, at that same
moment God's imminent presence call** c>, ,v .
'
ed Shekhmah
, went into
exile. God's own self became divided.
The ShekMnah is exiled here with us in this reality
which is the only reality, but which is tragically unlike^
what it should be. We are called, the kabbalists would say,
to redeem the sparks of divine light by hallowing every
being. And they would preface every religious act-which,
given the task of hallowing the entire world, included
sitting down to a meal and putting on clothes-with the
declaration, "This is done for the sake of reuniting God
and His Shekhinah .
"
what has been fragmented will be made
whole; what had been exiled will return.
Like any good midrash, Rabbi Luria's picks up themes
from the traditional account and deepens them in unexpected
ways. The story of the shattering of the vessels makes
human action absolutely crucial in the universe. It
nderlines God's dependence on humanity, for not only do
determine the success or failure of divine purposes: we
t heal the divine being. God is constituted in relation
to us, and the predicament which imposes God's needs sets
us our task as well. Furthermore, that task concerns
u
we
mus
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sh
ce
itself with our day.to .day existence Md ^
details of material life
. A11 this is traditionai
_
^ ^
fits easily yith what was "told to Moses at Sinai."
Yet Luria's tale also revises traditional Jewi
thought in a drastic way. ln the Torah> „ The ^ ^ ^
to all who call upon Him " "m,. Thls instruction," God's voi
in the dialogue, is "in your mouth and in your heart, to do
it" (Exodus 30). we find no mention of God ' s purposes gone
awry, no indication that we need to know anything that
Preceded the world in order to hallow it. m the Torah,
creation is unfinished because it is ongoing; in the
Kabbalah, because it is broken off.
Thus, the exile of the Shekhinah is a catastrophic
event which disrupts cosmic purposes and which makes
reality ironic. it requires our unrelenting effort to
effect its reversal, to bring God's presence and ourselves
home from exile. Short of that return, the Kabbalah
suggests, we cannot know our true purposes, and we cannot
be whole. Return and the longing for return become the
content of life. In the absence of dialogue, the need to
restore dialogue establishes what it means in Judaism to
be a person.''" 0
I want to propose that Marx's theory of alienation
shares the basic movements of the story of exile and
return we find in Luria, and that the tensions in the
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idea of return parallel the tension,s surrounding Marx's
concept of revolution Takin t"> . g alienation truly into
IT'
we wm have to
-
-erstanding of Marx , s
-rote the Torah , s theme Qf
All these convergences win k«y Wl11 become more evident
thOUgh
, if we go back to examine other texts ^
in Torah eaeh recurrence o f a theme must fae read
" f° rWardS ^ 3 C~^ « every other episode wh.ch
it infers, we will discuss three bibUcai ^^^^ which>
though they pertain to events in Mstory ^ ^
exemp l ify the themes of exile and return." Next
, as .
kind of suction, we will do our own midrash on a verse
fro, a 20th oentury Jewish poet. Then and only then will
we be reedy to disouss Marx's theory of elienetion in the
framework of exile.
Ill
Luria's midrash tells us how exile affects God and the
cosmos; the story of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the
Garden of Eden shows how human beings suffer from it, too.
In order to learn that particular lesson, though, we need
first to set aside the Christian reading with which, since
John Milton, we are so familiar. That story speaks not of
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exile but of "Adam's fall " rt ^ e4. ,I postulates that the sin of
f0rbi
— — ~vealed the lnherent sin-
fulness of human nature, which man.fested itself again
directly in Adam and Eve's descent infl to sexuality from
their (assumed) previously spiritual plane.
Jewish readers have intpm™t„jterpreted the story differently.
in the midrash on Genesis 2-3, disobedience, not sexuality
is- the sin for whioh Adam and Eve are banished. Sexuality
IS recognized to be fraught with moral dangers, but it is
also a positive commandment:
"Be fruitful and multiply, and
replenish the earth" (Genesis 1-2R151 1-28). Moreover, at least
one midrashist claxms that the serpent found Eve alone
because Adam had "engaged in his natural functions (an
idiom for intercourse) and then fallen asleep." 12 clearly,
sexuality was not a consequence of the serpent's temptation.
Beyond that, Martin Ruber questions the notion that
sin (or "a decision between good and evil") is the topic of
the story at all. Instead, he points out, Adam and Eve
decide for the knowledge of good and evil—or, better,
knowledge through the categories of good and evil,
"adequate awareness of the opposites latent in creation." 13
Arthur Waskow goes on to wonder whether leaving Eden was
not a punishment but a necessary step toward maturity— less
like the shattering of the vessels and more like that
initial contraction by which (in Luria's story) God
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Prepared for the creation of the world 14xu
- This readinq
seems to contradict the text k *., but lt shows how far from
say, Milton's Eden the w ehJewis commentator feels free to goSince we are not compelled to read thei-eaa story of the
expulsion as a lesson about sexual itl y and original sin, we
are free to ask what we can learn tfrom it about the theme
of exile. Adam and Eve, we are ma
'
told
'
^re driven forth
from the Garden. This exil ^ +->-SXl e tran sformed their lives and
those of their deqrpn^nf,scenda ts, so much so that an ancel with a
flaming sword is a fit symbol for the impossibility of
their going on unchanged, we can ask the text a new
question, then, about the con^uences of the expulsion-
"How does exile affect human lives? What did Adam and Eve
lose when they left Eden behind?"
The Torah mentions four changes that confronted the
first couple when they departed the Garden. They became
ashamed before each other and before God. They had to work
hard and unrelentingly in order to survive. Even "in the
sweat of thy brow, •• they could never be sure of producing
what they needed to live; the earth from which they sprang
became the adversary. Finally, the sexual relation and the
act of giving birth became bound up with pain and travail.
All the activities in which human beings had engaged in
Eden as partners in creation, they now find themselves
doing under the whip of necessity. The most basic human
needs, food, i abor/ and x
'
Can onl y be met sometimes,
u"certainly
'
and in a
- ——— ity . s original
status as namers and tenders of the worid. Exile means f(
^ 3
-« ° f est ra„gement has fUtered in
to their diaiogue with Cod which affects hcth Cod and
human. it cannot be willed awavy, only struggled with and
gradually, painfully transcended.
But humanity decided to try for a shortcut. instead
of learning how to be human in order to become God's
Partners once again, they opted to become gods themselves
On the plain of Shinar, the tower went up, story after
story, an assault on the heavens. Building the Tower of
Babel was a truly monumental effort, spurred on by a fear
of equal proportion: "lest we be scattered abroad upon the
face of the whole earth" (Genesis 11:4). Ironically, by
their own actions, the builders provoked the fate they
feared. The Torah tells that God "did there confound the
language of all the earth." None of them could understand
each other. Their common purpose lost, they scattered.
Their exile was complete with the fragmenting of their
shared speech; after that, physical dispersal was all but
a foregone conclusion. The tower-builders had lost sight
of God's purposes in creating human beings who could act,
and so they lost, too, the ability to frame common human
purposes of any sort from Babel onwards.
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Hence it is the peopl£ Qf^ ^ ^
™anlty WhlCh ""^ ^— « repairing the
for most of the biblical story That. nation suffers exile
<0nCS
" MbliCal «—
>
with the successive
destructions of the Temple, f irst by the ^
not om y do the Jews become captives, uprooted from their
land; they also undergo the destruction of the lecal and
cultural institutions that had defined everyday Jewish life
Many of the 613 pitzvot, or commandments of the Torah
oould not be carried out anywhere but in the land of Zsrael
Others had no application in the climates and social
systems the exiles began to inhabit, while still others
made sense only as directives to a self-governing people.
With good reason, then, the Jews of the Diaspora
asked, "How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange
land?" Like Eve and Adam, they had all they could do to
keep themselves alive on alien and hostile soil. Like the
shocked crowd at Babel, they were forced to speak in new
languages, both metaphorically and literally, which blocked
the expression and even the memory of what they had been
working at before. And when they swore, "if i forget thee,
0 Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning," they
underscored the tacit truth that henceforth, Jerusalem
might only live as the capital of Jewish life in memory.
IV
Memory, and the language which nr.y n preserves it, havebecome matters of l ife and death Jews in exile. AsHarold Bloom writes »t0,^„
'
JeWry can su"^e without a JeWishlanguage.
.
.but not without l „
,
.
U lan9u^, not without an intense
obsessive concern that far- 4-vr transcends what we ordinarily
call literacy." 15 Gestures and ritual, v,s have the power to
stir something nameless within =, and sometimes to evoke an
unspoken meaning that, like a
,
HK tradition, gives people their
bearings for a little while. m exilP ^ uin e, though, what is
last to give way as the institutional foundations of iden-
tity crumble is language: for Jews, the discursive struc-
tures of dialogue. No matter what Jews know or accept of
their religion, when they address the demand to hallow the
world through material action guided by changing human
needs, they return to the situation which seems most real
to them and in which they feel most right to themselves.
Language helps create a meaningful world-or destroy
it. It follows that one aspect of exile is losing one's
own voice, having to use concepts that others recognize to
address problems that others deem significant in order to
say anything at all, even indirectly, about what concerns
one most. And one route to return would be to speak in a
voice one can claim as one's own" to tell the story of
one's estrangement, one's present needs, and one's
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stutter lng attempts to reshape the world into . home
. Tq
tell the story-and to attract an audience wMch fche
t6rmS
' ^ SmPathy ' ^ ab°- the good will to hear
As our final midrash on the theme ^ ^ ^t
us try to listen to someone trying to he heard, African
Jewish poet Charles Reznikoff writes:
How difficult for me is Hebrew-
even the words for mother, for 'bread fnrare foreign. How fa^e I bee^Hue^ B*.
" How difficult for me is Hebrew": this opening sen-
tence, to any present or former student, calls up a vision
which is instantly familiar. Someone is working hard at
learning a language without having any real aptitude for it.
Many know how that feels; we can shake our heads ruefully
and sympathize. But, this man is a Jew. The language he
is trying to learn is his own language. How can we
comprehend that?
For just a moment, imagine yourself suddenly forgetting
how to speak English. You have to express yourself now,
say, in German, in words that seem strange and disconnected,
in a grammar you learned out of a textbook. Not only do
you have to search for words when you try to talk with
other people; in your own mind, you hear yourself in an
alien tongue.
Can you feel that? The constant groping for vocabu-
lary, the unsureness that you've said what you meant to
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you
say or that what vou'vp «^yu e said made spnw +.u L . .ense, the biting scorn
°r ooneesce„dlng patience Qf ^^^ ^halfwit foreigner?
"Difficult „ „ Kttr , the poet says. Difficultis not the word for your condition.
"
But think, instead, that this ioss of yours did nothappen yesterday, but a long ^ ^ a ^ ^
as far back as you can remember You sro^ . y a e unaware that you
ever spoke another language. Only, there are these caps in
conversation where you know you want to say something hut
cannot figure out what, only that it is important. So
try anyway, hop.ng to reach someone with a piece of it, ]
hint, a spark. To your amazement, your neighbors hear only
what they expect to hear. The .old of their o„„„
understandings keeps casting your tentative, hopeful
'
messages back into the same distorted shape. Do you rage
at their obtuseness? Or blame yourself for this vague
something you cannot seem to say? This is a dimension of
exile: losing your own thoughts to a foreign language.
"Even the word for mother, for bread, for sun/are
foreign." why these words? Why not bigger, meatier words
like freedom, power
,
Spirit
,
or, for that matter, alien-
ation? The poet feels estranged precisely from the
everyday. If he knew his own language, through interpre-
tation the tiniest, most personal elements of his life
would become sources of meaning and chances for action.
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gn
problem
-cause the terms of his ^^^^ ^^^^ ^to h». the poet finds them „ difficult „..not ^ a Q i
» ™cult; but as a persQn
obstreperouS; Qbstr_
txonist, perversely resisting what u Qbvious ^
to be done, which i<; +-hothe hall°W">g of the everyday
everyone and everything, including ^ ^^
it cannot be done, Thls is the secQnd ^
exUe: when your own needs see, forergn, and the difficulty
of an integrated life confronts you l ike an enemy
.
The poet seeks his own language, his own needs, and
even his own land. "How far h^,o t kn r nave I been exiled, Zion"-
the hill country of Judea is the terrain of Jewish identity.
But exile is not a matter of geography alone. This thick-
witted Hebrew student could move to Jerusalem tomorrow-
and be worse off, not better. His problem, we read, is
not land but life. The State of Israel is not Zion: in
Zion, "the words for mother, for bread, for sun" would be
spoken in a living communal effort to discover how to do
that for which we are. No state we know can do that. No
country has ever been Zion.
Is this too paradoxical, the poet's longing to return
to a place he has never been? On the contrary. How can
his need be silent until it is fulfilled? zion is not an
abstraction. To him, it is no completely rational society
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now,
inhaMted
^ tW°^—ional figures. It is what he ^
perhaps, he is sometimes there: not in a hi „•m blinding flash,but in the sound of a still, small VQlce that wMspers tQhim what his words might mean. He is Can efl k „££ll d back.
. .andMs return becomes real, and he starts to Hve a real life
Following „arX . s poignar, phrase> he^ ^^ ^
poetry out of the future.
carried him. The familiar landmarks have ^ ^ ^
good trying to steer by them now. Fis pleas falln-Lfa i r i on; empty
air. He is suddenly a man alone, having trouble with his
language lessons; while, all around him float the shib-
boleths of a country which is inescapably, inexcusably
foreign. Being in exile, then, means trying to sing the
Lord's song in a strange land.
But this brings us to a fourth dimension of exile, one
that Reznikoff only hints at, so that we will need the
fine reading skills of midrash to discover it.
When the poet says, in the first line, "How difficult
for me is Hebrew," he is speaking soliloquy, a form which
heightens the sense of isolation his words express. By
the third line, however, he changes his mode of address.
He employs apostrophe, a figure in which the person
addressed is not literally there. "How far have I been
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—a,. hesays
,
„
zion„ Now
, what of it? isthere
anything here that adds to ^^^^^^ ^ exiiebeyond simply concluded that +-hoa the poet knows his trade?
"Zion." The apostrophe calls into mx l P!ay someone who isnot there even when there means "in ^S l the w°rds of the poem."
speaks to someone whose name the poet never utters
"Zion" cannot be the one meant to hear. zion is a
Place, a condition for the task, but not a partner ^ ^
The poet is reaching out metonymically to someone for
whom his difficulty matters t„ , v,y . To whom is the poet speaking?
When, throuqhout hi cj.rtr„ Tgn story, Jews haye found themselves
challenged by the need to integrate all aspects of their
lives and to dedicate them to the fulfilment of the world,
and when, so choosing and having been chosen, they asked
how they should begin to do so, they traditionally named
the one they questioned, God. The name, however, is
unimportant. what matters, to Judaism and to this Jewish
poet, is the act of questioning, which thrusts the
questioner into the middle of a relationship based on a
shared predicament.
This entering into dialogue is the beginning of an
exile's return. it is only a beginning—for the poet is
still a stranger in a strange land. But if the motion of
dialogue impels him to build the community he calls Zion,
it will enable him little by little to feel at home in the
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"0rld
- ^ dial°-Cal — —
-
a home for him
-cause it establ.shes the structure Qf geif( ^
world on which his identity depends.
V
:rom
The stories of exile we have just explored, f
Luria-s to Beznikoff,. plumb the meaning Qf^^
deeply than any definition can do. The text n* «,in of the Torah,
we remarked earlipr i <=ner, ls its own best summary. Just so
, the
stories which introduce us to the theme of exile also
provide our models of the condition. No description or
exposition can do as well, for none can be sure to repro-
duce in us the emotional response which is vital to knowing
exile from within. We were able, though, to detect certain
themes from the Torah narrative for their pertinence to our
present inquiry, and we can do the same with our stories of
exile. Let us carefully direct our attention to certain
more clearly universal features of exile, aspects we may
recognize once again in the lineaments of Marx's theory of
alienation
.
We can think of exile in two distinct but intrinsic-
ally related ways. Exile may be the burden of some
particular social group, or it may be the condition of a
whole society, affecting all its individual members.
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certain kinds of groups wUhin sQciety
_ ^^
expect to apply it in describina n,g the group of left-handed
People, nor redheads, Democrats, or Virginians. Exile
occurs only to groups which share m0 re exi stentiall y basic
situations, so that the defining characteristics of the
^oup also structure the selves of its meE1bers. Most
U*ely, a group ln exile will possess some shared
-
t.. k
,
the elaboration and continuous reinterpretation of
which is a central element in the constitution of the croup
Exile, then, affects people in relation to how their
identities depend on situations or purposes shared in
common within a group.
Again, we can stipulate that a group which finds
itself in exile (in the first sense) is never the dominant
force in society. One of the important ways in which exile
is manifested is in the relation of the exiles to the
dominant group and to the parameters of the self that group
maintains for the whole society. We might therefore
propose that some group X (e.g., the Jews) is in exile
with respect to society Y which it inhabits (e.g., 19th-
century Germany) as a result of some factor or factors Z
which have to do with the self created by its task or
situation, that task or situation not being constitutive
of society in general.
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It is already clear, both fm™
anal .
r°m
°ur Tories and our
rr
at even a profound
—
-
- -
,
e. what factor puts a non .dominant sQciai
partially constituted by a task or situation
„
, into the
exile state? Primarily it is thY S S 9rouP' s divergence from
ma" Stream
^ ^ ^ «-* members construct
rea
;
itY
- * * their task, tbey tacitly
77 C3teg0rieS ° f ™— -— « significancewhich others do not use or recognize.
The exiles themselves may be aware of the incongruity
°r they may not, and whether they are will nave little
bearing on whether their differ," a t mg sense of the real
becomes a problem for them. lf their group lives apart
interacting with the larger society mainly for instrumental
Purposes, then they can maintain their understanding of
self and reality with little strain. (The ghetto-dwelling
Jews of premodern Europe are an example.) 16 If
, however
,
the group lives in and among its neighbors, partakes of
their culture, and permits its members to pursue goals
extraneous to its existential task, and yet still forms
its members so they must respond to that task, then the
scene of a tragic conflict is set.
The members of such a group as we have been describing
(and modern Jews, I contend, are such a group) must know
the world and conduct their actions in society on the
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basis of two different senses of reality: that Qf ^
group ana that of their general oulture. Both are their
own. The individual identity is incomplete unless s/he
oan somehow manage to make sense of herself or himself as
a character in both stories. Yet a worlrf : v.- vc °rlo in which one is
called to do a certain task may differ from a world which
demands another direction to one's efforts. It is almost
certainly irreconcilable with a notion of the world which
gives people no purposes at all, only arbitrary and
contingent desires.
Now, the members of this group are in exile. They
lack an ontology which accepts all their concerns as real,
as well as a language adequate to express them. Conse-
quently, they cannot express their constitutive purposes
and needs, either to outsiders or to each other. They
have lost the shared context of meaning which makes
interpreting one's own experience possible. Therefore,
they are impeded from formulating their experience, even
to themselves.
The relation between the exiles and their neighbors is
not symmetrical. Most citizens of society possess a
language and an ontology sufficient to their needs. They
can make themselves understood by each other and by the
exiles, and in general they can know when they are making
sense: that is, when their statements and claims will be
taken seriously, with . good chance Qf
^
those rare occasions when other members of SQCiety do ^
make sense to the exiles, it is the exiles and *c i not society
who are deemed to have failed, in societv. „, j-u iety s judgment and
usually in their own.
For the exiles, the discursive norms of society are the
flawing sword barring their way. They can only enter the
garden of relaxed, routine discussion by leaving important
parts of themselves behind. And this continues to be true
as long as they are in any way part of the group, until they
have left their specific situation and task completely
behind
.
The exile which affects specific groups is not only a
malaise of discourse; it is the fingerprint of power. We
can see power at work in the silencing of the exiles about
their particular experience, the excluding of their
difference from what society counts as real, and the
producing of the exiles themselves as persons who must give
a rational explanation of themselves and cannot. Power
operates at the same time to estrange the exiles from
themselves, from each other, and from other human beings.
The social relations in which they seek fulfillment are
fraught with tensions, instead. Exile also extends into
the realm of politics as usual. The particular group which
is exiled cannot use the procedures of liberal democracy
to address its needs: first, because it cannot formulate
them; second, because many of them deal with what are
called "private" matters; third, because the language of
rights, interests, and utility cannot justify them; and
fourth, because by admitting themselves unable to fit the
narrow confines of the rational individual, the exiles
declare themselves unfit to participate in public life.
So far, we have spoken only of exile in the first
sense, as it affects particular social groups. We have
outlined it as a breakdown in the normal, equal relations
between members of those groups and society. Implicit in
that definition, though, is another understanding of exile
,
one which designates a condition which may affect the whole
of society.
Let us assume (as both Marx and the Jewish tradition
do) that humanity shares, not a common end, but a common
purpose. Let us further assume that pursuing this task
requires the active development of our human powers. Any
society which fails to embody this pursuit in its consti-
tution runs the risk of becoming an obstacle to human
development. It matters naught whether the purpose which
makes us human is defined as hallowing the world or as
realizing human powers, or as love, brotherhood/sisterhood,
community, or spiritual nobility. The individuals who
compose such a society will be hin.1 lndered m their pursuit of
any of these since they cannot rely on one another.
in some cases, a society which bears this second sort
of exile will lac, not only a purpose, but any notion of
common purpose or why such a shared pro D ect might be
worthwhile. if a group in exile of the first sort
inhabited a society of exile in the second meaning, the
estrangement of self, group, and social whole would have
reached its ultimate crazy peak.
VI
We can read Marx's theory of alienation as an attempt
to capture in words the plight of an exiled group in a
society without purpose: namely, the workers under capital-
ism. The reality of the proletariat, Marx argues, is
structured by its members' deep and abiding need for
creative work. This need is generated by the task Marx
believes all human beings are drawn to, but in which the
working class of all segments of society is most
frustrated: the realization of their human powers.
Workers, Marx contends, feel the pull of this aspect of
themselves as something tangible, and they suffer from
not being able to pursue it.
What constitutes the alienation of labor? First,
that the work is external to the worker, that it
is not part of his [ sicj nature; and that, conse-
quently, he does not fulfill himself in his work,
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but denies himself, has a feelinn nfthan well-being, does not develop TreTlTlV^physical and mental eneroies W il t Y - ?
exhausted and mentally debased?^
1
"
physically
The misery Marx describes is partly the result of
exploitation. m his famous chapter of Capital on "The
Working Day," he serves an indictment of capitalism for
laying waste the lives of the workers with long hours and
brutal conditions. 18 Primarily, though, we find Marx
attacking the evils of alienation itself: not the loss of
things, but the catastrophe of capitalism for human
relations. Alienated labor, writes Marx, disrupts the self
insofar as it prevents the workers from fulfilling their
task as species-beings, which is essential to whom they
are. By the same token, it takes away their common purpose
by denying it any social importance. As its end product,
too, alienated labor reproduces a class system and a mode
of production which allows no room and provides no
resources for the workers to develop in any direction
that does not boost profit and productivity. 19
If we say, then, that the working class is in exile
within capitalist society because their sense of the real
requires them to do what capitalism makes impossible, we
will have gone a long way toward showing why the tran-
scending of alienation is what Marx cares about most.
Interpreted as exile, alienation is more than an
injustice: it is a tragedy. It deprives the workers of
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the ability to make sense of their world. without that
ability, none of their powers matter.
But it is not only the workers who are alienated. m
The Holy Family
. Marx writes:
The propertied class and the cls^ of f upresent the same human se^aU^at^^K*""'former class finds in this sel f -»7 ; I^Z • 8
confirmation and its cood? iS^^fi"has init a semblance of human existence. 21
Within the capitalist scheme of things, the bourgeoisie
holds all the advantages. As Oilman comments, though,
these privileges "concern registering a higher score on a
scale which itself must be condemned." 22 The capitalists
are no more free than the workers to pursue their human
task. They, too, inhabit a world in which commodities and
money rule the uses of human energy, 23 and labor is
treated as a source of a mysterious good called "value"
instead of as an intrinsically human activity. 24 Workers
and capitalists both conduct their lives according to the
variations of the market, and its boom-and-bust cycle
(and not their own needs and powers) supplies the situation
to which they respond and which they search for meaning.
We can summarize this general craziness, this inversion
25
of human reality, by saying Marx portrays capitalism
as a society in exile. For people to become free, that
exile must be ended.
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Heading alienation as an analogue to exUe> „^
stand why it is Marx , s Qverriding ^^^^ we
to appreciate the cruel irony aUenation infiiota ^ ^
accordinq to Mary t?v!i« ix. Exile takes the challenge of hallowing
the world in dialogue-which already deraands our every
effort-and adds to it the agonies of distance, cnanginc
the joys of partnership i„ creation to the numbinq struggle
of existence. Likewise, alienation distances us from our
own powers and our own nepdq ™ ie s. it makes our immediate sense
of what to do unreliable; our apperception of the real,
ambivalent; and our basis for D oint action,
unpredictable. Neither exile nor alienation stifle the
call that moves us to realize our task. Both, however,
muffle its volume and baffle our attempts to respond.
If that is so, however, then Marx finds himself in a
very serious dilemma as a theorist. On the view of Marx's
ontology we took in chapter 3, he should strive with his
theory to bring his neighbors back to an awareness of
their still unmet needs. He should explain how the social
structures under which they are laboring have limited their
humanity and stultified their consciousness, and he should
move them to revolutionize the mode of production in all
its social ramifications. 26
The theory of alienation, though, suggests that
people's acceptance of their "particular situation" in
171
•^e present enslaved „rld . is not . ^ ^ ^
of-lng
. capitallsm £hapes^ beings; ^ ^
us so stupid.- but it makes us, nevertheless. Marxis
1,111
^ reSPMd t0 hiS to shape a more huma „ world
They will deny that the world can be human
, for that is
what it means to be alienated.
To have the effect Marx hoped for, his theory would
have to find an audience which believed in the continuing
force of unmet human needs, which took the answering of
these needs as an imperative, and which refused to accept
spiritual solutions as real satisfaction. He would have to
reach people who could balance the pressing demands of the
present capitalist system with their allegiance to an
absent but humanly necessary order. Marx's theory requires
adherents who can mount a revolution (because they must)
,
then strive together to accomplish tasks about the neces-
sity of which they maintain a sense of humor, in a spirit
of indeterminate belief. To become fully human, he must
rely on people who can be more human that their society
permits
.
^erhaps--just perhaps—we could fulfill Marx's project
if we knew our situation was exile. Perhaps if we longed
to return, we could. But no one in Marx's society lived
life every day as a story of exil Px ui e and return. Marx
himself did not. He only wrote as if he did.
CONCLUSION
POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EXILE
it becomes conscious^ it l^wi^T" ±f °^it is not a matter of havT™ transpire thatbetween past and future bu? ofT** dividi^ linethoughts of the past f carrying out the
that mankind beg?n no S^^1 WU1 Aspireaccomplishes its old worf: consciously
—Karl Marx 1
At the beginning of this pc,<= = ,,y n essay we set out to explore
the relation between Marx's Jewishness and the structures
of his political theory. Marx's philosophy of writing,
with its invitation to find meaning in the gaps of his
written work, gave us our provisional charter. We asked,
"What Jewish patterns of thought reappear to us in the
movement of Marx's theory? How would Marx make more
sense—or a different, more interesting sense-if we read
him as a writer in the Jewish tradition?"
Now, we can summarize what we have found.
Reading through and beyond what Marx actually wrote,
we discover that Jewish patterns of thought do offer an
intriguing perspective on Marx's project. Biblical
ontology, for instance, helps bring out the distinctive
features of Marx's sense of the real, which we find not so
much in his political and economic doctrines as in his
presumptions about the world, the thinker, and the
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relation between the,. Like the Torah
, ^ ^ ^
conceive of reality as that which merely is
. Nor does he
locate human excellence in seeing reality as it is, in its
essence. Instead, he outlines a theory in which human
beings help to constitute the world through their actions
Moreover, in Marx's theory, people act to appropriate the
world out of a sense of need which previous human actions
have helped create and which will continue to evolve
throughout history. This dialectic of needs insures that
reality (human, social reality) will continue to change,
too. Therefore, no thinker can stand outside the currents
of history and declare the truth, once and for all. m
order to interpret the world, the philosopher must con-
tribute to changing it.
Marx thus consciously distances himself from his
perception of the classical Greek thinkers, and of most
modern theorists as well. By the same token, but without
the same degree of awareness, he approaches the standpoint
of the Jewish tradition. True, his ontology removes God
from the universe, repositioning all needs and all powers
within species homo sapiens, as the Torah does not. But
an important effect of his doing so is to free human
beings from the "God's-eye viewpoint" which looks past
material oppression to find purely spiritual solutions.
In his stress on the indispensability of action, Marx
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echoes the Jewi sh motifs of pa^^^hip^creati^ and
^i22H£. He takes the Operatives of the aewish situation
as they resound in Tnrsh = *.o a and transposes them into those of
the species.
This insistent introduction of Jewish themes appears
to us again when we examine closely how Marx treats Hegel.
No simple inversion model explains what Marx does to the
Hegelian dialectic He rhali 0n„QP
•
cn lenges, corrects, and revises
it at all the key points where it departs from the Jewish
understanding of reality. it is just as if Marx were
holding Hegel responsible for addressing Jewish concerns,
a responsibility he never explicitly takes on himself.
Studying the rabbinical mode of textual interpretation
called midrash, though, we can form a better idea of what
Marx is doing here. Like a midrashist, Marx reading Hegel
excerpts particular passages and points on which to
comment. He tries to make the earlier writer speak to his
current preoccupations (his "value-concepts," as Kadushin
would say)
.
Marx interprets as if his text must neces-
sarily have meaning for him and his particular questions.
The rabbis, who assumed the divinity of their text, did
the same. Furthermore, we see Marx at work breathing new
life into Hegel through his reinterpretation
,
making
Hegel's texts a necessary corridor to reach his own. As
Lenin wrote in 1914:
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It is impossible completph; +-«
giPital, and especially ill f?
""de"tand ««x
'
s
having thoroughly studied ,ni ^ chapters, without
f Hegel's Logic! Conseouently^lf^ ^ Wh0lelater none oTThe Marxist's unalrstooa MarxT^
indeed, understanding Marx must have been a nightmare
for his oolleagues and contemporaries. Our findings
suggest that to appreciate what Marx was doing, Marx's
readers would have to employ Hegelian dialectics, biblical
ontology, and midrashic ingenuity, all at once. Compared
to the classics of Western thought, all Marx's writings
(and not just the Grundrisse, as Martin Nicolaus claims)
are "altogether unique and in every sense strange
product! s] of the intellect, and must have appeared like
reflections of some man from a distant planet." 3 Yet
Marx labored over these writings, and he clearly meant them
to be read. Hence, we confront the paradox of a man
striving energetically to communicate with an audience that
is nowhere at hand.
Once more, it is the Jewish tradition which hints at
the possibility of such an estrangement. The theme of
exile portrays the breakdown of meaning between self,
situation, and other that recurrently plagues a group of
people which is partially constituted by a compelling
purpose. When changes in the world they inhabit make the
tasks belonging to such a group impossible to fulfill, its
members suffer. They are injured in their identity, in
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and in
their claim to social resources that they need
their ability to participate in everyday social life
freely and as whole selves. Most poignantly, though, the
notion of exile imp lies that members of such a group will
find them selves dispossessed of the language they need in
order to formulate and c0mmunicate their predicament. They
are psychically isolated, as well as ,nn1»n a
•
n socially disempowered.
The theme of exile immediately alerts us to some
important aspects of Marx's theory of alienation, aspects
not often discussed. Alienation means more than the brute
exploitation of the workers, and certainly more than dis-
satisfaction with one's work. Alienation is a disaster to
the self and the species because, according to Marx, part
of what makes us human is being caught up in a web of
intrinsic relations to the world and to each other.
Because of alienation, the strands of this web are severed.
Alienation is not the opposite of possession, there-
fore; nor of power, at least in its sense as "domination."
Rather, alienation is the opposite of dialogue. It
derails the dialectic of human need so that we mistakenly
pursue what will injure us, so that we choose death
instead of life. The model of exile illuminates these
most tragic traits of alienation. The model of return
suggests that revolution, Marx's remedy for alienation,
works to restore the unimpeded exchange between human
178
beings and their needs- nnt, o an end to history, but a
renewal
.
In capitalist society, all hun^n1 ma beings are in exile,
but the working class suffers it most a1 OS
* As a group, though,
they do have the power to rise up and alter t-wp etna heir condition,
Karl Marx, too, seems to suffer exile as his personal fate,
Yet up until now he has apparently been powerless to achieve
the conditions of his repatriation.
We have found that reading Marx through the prism of
the Jewish tradition makes us aware of certain underlying
dynamics in his work, patterns and problems which crop up
again and again. Marx alludes to this texturing of his
thought, but he never reflects on it: that is left for us,
his readers. Consider, though, what kind of reader he
needs. First, Marx requires us to be familiar with the
Western tradition of political thought. His theory could
not exist without the writings of the philosophical canon:
he constructs his whole project of research and exposition
in reference to them.
Much of what Marx has to day, however, he conveys by
how he diverges from previous writers, explicitly or
implicitly. To understand Marx, it is not enough to read
his statements about this topic or that. It is not even
enough to compare them side by side with the propositions
that other thinkers have put forth. We have to measure
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the specific differenoe „hlch aetemines ^^
tions he performs on the text he reads.
The reader Marx recuires, then, must he ahle to imagine
theory as theory, as a kind Qf ^
S/he must also be motivate <-„° vated to ask questions about Marx's
Practice in the belief that the answers will teach us all
something significant: that is, something which bears more
than an arbitrary connection to what Marx wrote and which
addresses the present needs and difficulties of those who
are now reading him.
Besides a grounding in Western philosophy and an
interest in the practice of doing theory, Marx's reader
would also do well to know something about Jewish thought.
It is not impossible that one could trace the trajectory of
Marx's revision of Hegel, for instance, and work it backward
until one came up with approximately the structures of
Jewish thought we used to interpret Marx with—but is it
believable? Generally, we do not think to ask how
philosophers depart from the Greco-Christian tradition in
political thought, because they do not. Our task instead
is to locate them within the flows and eddies of that
tradition
.
If a reader were familiar with Jewish thinking, though,
as well as Western philosophy, and were accustomed to
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ght sense attit
--
- «~ative move£ thatseemed f am- i i ar. ^ ^ai.r i from another place q/v^ • uP C
'
s / he might even beainto wonder about Marx and his personal Tp „Jewish question
But we have done this kinrflnd
° f dicing and wondering
ourselves: at the very beginning of this essav h-3 in y, w en we
explored Marx's declaration »t »»,
"° Marxist
-" The playful
explanatron at which we arrived-that Marx's theory is left
reCOPiZe
^
3
°
f
"1 through the body of
this work, we have been el aborating on ^ ^ Qf
tatron. We used our initial oonoeption of how Marx writes
to make sense of his key theoretioal demarches against the
Greeks, Bauer, and Hegel, we laid out his ontology to
deepen our understanding of the direction he is takina
More than the doctrines he enunciates, we wrestled with the
problems he tackles, central among them the struggle to
make what is important to him important to his readers.
In short, we have done what we argued Marx requires
his readers to do
:
a midrash cn the interference between
the Greco-Christian political tradition which Marx addresses
and the Jewish tradition which helps construct his message.
We established the context which gives the Jewish question
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a^t Marx its meaning
. rn ^ ^^ ^^Marx from exile.
" exile is the name of the SQcial ^
separates Marx f rom his potential audience, what are the
soc.al forces which sustain it? why is it difficult for us
to read Marx as we conclude he needs to he read? It would
be presu.ptuous to try to answer the question fully, here:
that calls for an investigation all its own. There are two
factors, though, that any answer would have to take into
account
.
The first is the persistence of antisemitism in modern
political thought: not virulent Jew-hatred, but the genteel
and generally quite unconscious assumption that nothing
about Jews or Jewishness matters. We saw this assumption
at work in mainstream interpretations of "On the Jewish
Question," and we saw there how it obscured Marx's point.
When Marx wrote, of course, this assumption was quite
explicit and only barely detached from its theological
moorings. Furthermore, Marx shared many of the anti-Jewish
and antisemitic prejudices of his day. in order to develop
his critique of "Christian" politics, he had to invent an
"everyday Judaism" from which religion was methodologically
excluded, and then proceed by negation. It follows that
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nis own work inuu l the way we have.
But even in recent times most co^entators nave notbeen prepared to as, the Jewish question about Mar,
-ssibly
, thls inabUity refiects ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^
Sunaay-sohooi Xessons that God hro.e off with the Jews to
ooiieot a new Xsraei through the christian churoh. Possibl .
though
,
the theorists. negieot represents their ae.ocratie
_
and not their Christian, faith. As Jean Paul Sartre writes:
The democrat, like the scientist f ai 1 c <particular case- t-n him 7 • , 7?' t ls to use the
an ense.b e ;n e l
[
t l3
Clthe individual is only
his defense of thP iff
rait
J.
It follows that
and annihila^es^L^: Tel** nTs deT^ 95 Windividuals that thev exilt 'in f efe? se 15 to Persuade
"There are no Jew / h hV S°hted state •Question. " This Ln! fh J u 8re 15 no Jewi sh
Jew from his rP il * ^ ^ Wants to separate theuc i n el gion, from his family from hie
sr^s^jss.f- soiit-y partic?: ssr-s-
Sartre's shrewd observation leads on to the second
reason we find it difficult to do midrash on Marx's
Jewishness: the definitions of self, knowledge, and freedom
which have marked off the modern age and which have set
their imprint on liberal notions of democracy. Before
modern times, as Charles Taylor points out, to be in touch
1th one's true self, one sought to find one's place in a
aningful cosmic order using one's God-given powers of
reason. The intellectuals of the 17th century Enlighten-
ment more or less reversed this conception. They put forth
w
me
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back from the world
, refusing to outside
for Meaning, and observing the physical and social univer
1,1 3 dStached
-
objective way in order to gain mast
both. 5
se
ery over
This deliberate setting of boundaries between the self
and the outside world ushered in what we have come to know
as the modern age
.
Certainly, not everyone has completely
aooepted what Taylor calls "the self
-defining subject/'
even in theory, but no one today can entirely escape its
influence: it is our tacit understanding of what it means
to be a person. Thinking of ourselves this way, though,
prevents us from understanding any theory which finds a
meaning to human life anywhere but in the arbitrary
impulses of the individual. We have committed ourselves as
moderns to the idea that there is not and cannot ever be a
meaning which human beinas did not wholly create.
The modern view of the person as a self
-defining
subject insures that when we do run into purposes larger
than ourselves, we are most likely to regard them as
threats to our freedom. Freedom, in the modern world,
consists first and foremost of the rejection of anything
vaguely resembling a meaningful order which could impose
claims on us. This defensive stance, moreover, sets
certain unspoken limits on what can count as knowledge in
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m°dernity
-
Kn°— is "f the world, by the knowgr ^
» universaUy applicable and communicable ^ ^ ^ ^kn°Wr ' S SitUati
°"— • P- o f how s/he knows
,then i„ ^dernity we regard ^ ^
tainted, biased, irrational.
Against this background, how to do a midrasbic
readinq of Marx"? -;^4-x. to interpret Marx as we have done is to
place him within a mntpvtcontex of meaning which goes on beyond
the individual: not a cosmic order, but an interactive
structure resembling it closely enough tQ ^ Qff^
bells in the modern mind. If „arx raakes sense ^ ^
light of a certain tradition, then by modern standards he
is not free, and how shall we learn about freedom? Further
more, on our account, Marx calls us to pay attention to
human need, a product of our evolving sense of what it is
to be human. Surely, this call infringes on the right of
every subject to define his or her needs autonomously.
On top of all this, our midrash blends Marx's situ-
ation with his theory and our own with our understanding
of it. Unless we are familiar with Jewish thought and
not troubled by the question of what it is to do theory,
chances are we would never arrive at a reading like this
one. Does that not show we are reading into Marx what we
want to hear, projecting what we want to see? How can we
call the outcome of such an inquiry "knowledge"?
185
If we can do so, Z submit, the^ ^ ^
^ ^ be9innlnS ^ l0SS itS -iP °n our senses of reality
Possibly lt had never fuUy triumphed; pQssibiy ^
notrons of self, freedom
, and kno^ ^^^
as disciplinary ideas, never fully achieved in practice
in any event, two movements, one theoretical and one
primarily social, have eroded them in the twentieth
century. The first is the deconstruction Qf ^
When Freud traced our patterns of thought and behavior back
to their oriains in early childhood, and when Nietzsche
analyzed the irrational basis of our values and the covert
influence of the will to power on our senses of the real,
they raised doubts from which the modern self has never
recovered
.
The women's movement, meanwhile, has heightened our
awareness of difference, making it clear that being a
particular person is not less than being a sel f
-defining
subject, but more. The strain of feminism known as
"identity politics" has sought within each person's
reference as a White woman, a Black woman, a Jewish woman,
a Christian woman, to find authentic ways of understanding
the world and acting in it. 6
Many contemporary students of politics remain com-
mitted to modernity. They take notice of the fading of
the modern subject only to deplore it. Those who find
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now revive
these develops encoding, however, mu£t
the aUestion asKed by another interpreter Qf^^ &
- be ao„e ? - In the late part of ^ twentiefch ^^^^
that guery resolves itself into the Jewls h guestion of „„
times. In „arx . s Ger[panY; the jewish questi^ conceraed ^
People unfitted to be free, whose existence helped give
^ 3 ^ the°ry ° f— ipation. Today, it means,
" How may ,,e all become free, excluding none of us ? How may
we liberate our whole selves, ceasing to reject the parts
of our humanity which are neither rational, autonomous,
polite, orderly, or eternal?"
In the first place, as political theorists, we can
become better readers. The midrashic mode we have used
with Marx fits his writings well, but we cannot transpose
it into Mill, or Arendt, or de Beauvoir, and expect the
same results. That does not mean, though, that we have to
go back to asking solely after the intentions of the
author, or constructing and deconstructing texts in a
vacuum. With each thinker, we can ask if he or she is
somehow in exile, how that condition is maintained, and to
what promised land he or she is trying to return..
This way of talking about exile expands its meaning
somewhat. It includes groups which face a common situa-
tion that restricts their development of their human
powers, whether or not they are constituted by a task
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which exile frustrates. We can r.noec gnize such groups by
the conditions of their social being ^^^
tions on their discourse
. when we reaa a ^^^^
renects the situation of berng a Jew.
. woman
, etc ., we
oan re-reaa their theory as a response to that situation
and see how that affeots our understanding of what they
have said. Just as i.portant, though: we oan ask how the
effect of their theoretioai „ves is to allow then,, as a
Jew or a ,oMn
,
to enter polities as more nearly whole
persons, and we can seek successful strategies to repeat.
Not just how we read but whom we read can make a
difference. when we went searching for a Jewish conception
of reality, we did not find it in philosophy but in Torah.
In order to understand what oppresses and what liberates,
we will need tc explore fiction, drama, and poetry, listen
to songs and street conversations. We will have to pay
attention to the self-understandings of people who do not
often speak for themselves in academic circles: working-
class people, Jews, Blacks, women, gay men and lesbians,
and an immense cast of characters classroom teaching of
theory usually leaves waiting in the wings. We need not
abandon the classics, only recognize that, however
brilliant, this handful of men represents only a fraction
of the experience of being human. The logic of other
lives may be as different from theorists' notions of
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?e can
SUbjeCti' ity 35 m""Sh is ^ema! critioue
. W(
Put our theoretical skills to use to ^
logics instead of to disqualify the™.
.
What all this. suggests and what, ultima tel y , we can
learn from Marx, is that political theory in „ „n , m order to help
us all become free, should mGve in the direction of
dialogue. Theorists know how to speak; we mUst learn how
to listen. we can write for each other, but the real
challenge is to make our ideas accessible to others who
oo not share our experience in reading theory. Anyone can
tell people how the world is, and anyone else can disagree
but our real challenge lies in exploring our various worlds
together. To coin a phrase, theory is too important to be
only for theorists. It must give way as a professional
activity to make room for theorizing as a social practice,
the property of all.
Of course, as Marx would never let us forget, no
amount of "shoulds" and "musts" can change the reality of
our working conditions as academics. If we seek to create
dialogue in the larger polity, we will need to change the
material conditions we immediately face. Few of us, no
matter how dedicated, would lose their livelihoods for
political ends, too few to make a difference. How to
change the academy in order to be able to interpret the
world: that is one humble place for dialogue to begin.
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Let us return to the words of Charles Reznikoff one
last time:
oreign. How far have I beiTTiJiled, zT^n
.
When we take up those difficult words, when we speak
of families and peoples, nourishment and survival, power
and joy in one breath, our political discourse will beg in
to return us from exile.
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p. 112°'
JSrUSalem Talmud Peah 17:1, cited in Yerushalmi,
21 This section is based on Handelman, pp 51-76Aristotle's logic of categories continues to influence*
t~ °ri i
of fading and writing: for a textbook example,
W W M^^ 5 K^ Smth ' Styles and Structures (New York:. . Norton and Co., 1974)
, pp . 184-86 .
22. Babylonian Talmud Eruvin 13b, cited in Handelman,p. JO . '
23. See the remarkable story of how the rabbis ignored
a divine intruder in Babylonian Talmud Baba Metzia 59a-b
cited in Handelman, pp. 40-41. See also Pesahim 119a.
24. Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 63a, cited in Handelman
p. 55 .
25. Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind
,
2nd ed. (New York:
Blaisdell Publishing Co.
,
1965)
.
26. Ibid.
, p. . 78.
27. Ibid., p. 134.
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28. Ibid., p. 133.
Prooft^tsTn^^'-^^^^^^ions to Midrash,"
p _ 37
30. Babylonian Talmud Pesahim 6b, cited in Handelman,
31. Kadushin, p.
rathefthln'an activltv™
° f
?i2-"h " a literary form
Literary Genre Midrib" 1*f'™ G " Wri9ht ' "The
(1966)
y
pg? lOS-H, 4j-
^tholie BlbTica] n,,.^,., 28
referencefrfthTin^. 137
-40
'
174 " 78
'
and See the
°th"
3". Marx, Capital
, volume I, p. 19.
CHAPTER 5
^ ,
1
'
S® e the dis=ussion in Meszaros, pp. 217-27 andthe irst of references in Oilman, p. 304, ^ote 1 on 'chapter
2. See note 68 on chapter 1, supra .
3. E.g.
,
Kenneth Keniston, Young Radicals (New York
•
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
4. See G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: ADefence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
....
5
-
For example, see Erich Fromm
' s introduction to the1844 manuscripts in Marx's Concept of Man (New York:
1963) .
6. Alasdair C. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in
Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981)
, p. 206 .
7. Ibid., p. 210.
8. See our earlier discussion of hayah
,
p. 57 supra.
9. This is a paraphrase of the general strokes of
Luria's doctrine. It can be found described in more
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SSiy:SK ££S& SS^Sf^^,,
one side Many ?ess rrad^o"? ^T^™ °* fining on
other hand a„ f f traditi nal religious Jews, on the
?hefr 1° r^tr'naxi^!
16
" * ° f
Mi^ =^'„ I , d0 n0t inclu<3e the Exodus story. Unlike
Books 198 5rVd Siiod^an^evo^^ion (Lw York: Basic
were to adopt the story of the going out of Eavot «i I» 1 ^Uld Stil1 diSagrSe ^"Izer^s InTi-ra^ical
exile mav J£
°aS
?'
Sl *V6ry is not exile (althoughy be slavery). what we have to contend wi +-h inmodern societies is far more difficult t^ecSgn^e tSnovert oppression, and stories of exile win aid is tounderstand our plight.
12. Bereishit Rabbah 3:1.
13. Martin Buber, On the Bible, ed
. Nahum N Glai-7er(New York: Schocken BookT7 l982 ) , p . 18.
tz
14. Waskow, pp. 47-48.
15. Harold Bloom, Agon: Towa rd a Theory ofRevisionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982),
P J J. .
16. See Jacob Katz
,
Exclusiveness and Tolerance (NewYork: Schocken Books, 196TTT " ~
17
• 1 844 Manuscripts
,
in Bottomore, pp. 124-25.
18. Capital
,
v. 1, pp. 231-302.
19
• 1844 Manuscripts
,
in Bottomore, pp. 121-2 9.
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20. The idea that maintaininq one's idpnti-t-^
worldview are interests of ecual importance So the economicones is expounded by Karl Mannheim, ideology and Utopiatrans. Louis wirth and Edward ShillsTNew Yor HaSBrace and Co., 1936). arcourt,
21. Cited in Oilman, p. 304n.
22. Ibid., p. 156.
23. See Marx's discussion of the "fetishism ofcommodities" in Capital
,
v. 1, pp. 71-83.
24. See Oilman, pp. 174-86.
25. Seigel discusses the theme of the inverted worldin Hegel and Marx, pp. 32-37.
26. See p. 100, supra
.
CONCLUSION
1. Marx to Ruge (1843), in Tucker, p. 15.
2. Cited in Oilman, p. 35.
3. Grundrisse (Nicolaus), pp. 61-62.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, Antisemite and Jew, trans.
George J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books7~T948)
, pp.56-57. I do not endorse Sartre's broader theory of
antisemitism, however.
5. Taylor, pp. 3-11.
6. See Combahee River Collective, "A Black Feminist
Statement," in This Bridge Called My Back
, ed. Cherrie
Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, 2nd ed . (New York: Kitchen
Table Press, 1983), pp. 210-18, and Elly Bulkin, Barbara
Smith, and Minnie Bruce Pratt, Yours in Struggle (New York:
Long Haul Press, 1984) .
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